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

Susan Jane Ellis

AN EVALUATION OF SHELTER PROJECTS AND POLICIES FOR REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS WITHIN THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA

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A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Design and Technology, University of Luton, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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ABSTRACT

The subject of this thesis is the provision of shelter for refugees and displaced persons in a war-torn, developed nation with a cold climate. It aims to develop a set of working recommendations that can be utilised by implementing agencies in the field to provide improved shelter response. The recommendations are not provided to be universally applicable or as a definitive document, but as a 'stepping stone' on the path towards improved shelter response in similar situations, such as the current crisis in the Caucasus countries. The recommendations are a practical application of the academic evaluation of shelter contained within this thesis. This research was carried out using literature reviews, periods of field study and constant peer review. It was driven by the following question:

> How can emergency shelter be provided in a way that supports the innate coping mechanisms of refugees from, and persons displaced by intrastate war in a developed nation, whilst addressing the social, political and economic constraints and concerns of the humanitarian community, the host community and the host government?

This research question directed the evaluation and analysis of a complete range of shelter solutions in use in the Republic of Croatia. A framework of issues surrounding shelter provision in war was developed from the review of the literature covering firstly, humanitarian action in natural disasters and refugee situations and secondly, wars. The framework is divided into two central discourses which were identified from the literature:

- Vulnerability and capacity
- Integration

The framework of issues was used to conduct a comprehensive and critical evaluation of a range of shelter types from camps to private accommodations within Croatia. Through evaluating the shelter in an holistic manner, from the perspectives of the user, the provider and the facilitator, enabling and disabling policies and practices were identified. Through the subsequent agglomeration of good practice and enabling interventions, a set of working recommendations have been developed that advocate the concept of shelter as a mechanism for supporting innate capacity and promoting long term recovery and development.

For my Mother and Father...

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Lynellyn Long begins her story of *Ban Vinai* by stating that a book is a social construct — over the past three years I have discovered that a thesis too is the product of many influences, which I would like to acknowledge here.

I am very grateful to the Faculty of Design and Technology, firstly for giving me the chance to conduct my research and secondly, for all the financial support they have given over the past three years, without which this study would have proved impossible.

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Thanks must also go to Martyn Baker, director of studies for this thesis, for giving me the freedom to pursue my own investigations. I would also like to thank my external and internal supervisors — Gordon Browne and Stephen Fallows, for all their advice and for wading through the drafts of every chapter. Roger Harvey has also provided much support, guidance and encouragement over the past three years and his wisdom has been gratefully received.

Finally, I would like to thank both Colin Blackburn for his unfailing friendship, patience in the face of adversity and invaluable computing genius, and my mother and father, without whose unending support and encouragement I would not have made it this far.

AUTHOR'S DECLARATION

I declare that this thesis is my own unaided work. It is being submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of Luton. It has not been submitted before for any degree or examination in any other University.

Susan Ellis

Thursday 24 May 1996

GLOSSARY OF COMMON TERMS

A common understanding of the usage of key words and phrases is essential to all reviewing the following thesis. To develop a platform of shared understanding, the subsequent definitions are supplied:

displaced person is any person who owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted has fled their home but has remained within the borders of the country of their nationality

house is any structure within which people dwell

home is the place felt to be the habitual dwelling place of a family with all the consequent emotional associations

humanitarian community covers all those involved in the provision of humanitarian aid and includes: bilateral and multilateral donors, international non-governmental organisations (NGOs), international governmental organisations (IGOs), foreign military forces, national (host) government, national NGOs and national military forces.

international community includes only those 'non-nationals' providing humanitarian aid: bilateral and multilateral donors, IGOs, international NGOs and foreign military forces.

refugee is any person who owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, or political opinion, is outside the country of their nationality

shelter is the superstructure of different shape, size, type and material erected to provide lodging and protection from the elements in times of distress or persecution. (Definition adapted from the United Nations Conference on Human Settlements, 1976)

ABBREVIATIONS

CRC	Croatian Red Cross
DRC	Danish Red Cross
EC	European Community
FRY	Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
GTZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit
HDZ	Croatian Democratic Party
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IFRC	International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent
IGO	Inter-governmental Organisation
IOM	International Office of Migration
IRC	International Rescue Committee
JNA	Yugoslav People's Army
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
ODA	British Overseas Development Association
ODPR	Croatian Government Office for Displaced Persons and Refugees
SPLA	Sudan People's Liberation Army
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNPA	United Nations Protected Area
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force

CHAPTER ONE: PRELUDE

1.1 THE RESEARCH DEFINED

The subject of this thesis is the provision of shelter for refugees and displaced persons in a war-torn, developed nation with a cold climate. An initial examination of the subject and related fields suggests three primary reasons for the study.

- Current praxis for organised shelter is both debilitating and detrimental to the long term recovery and development of the refugees and displaced persons it accommodates.

- Fifty years after World War Two, the humanitarian community is no longer solely operational in developing nations with tropical or semi-tropical climates, but has found itself acting once again in developed nations with cold climates.

- There is a paucity of research on shelter for refugees from, and persons displaced by war. The resulting lack of understanding of the extreme environment of war creates complexity for the humanitarian community acting within it.

1.1.1 **Current Praxis for Organised Shelter**

The author believes, that it is of crucial importance to see shelter as more than a technical issue concerned only with materials, dimensions, densities and ease of construction. The provision of shelter is not purely a technical problem, but one that is intrinsically linked with social issues. Shelter needs to be understood as an enabling intervention rather than merely four walls and a roof; as a means of supporting the innate capacities of refugees and displaced persons and maintaining them as productive social beings during their time in exile. As Anderson (1993) powerfully remarks;

> "Emergencies are not technical problems. They are human problems that involve physical, social, political and psychological realities. Purely technical approaches that focus on tonnage, transport, caloric content, and financial accountability to donors will never effectively reduce human vulnerability to future emergencies." (Anderson, 1993)

The paucity of research and literature illustrates the lack of understanding of the extreme debilitating effects of inappropriate emergency shelter on the capacities and long term recovery of refugees and displaced persons. Comparing the amount of shelter specific literature with that covering issues of mental and physical health, education, gender, rights and nutrition among communities of refugees and displaced persons, the lack of understanding of the social and psychological importance of shelter can be seen. Many studies address issues of health and capacities of refugees and displaced persons in camps and settlements and yet negate the impact of the built environment on the health and welfare of the inhabitants (Appe, 1984; Black, 1994; Cahill, 1993; Callamard, 1994; Chambers, 1986; Chimni, 1994; Christensen, 1982, 1987, 1990; Hansen, 1982, 1990; Harrell-Bond, 1986, 1990; Harrell-Bond, *et al*, 1992; Kibreab, 1993; Klein, 1994; Long, 1993; Macrae & Zwi, 1994; Rogge, 1987a; 1987b; Schoenmeier, 1987; UNHCR, 1993; Weiss & Minear, 1993; Wilson, 1992). It seems that the planning and design of refugee shelter, camps and settlements are not perceived to be of importance to the wider community. Indeed, it was not until 1993 that the UNHCR deemed the subject to be of sufficient importance to require its own specific conference (UNHCR, 1993a).

This thesis begins to address the paucity of data on shelter for refugees and displaced persons, in the belief that only through evaluation of current praxis is it possible to develop structures and guidelines for action that will promote shelter as an intervention for supporting innate coping mechanisms. To develop policies and programmes for improved shelter provision, it is essential to have a comprehensive and holistic picture of the positive and negative effects of current praxis for shelter on refugees and displaced persons. Shelter must be viewed as a dynamic social and psychological intervention in an extreme political and economic climate, as well as a physical object, in order to fully understand its effects on refugees, displaced persons and hosts. It is only when viewed from this wider perspective, that it is possible to advance recommendations for improved policy and provision. The changing arena of operations for the humanitarian community make such an analysis even more relevant and timely.

1.1.2 **The Changing Arena: War Revisited**

Although the humanitarian community began its activities as a result of the Second World War fifty years ago, there has since been little direct intervention into situations of ongoing warfare. During the period of the Cold War, the international

PREFACE

During the course of this thesis, a number of papers have been published by the author within journals and at conferences:

Barakat, S. and Ellis, S. (Forthcoming) *Report of an International Workshop, Towards Improved Shelter and Environment for Refugees and Displaced Persons in the Post-Yugoslav Countries,* University of York, York.

Ellis, S. and Barakat, S. (1996) 'From Relief to Sustainable Reconstruction: The Effects of Temporary Shelter Provision on Innate Coping Mechanisms', paper presented at the *Fifth International Research and Advisory Panel Conference on Forced Migration*, 9-12 April, Centre for Refugee Studies, Moi University, Eldoret, Kenya

Barakat, S. and Ellis, S. (1996) 'Researching Under Fire: the Collection of Data in War Circumstances with Specific Reference to Relief and Reconstruction Projects', *Disasters*, (20)2, pp. 141-149

Ellis, S. and Barakat, S. (1996) 'From Relief to Development: The Long Term Effects of Temporary Accommodation on Refugees and Displaced Persons in the Republic of Croatia', *Disasters,* (20)2, pp. 113-129

Barakat, S., and Ellis, S. (1995) 'International Workshop: Towards Improved Shelter and Environment for Refugees and Displaced Persons in the Post-Yugoslav Countries', *Journal of Refugee Studies,* (8)4, pp. 418-421

Ellis, S. (1995) 'Shelter and Environment for Refugees and Displaced Persons in the Post-Yugoslav Countries: Towards Some Principles for Action', overview paper presented at the International Workshop: *Towards Improved Shelter and Environment for Refugees and Displaced Persons in the Post-Yugoslav Countries* , Organised by the Department of the Built Environment, University of Luton and the Post-war Reconstruction and Development Unit, University of York, 9-11 October, Luton

Ellis, S. (1995) 'International Workshop in Luton', *Revival,* (4), August

Ellis, S. (1995) 'Living as a Refugee in Croatia', *Revival,* (3), April

Ellis, S. (1995) 'Issues in the Planning of Emergency Accommodation for Refugees and Displaced Persons Residing in the Republic of Croatia', paper presented at *Emergency Planning '95 Conference* , University of Lancaster, Lancaster

Ellis, S. (1994) 'An Evaluation of Shelter Projects for Displaced Persons and Refugees in Croatia', paper presented at the *Settlement Reconstruction in Croatia Workshop,* organised by the Study Centre for Reconstruction and Development, Dubrovnik and the Post-war Reconstruction and Development Unit, University of York, 12-16 September, Dubrovnik

community has primarily dealt with refugees **from** war, rather than violating sovereignty and intervening in countries **at** war, to assist internally displaced persons. Consequently, following the end of the Cold War and the subsequent proliferation of wars throughout the world, the humanitarian community now finds itself acting in an environment for which it possesses no institutional memory. It has become a player in many conflicts.

The collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989, symbolised a period of change for many communist countries; a period that has been marked by increased nationalistic concerns and has defined a shift in the cultural and climatic context of the humanitarian community's field of action. Intrastate wars in the former USSR and the former Yugoslavia are both testament to the changes taking place in the North. Where agencies once dealt mainly with disasters in the South, in 'developing' nations such as India, Bangladesh and the countries of Africa; they are now working in radically different environments such as Chechnya, Georgia, Uzbekistan, Armenia, Afghanistan, Bosnia and Croatia. Crises in cold countries cost more money, require more fuel, have higher food requirements and are more demanding in terms of shelter than those in tropical or semi-tropical locations. It is not feasible to offer a tent or piece of plastic sheeting to a refugee or displaced person trying to survive winter conditions of snow, frost, rain and temperatures of minus 20°C. In addition to the pressures on the humanitarian community caused by their new field of action, the rapid onslaught of disasters and war crises and the speed with which one crisis is replaced by another, leave little time for agencies to evaluate and monitor the projects that they have implemented. Additionally, the rapid turn over of staff means that even the lessons that could be learnt from short term monitoring are never disseminated or passed on to those following behind.

The result of these changes is that the humanitarian community is trying to provide relief shelter from the disadvantageous position of inexperience and inability to learn from current experiences. In racing from one crisis to the next, mistakes remain unidentified and repeated until they become engrained as standard practice. Thus, shelter policies that are debilitating and detrimental to longer term recovery proliferate.

The importance of the 'relief to development continuum', or how relief effects long term recovery, has become a much discussed issue among donors and aid agencies in recent times. The squeeze on development expenditure has encouraged the

international community to endeavour to make their relief provision more developmental. In academic circles, the importance of relief that positively affects long term development after **natural disasters** has been acknowledged for thirteen years (Cuny, 1983), but there has been little research into the effects of relief shelter on refugees and displaced persons in **war**.

This thesis advocates that the environment of war makes the primacy of developmental relief even more crucial. The widespread devastation of the social, physical and economic structures that war causes, necessitates the mass efforts of a nation's population to reconstruct. Without investing in and maintaining the productive status of the population during the years of exile and displacement, post-war rehabilitation and reconstruction will be adversely effected. It is important, therefore, that the relief provision to refugees and displaced persons maintains their productive capacities and invests in their status as capable social beings in order to facilitate both individual, and hence nation-wide, post-war rehabilitation and reconstruction. To retain the innate capacities of refugees and displaced persons, the provision of shelter must act as an enabling mechanism and should facilitate the access of its inhabitants to the support of existing social and economic systems.

The findings of this research begin to address the lack of evaluation and institutional experience of war by analysing a range of current shelter practices. Through analysis and subsequent agglomeration of good practice, experience in the field can be utilised to inform improved policy and praxis.

1.1.3 **The Paucity of Literature**

Although organised accommodation in camps and settlements has been, and continues to be, the primary response by the international community to refugee crises, the literature researching the effects of inhabiting such accommodation is sporadic and ill-defined. Cuny's overview paper on the state of the art of camp planning (Cuny, 1977) which was reiterated and expanded upon both in his later work (Cuny, 1983), and the UNHCR handbook for emergencies (UNHCR, 1982), was one of the first that attempted to address the subject of organised accommodation in an holistic way. The paper examines physical, social, health and administrative factors through analysis of a range of camps and settlements. Cuny tried to emphasise that shelter planning is a crucial part of 'caring for' refugees and should not just be left to chance but determined from the outset of a crisis.

More recent studies that specifically target shelter are those of El-Masri's investigation of West Beirut (El-Masri, 1989), Jabr's brief study of the West Bank (Jabr, 1989) and Zetter's analysis of housing for Greek refugees in Cyprus (Zetter, 1987). These studies start to move away from camps and settlements and focus on alternative shelter types such as the occupation of existing buildings, squatting on vacant land and permanent provision by host governments. These few cases aside, most data concerning shelter for refugees remains in unpublished field reports or with the implementing field officer. Such reports tend to be of a highly technical, pragmatic nature and focus on densities and cost/benefit ratios rather than addressing shelter in an holistic manner.

1.2 THE SCOPE OF THE THESIS AND THE RESEARCH QUESTION

In the light of these three areas of concern, this research was carried out in order to provide an answer to the following question:

> How can emergency shelter be provided in a way that supports the innate coping mechanisms of refugees from, and persons displaced by intrastate war in a developed nation, whilst addressing the social, political and economic constraints and concerns of the humanitarian community, the host community and the host government?

This research question drove the evaluation and analysis of the complete range of shelter solutions in use in the Republic of Croatia. By conducting a comprehensive and critical evaluation of a range of shelter types from camps to private accommodations, an understanding of good and bad practice was developed. Through evaluating the shelter in an holistic manner, from the perspectives of the user (refugees and displaced persons) , the provider (donors, aid agencies and host government) and the facilitator (host community), enabling and disabling policies and practices have been identified. Through the subsequent agglomeration of good practice and enabling interventions, a set of working recommendations has been developed that advocate the concept of shelter as a mechanism for supporting innate capacity and promoting long term recovery and development.

Thus this research set out to achieve the following:

1.2.1 **Aim**

To advance a set of working recommendations for improved shelter response for refugees from, and persons displaced by, intrastate war in a developed, cold climate

environment. While not attempting to be universally applicable, the recommendations are meant to provide transferable guidelines to the provision of shelter in other similar situations, such as the current conflicts in the Transcaucasus region.

1.2.2 **Objectives**

i. To establish a theoretical understanding of the field of shelter provision for refugees and the survivors of natural disaster, through examining the current literature and addressing the issues of:

- the root causes of disasters and crises perceived within the broader context of society
- the concept of vulnerability both as an *a priori* and an imposed condition
- the potential of the innate capacities of refugees and the survivors of natural disaster
- the integration of incomers and hosts and the potentials for conflict

ii. To investigate the field of humanitarian action in war, through examining the current literature and addressing the issues of:

- the situation of permanent emergency that develops in war
- the nature of the relief to development continuum
- the expanded categories of vulnerability in a war situation and the systematic destruction of capacities and coping mechanisms
- the potential for integration of incomers and hosts
- peace building and conflict reduction

iii. To develop a framework of issues surrounding shelter provision in war that could be significant in improving provision.

iv. To evaluate a range of existing shelter projects in the Republic of Croatia using the framework developed from the literature review and carry out this evaluation from the perspective of the inhabitants, the providers and the hosts.

1.3 METHODOLOGY

The lack of information on the methodology to be utilised when conducting research into shelter provision in war, meant that the author had to develop a

composite framework from the fields of development studies and the built environment in order to conduct the research. A variety of methods were used to accomplish the research process and validate the findings:

- Literature review
- Field work
- Peer group review

i. Throughout the past three years a comprehensive study of relevant literature has been conducted by the author. The review has been performed in order to develop an understanding of previous related work, to direct the research and to maintain an up-to-date understanding of developments in the field.

ii. Data for the study was collected during two periods of field study; one of two months in the Summer of 1994 and one of three weeks in the winter conditions of January and February 1995. The data collection techniques utilised during these periods of study are comprehensively outlined in Chapter Four. It is worth stressing however, that the conditions governing data collection in war meant that the methods were reliant on the author adopting a flexible, reflexive and innovative approach.

iii. The paucity of information specific to the research question necessitated the close monitoring of the research progression and process. This monitoring was achieved through consultation with experts in the field; presentation of papers documenting the research findings at conferences and workshops; submission of papers, with invitations to comment, to both refereed and non-refereed academic and trade literature and presentation and discussion of the research findings at a specifically convened and directed workshop. Through this constant process of peer review the research maintained an acceptable and appropriate direction, pace and structure [1].

1.4 STRUCTURE

The thesis is arranged into two main sections, the first of which comprises Chapters Two to Four and presents an overview and evaluation of current praxis and an outline of the methodology utilised and developed for the study. The second

[1] A full list of the papers and conference presentations of the author is presented in the preface to this thesis.

section contains Chapters Five to Eight and details the specific findings of the research in Croatia concluding with the recommendations and proposals for future work.

The thesis begins by presenting a cross cultural perspective of humanitarian relief in **Chapter Two.** Through evaluation of post-natural disaster and refugee experiences the chapter introduces two central discourses that are identified from the literature:

- Vulnerability and Capacity
- Integration

Each of these concepts is explored with reference to past experiences of natural disasters and refugee crises through the discussion of issues of root causes of disasters, cultural sensitivity of provision, timing of provision, needs assessment, media involvement and agendas and motivations behind the actions of the international community. The chapter introduces the central concept of imposed vulnerability.

Acknowledged differences between natural disasters and war make it essential that the discourse is expanded to include the nature of the humanitarian community's actions today. Thus **Chapter Three**, explores humanitarian relief in war and develops the framework of understanding of the issues underpinning the two central themes of vulnerability and capacity, and integration, through examination of current practice. The chapter explains the importance of the relief to development continuum and introduces issues of accountability and conflict reduction as essential threads within the vulnerability and capacity, and integration discourses.

Chapter Four documents the research methodology adopted for the study and illustrates the importance of maintaining a flexible, reflexive and innovative approach to data collection in war. The chapter is a contribution to a much needed discussion on the subject of data collection in war and attempts to begin to address the paucity of literature on the subject. The chapter further discusses the importance of dissemination of findings for peer review and scrutiny throughout the research project through attendance and presentations at workshops and conferences and authorship of papers in refereed journals.

Section Two begins with the introduction to the field data in **Chapter Five,** where the build up to the war in Yugoslavia is described to present an understanding of the political and ethnic pressures governing action in Croatia. The chapter includes a brief, quantitative, demographic presentation of the refugees and displaced persons and outlines and describes the range of shelter types in use throughout the Republic of Croatia.

The two subsequent chapters present the findings of the field study in Croatia and expand upon and develop the discourses on vulnerability and capacity, and integration initiated in Chapters Two and Three. **Chapter Six** develops the concept of imposed vulnerability and repression of innate coping strategies. **Chapter Seven** tackles the issues surrounding integration in a country engaged in an ethnic intrastate war.

The thesis is concluded in **Chapter Eight** with the derived set of working recommendations for improved shelter provision and reflections upon the findings of the research. The recommendations, which are proposed for use by implementing agencies, are not definitive but offer a first step in an ongoing process of evaluation which poses future research potentials.

SECTION ONE

AN OVERVIEW OF CURRENT PRAXIS

CHAPTER TWO: CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES OF HUMANITARIAN RELIEF

2.1 INTRODUCTION

2.1.1 **The Changing Climate: War Revisited**

The collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 symbolised to the World the end of the Cold War and the beginning of a new era of peace. It is now apparent that that optimism was misplaced. Indeed:

> "It seems that the great fall of the Berlin Wall has been overshadowed by the erection of many other dividing walls." (Barakat and Cockburn, 1991, p3)

While a tenuous peace has come to South Africa and Ethiopia, the proxy wars of the USA and USSR are still being enacted in Afghanistan and Mozambique. In Bosnia, Croatia, Rwanda and Somalia, new and fierce conflicts have broken out (Barakat & Hoffmann, 1995; Macrae & Zwi, 1994). Today, in a situation far from an era of peace, there are over thirty outright wars being waged in the world (not including major skirmishes) (Barakat & Hoffmann, 1995).

The new conflicts present a marked shift from **inter**state conflict to internal, **intra**state conflict (Barakat & Hoffmann, 1995), a shift that constructs civilians and not military personnel as the prime victims. In World War Two, 52 per cent of casualties were civilian, in today's wars they represent 90 per cent of the casualty list. The massive social, political, environmental and economic devastation of these internal conflicts causes extensive population displacement. The numbers of refugees and internally displaced people have grown from 2.5 million refugees in 1970 to 18.9 million refugees and 24 million internally displaced persons in 1992 (UNHCR, 1993; US Committee for Refugees, 1993). Today, the number of refugees and displaced persons is approaching fifty million (UNHCR, 1995).

During the Cold War, there was little concern for the sanctity of human life without prior consideration of the political and strategic importance of the country involved. Superpowers made judgements calibrated by the perceived importance of

the country concerned (Macrae & Zwi, 1994; Weiss & Minear, 1993). Humanitarian relief was not given according to need but reliant on the allegiances of the affected country's government. An illustration of such a reliance was the ousting of American-backed Emperor Haile Selassie by a communist take-over in Ethiopia in 1974. The change resulted in the superpowers adjusting their economic and military aid provision accordingly; America withdrew and Russia stepped in (Weiss & Minear, 1993). Another example was the famine that swept Ethiopia in 1983-85 which was ignored by the Reagan administration for a considerable time as the USA perceived Ethiopia to be Russia's responsibility.

The international community of the post-Cold War era now views conflicts no more serious than those that existed prior to 1989, as "...threats to international peace and security" (Weiss & Minear, 1993). The United Nations Security Council perceived the mass flight of the Kurds following the defeat of Iraq, as just such a threat. They acted against the sovereignty of Iraq and authorised military intervention to guarantee the humanitarian community access to the Kurds (Tomasevski, 1994). Until this point, the Security Council had concerned itself only with matters of international security. The resolution of 5th April 1991 created the precedent for the international community to intervene against sovereignty in matters of human rights and humanitarian affairs. The reason for the unprecedented step doubtless lay in the fact that it was the international community that assisted in the victimisation of the Kurds through the imposition of sanctions on Iraq. Thus the Kurdish population were subject to a double embargo by both the Iraqis and the American-led international community (Tomasevski, 1994). With no designated entity responsible for Kurdish human rights, the international community was obliged to fulfil humanitarian needs. Since this action, the use of military forces has become a common place mechanism of 'securing' humanitarian intervention. Indeed, the 'buzz words' of the nineties are 'humanitarian intervention' and 'complex emergencies' .

The increasing scale of both international humanitarian and military intervention in war, or 'complex emergencies', is creating new pressures on the relief and development agencies. There is, therefore, a critical need for an increased understanding of the nature of relief provision in war. Agencies have to address the possibility that not only can relief provision negatively affect reconstruction and development, but also that in the highly politicised atmosphere of war, their aid provision can increase ethnic rifts and act to raise levels of conflict. These factors

make it necessary for agencies and donors to address and understand the changes in their roles and deal with the root causes of complex emergencies.

The past twenty years have seen many investigations of the character of 'natural' disasters and the provision of relief to refugees (Taylor, 1976; Kieffer, 1977; Davis, 1978; Christensen, 1982; Cuny, 1983; Harrell-Bond, 1986 and 1990; Rogge, 1987; Zetter, 1987; Jabr, 1989; Hansen, 1990; Aysan & Davis, 1992; Harrell-Bond, *et al.*, 1992; Wilson, 1992; Black, 1994; de Waal, 1994). All have been ultimately aimed at reducing the level of suffering that these disasters cause and improving response. The new era of 'complex emergencies' presents the humanitarian community with an unfamiliar and complicated problem to solve and validates further research into good and bad practice.

Complex emergencies are defined by the wide variety of hazard agents that generate them. They are characteristic of nations with growing economic insecurity and social vulnerability (Duffield, 1994b) and are most often accompanied by warfare. They are highly politicised and often cross international boundaries; an overwhelmingly political atmosphere that makes it difficult for agencies and donors to act within them. It is this complexity of action for the humanitarian community that inspired the designation of 'complex emergency'. In trying to deal with such emergencies in Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia and the Former-Yugoslavia, the humanitarian community has exposed many faults and limitations in its structures, mandates and practices. Its 'humanitarian' actions and military interventions have increased rather than reduced the problems and have, in certain cases, assisted the predatory forces in vanquishing the weaker [1].

The end of the Cold War and the consequent reduction in superpower rivalry, has reduced the forces that previously held multi-ethnic nations together (Cuny, 1993). Many ethnic minorities have realised that they now have an opportunity to seek independence and identity. One by-product of the rise in ethnonationalism is an increasing intolerance of different races and cultures; an intolerance that is frequently focused upon refugees and migrant workers. The result has been a gradual closing of the doors on refugees and migrants and a consequent reduction in resettlement possibilities.

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[1] For example, in Bosnia the creation of safe havens by the U.N. in Srebrenica and Žepa ultimately assisted in the process of ethnic cleansing by the Serbian forces.

The outcome of such policies is increased pressure to deal with potential refugees in their country of origin through, for example, the creation of safe havens. Consequently, aid agencies find themselves working more and more frequently with internally displaced populations in countries that are still affected by conflict and war, such operations are now the biggest challenge facing the international aid community (Cuny, 1993).

In this post-Cold War era, the chance exists to improve and restructure the humanitarian community and alter the way that donors, international organisations, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and agencies act (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). To take full advantage of the opportunity, it is necessary to examine both past and current performances, identify good and bad practice and subsequently develop improved responses. Without an institutional memory of aid provision in conflict, agencies and donors can only rely on lessons learnt from their experience of provision of aid in 'natural' disasters and refugee crises. Similarly, in this thesis, in order to develop a framework for the analysis of relief provision in war, the provision of relief in natural disasters and refugee crises will be examined first. Some of the general lessons from these fields are indeed valid when they are viewed from a perspective which comprehends the root causes of complex emergencies. The validity of this approach lies in the 'unnaturalness' of 'natural' disasters; the continuity of the institutions providing assistance in natural disasters, refugee crises and war and the importance of relief provision in all situations linking to sustainable development.

In the past there has always been a distinction drawn between 'manmade' (war, technical disasters) and 'natural' (flood, famine, earthquake) disasters. A distinction that inferred an absence of human involvement in the cause of a natural disaster. This chapter will show that a natural disaster is very much the product of human choices, actions and decisions and that the roots of 'natural' disasters share the same human arena as those of manmade disasters such as war.

Although the political, economic, social and physical destruction of war is more far reaching and devastating than that of 'natural' disaster, it does seem that there are basic concepts that can be distilled from the experience of providing relief in natural disasters and refugee crises and applied to an examination of relief provision in war.

2.1.2 **Structure of the Chapter**

This thesis identifies two basic themes within the literature. These are:

i Vulnerability and capacity
ii Integration

This chapter is divided into three sections. The first identifies the roots of these two central discourses in the literature through discussion of the models of disaster and recovery. The second and third sections concern the importance of understanding vulnerability and capacity, and integration, in the field of humanitarian action. These discourses will be presented under the following headings, which have been identified as the primary categories through the analysis of the literature:

i. Vulnerability and capacity
- Vulnerability
- Capacity
- Needs assessment
- Cultural applicability
- Timing of provision
- Media

ii. Integration
- Integration and assimilation
- Host-incomer conflict

2.2 MODELS OF DISASTER AND RECOVERY

To understand good and bad practice in relief, it is first necessary to understand how the cycle of disaster and recovery is perceived and what creates a disaster or crises.

2.2.1 **The Linear Model**

In the early days of disaster relief there was a perception that a disaster caused a limited suspension of 'normal' activities and that with adequate relief, life and development would soon continue again as previously (Fig 2.1).



Fig 2.1. The linear model of disaster and recovery (source: the author)

A disaster happened, be it 'natural' or 'manmade', it caused destruction and suffering which attracted emergency relief to alleviate the suffering. The relief addressed the immediate suffering, the country, town or village reconstructed itself and life returned to how it was before the disaster occurred. Development was believed to be a constant process, interrupted for a limited time, by disaster.

It soon became apparent that the disaster affected communities did not, in fact, recover and that very often a similar disaster would occur again in the same location. A new understanding of disaster was developed that began to acknowledge that this linear model was simplistic and misconceived. A newer model proposed that disasters and recovery from them was in fact, a cyclical process.

2.2.2 **The Cyclical Model**



Fig. 2.2. The cyclical model of disaster and recovery (source: the author)

This later model acknowledged that the process of disaster and recovery appeared to be a cyclical one and that disaster would often strike again following

reconstruction. Concurrent with this model, practitioners and academics tried to analyse why disaster continued to strike in the same place and destroy the same groups.

2.2.3 **Pressure and Release Model**

In the late Seventies, a connection was made that began to offer an explanation for the repeated occurrence of disasters. It was represented by the pressure and release model, which linked hazards to vulnerabilities (Fig 2.3).



Fig 2.3. Pressure and Release Model (source: the author, from Davis, 1978)

It was proposed that disaster occurred at the interface of a hazard and a vulnerable community. Thus the occurrence of a natural hazard on its own did not create a disaster; an earthquake in an uninhabited desert was not a disaster. However, when that same earthquake struck a vulnerable community then disaster was likely to occur.

The amalgamation of the pressure and release model and the cyclical model led to the proposition that if disaster primarily occurs where there is vulnerability, then it must be possible to intervene to reduce vulnerability and therefore reduce the scale of the disaster. This concept offered an explanation for repeated disaster in the same place: the relief provided before had never addressed the root cause of the problem, namely vulnerability. It had only dealt with the physical manifestation of suffering following the disaster. Consequently the risk of a disaster re-occurring had never been reduced.

This concept of vulnerability led to a major change in the way that relief and development were viewed. Returning to the cyclical model, it can now be seen that there are stages in the process where it is possible to intervene to reduce the level of disaster. There is potential for both preparedness and mitigation phases (Fig 2.4).



Fig 2.4. Preparedness and mitigation in the disaster and recovery model (source: the author, from the work of Davis, 1995)

At a basic level, therefore, it is possible to say that one reason for an earthquake becoming a disaster is that it strikes a poor community which is unable to build strong houses[2]. The disaster occurs as a consequence of houses falling down and lives and livelihoods being lost. So, at a simple level, if aid agencies provided the money and technology to enable the community to rebuild their houses in an earthquake resistant manner, then this **mitigatory** measure would reduce the level of disaster should the earthquake strike again. Combine this with a disaster **preparedness** plan that anticipates shelter needs and the levels and standards of shelter required to withstand earthquakes, and the overall **vulnerability** of the community is considerably reduced. This concept has led to many development projects that aim to increase the capacity of communities to resist hazard and reduce their vulnerability.

2.2.4 **The Spiral Model**

Most recent developments address the reduction in the level of disaster through decreasing vulnerability (Fig 2.5). The concept of vulnerability and, more importantly, capacity is of crucial importance to the way agencies and donors should supply relief in an emergency situation (Anderson & Woodrow, 1989; Blaikie, *et al.*, 1994; Cuny, 1983; Templar, 1994).

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[2] It is acknowledged that this simple depiction does not account for other factors that affect vulnerability. Issues of physical location and strength and magnitude of the hazard will be discussed further on in this chapter.



Fig 2.5. Spiral model of disaster and recovery (based on the model presented in Barakat and Davis, 1995; further developed in discussions in Dubrovnik, 1995, between Barakat, Ellis, Hakonsen, Skötte and Kojaković) (source: the author)

Only by addressing these areas is it possible to reduce the level of disasters and the consequent suffering that they bring. The reduction of vulnerability and correlating support of intrinsic capacity is one of the two pivotal themes of this thesis.

2.3 VULNERABILITY AND CAPACITY

2.3.1 **Vulnerability**

Disasters need to be perceived within the broader context of society and not as purely geophysical phenomena. In order to provide appropriate relief and development it is essential to understand the root causes of disasters. Without this knowledge, well meaning and philanthropically intended assistance can cause long term harm (Anderson, 1993; Anderson & Woodrow, 1989; Cuny, 1983).

As has been previously stated, there is no such thing as a 'natural' disaster. Accepting that disaster occurs at the interface of a hazard and a vulnerable community; it follows that a natural hazard such as an earthquake or flood could generate a disaster only if it comes into contact with a community made vulnerable through **human-made** social, economic and political environments.

Vulnerability is the :

> "...extent to which a community, structure, service or geographic area is likely to be damaged or disrupted by the impact of a particular disaster hazard, on account of their nature, construction and proximity to hazardous terrain or a disaster-prone area." (Coburn, *et al.* 1994, p67)

Although the definition indicates the importance of minimising vulnerability to reduce the level of disaster, it does not indicate that there are root causes of vulnerability that need to be addressed. Vulnerability is linked to socio-economic position (Anderson, 1993; Blaikie, *et al.*, 1994) and it is usually, though not exclusively the case, that those most affected by hazard are those of low socio-economic position: a classification that includes delineation of class, ethnicity, gender, age and disability. The concept of vulnerability affects not only the degree to which hazard causes loss or damage, but also has implications for recovery: high vulnerability is linked with a long or permanent recovery situation. The lengthy recovery period also increases vulnerability to the next hazard, thus inducing a downward spiral in which recovery becomes less and less possible and vulnerability increases (Blaikie, *et al.*, 1994).

This spiral is known as the ratchet effect (Chambers, 1983) and has been witnessed in many disasters. For example, in 1993, the Maharashtra earthquake had serious detrimental effects on the affected communities' capacity for recovery (Parasuraman, 1995). The hazard hit already vulnerable communities and through its effects further increased their vulnerability to the next hazard. The rural poor inhabiting the villages affected by the earthquake, lost family members and tools and equipment as well as their homes. Following the disaster, it was noted that there was a serious decrease in the numbers of children attending school. Investigation showed that this was due to the shortage of manpower following deaths in the earthquake and the continuing need of the families to farm their land in order to survive. Together, "...the two factors make it necessary for many boys and girls...attending school to drop out in order to satisfy the labour needs of their households" (Parasuraman, 1995). The smaller family size, the reduction in education levels and consequent restricted access to higher waged employment increased the family's future vulnerability to hazard. In the same earthquake it was observed that those farmers and artisans who had lost their tools in the earthquake, also had a slow recovery for money could not be made to replace tools when the

money-making tools were lost. Lack of money leads to marginality and marginality increases vulnerability to future hazards.

2.3.2 **Root Causes**

Poverty is often cited as the principle root cause of vulnerability (Anderson, 1993; Aysan & Davis, 1992; Davis, 1978). The increase in the number of disasters in the past years is not seen to be a result of increased numbers of hazards, but due to rapid population growth, hyper urbanisation and consequent unequal access to resources and marginalisation (IFRC, 1993).

As can be seen from the example of the Maharashtra earthquake, the poor are the prime sufferers in disaster: simply because an existence that is marginal in good times is swiftly and easily overwhelmed by disaster [3]. Money buys the privilege of a home located far away from hazard spots and the luxury of hazard resistant technology (Blaikie, *et al.*, 1994); it purchases insurance to replace lost possessions and transport to escape a disaster area. Conversely, poverty pushes people to live on the edge; to inhabit flood plains or the sides of volcanoes as the soil is fertile and supports existence; it forces people to dwell in slums on the periphery of conurbations to have cheap and ready access to any employment and it reduces access to the materials and technology required to make hazard resistant homes (Anderson, 1993; Blaikie, *et al.*, 1994; Davis, 1978). Poverty comes from **lack of access to resources;** either the physical resources of land, water supply, etc. or the social resources such as education, training and political representation.

Degg's account (1993) of the 1992 Cairo Earthquake shows how the rapid urbanisation of Cairo had put more people at risk from "...the extremes of the natural environment". He demonstrates how the earthquake exposed the failure of Egypt's social, economic and legislative systems to deal with the underlying problems that rapid population growth had caused (Degg, 1993). Those most affected were the inhabitants of slum dwellings in the inner city and the residents of illegally extended high-rise blocks in the suburbs. Outside the city, the rural poor living in the fertile plain of the Nile, where they gained the advantage of increased crop yields, were badly hit by the amplified and prolonged shock waves. 80 per cent of the villages' housing stock was destroyed. Thus the earthquake did most

[3] The poor are not the exclusive sufferers in disaster. It will be shown later in the text that the rich are not always protected, and importantly, in war, the rich are often more vulnerable precisely because of their wealth (Slim, 1995).

damage to the urban and rural poor: those marginal groups living on the edge due to the restrictions of poverty [4].

However, it should also be borne in mind that poor communities with a high degree of social organisation and cohesion can withstand and recover from disaster very well (Anderson & Woodrow, 1989). The strength of social coping mechanisms outweighs the vulnerability brought by poverty.

Understanding this concept of root causes of vulnerability and applying it to the pressure and release model cited previously, a new picture can be formed that illustrates a progression of vulnerability (Blaikie, *et al.*, 1994). Root causes lead to dynamic pressures which spawn unsafe conditions and result in disaster when compounded by hazard (Fig 2.6).



Fig 2.6. Pressure and release model showing incremental build up of pressures (source: Blaikie, et al., 1994, p22)

Understanding this chain of vulnerability and its effect on the magnitude of disasters gives some framework from within which to analyse good and bad practice in relief provision. In order to be effective, aid needs to address the root causes of problems and not merely deal with the physical manifestation of the disasters themselves. The recent events in Somalia provide a perfect example of how relief provision only dealt with the results, not the causes of the problem.

[4] However, an example such as the Kobe earthquake of 17 January 1995 shows that disasters can strike rich and poor alike. Here greater wealth did not correspond to better constructed housing or location far away from the hazard zone (Hayashi & Kawata, 1995). Greater country wealth however, has contributed to swift and efficient relief and recovery operations.

In December 1992, the Security Council of the United Nations stressed the "...urgent need for the quick delivery of humanitarian assistance in the whole country" and thus ordered military intervention to establish an environment for the safe delivery of humanitarian aid within Somalia (Tomasevski, 1994). However, de Waal (1994) shows that this aid provision only addressed the need of the population for food to prevent starvation, it did nothing to address the underlying causes of the famine itself which were: forcible land alienation in 1988; breakdown of social services (veterinary provision and bore holes) and intensification of rural insurrection in 1989-90. This cycle led to increasing impoverishment of the population and culminated in fighting following the overthrow of the Barre government in 1991. Fighting led to displacement, which in turn provoked more conflict and a mass exodus into Kenya and Ethiopia. By 1992, death due to starvation was considerably reduced, but disease spread rapidly through both the refugees and the remaining resident population (de Waal, 1994). The UN intervention in December was based on a false understanding of the situation as it existed on the ground. It came as a response to claims that two million Somalis faced death by starvation, although by this time the main cause of death was disease, death through starvation had been controlled since July. Media portrayal of the situation came in 1992, with little or no coverage prior to that. The media simplified the solutions to the crisis as foreign food to stop starvation and foreign military to stop the fighting (de Waal, 1994). With the exception of the ICRC, agencies acted too late and without a basic understanding of the underlying roots of the starvation and thus targeted only the visible result with food aid. It was one of the worst displays of the international humanitarian community in action to date (Macrae & Zwi, 1994).

In many disasters, the root causes can be traced back over a number of years. The war in Angola from 1975-91 had its roots in the colonial activity of the Portuguese in the 1940s (Macrae & Zwi, 1994); the Mexico city earthquake disaster of 1985 had its base in the many years of limited access to resources experienced by tenants in the inner city historical core (Blaikie, *et al.*, 1994).

The concept of vulnerability and its root causes in disasters is a crucial determinant in the way that relief agencies and donors should respond. If it is understood that it is social, political and economic vulnerability that leads to disasters then relief provision can start to address those vulnerabilities in order to successfully minimise

future disasters. As all disasters have a human core, they can all be minimised through cognitive human action.

To address vulnerability, it is also important that agencies realise that the communities they aim to assist are not homogenous and therefore will not all display the same level of vulnerability. For example, in a refugee camp it could be said that all the refugees are vulnerable, as indeed they are: they are politically vulnerable. Within that strata, however, there are further embedded vulnerabilities such as age or gender. For instance, in Wilson's study of Mozambican refugees it was found that the agency policy of giving food as the main item of relief did little to meet the food needs of the elderly, as in order to obtain **non**-food items such as firewood that they could not collect themselves they had to barter their own food ration (Wilson, 1992). Thus the provision did not address the particular vulnerabilities of the elderly population.

This issue of compounded vulnerability is investigated to a limited extent within the refugee literature. Black (Black, 1994) makes an important distinction between vulnerability as seen as an ***a priori*** condition of certain groups and vulnerability which is **imposed** by the conditions in which individuals may find themselves. In refugee terms, this distinction would manifest itself as the difference between the political, social and economic vulnerability that led to a certain group becoming refugees in the first place and the vulnerability of that group to future hazard as imposed by the manner in which aid is provided in camps once they had become refugees.

Expanding this argument it can be seen that this notion of vulnerability, and conterminously, capacity, has implications on the concept of dependency syndrome as outlined in many texts on refugee crises. There is a large body of literature that promotes the view that humanitarian assistance encourages dependency among refugee and displaced person populations (Black, 1994; Harrell-Bond, 1986, 1990, 1993; Harrell-Bond, *et al.*, 1992; Zetter & Baker, 1995). Harrell-Bond, in her seminal work *Imposing Aid* (1986), suggests that dependency among refugees is increased through the refugee regimes that usurp the decision-making and organisational capacity of refugee individuals and communities. Thus, when

refugees are denied the autonomy to make their own decisions, their dependency on outside assistance increases [5].

For example, the UNHCR emergency handbook states that "...the establishment of refugee camps must be only a last resort", (UNHCR, 1982) and yet refugee camps are consistently the characteristic way in which forced migrant populations are organised and administered (Harrell-Bond, *et al.*, 1992). The establishment of such camps and the labelling of forced migrants as 'refugee' reinforces vulnerability of the groups through the consequent view of the wider society towards that group (Zetter, 1987). Camps are promoted by the 'hand-out' mentality in which it is perceived that the refugee's **every** need must be provided for by the humanitarian community. This mentality gives rise to the predominant view among agencies and donors that "...prolonged reliance on hand-outs fosters a 'dependency mentality' among refugees" (Kibreab, 1993). A mentality that is characterised by laziness, a killing of refugees' aptitude for work, creativity and initiative and an unwillingness to invest energy in self-sufficiency.

Dependency implies a lack of ability to be, or to become, self-sufficient **even in the presence of enabling interventions.** However, in much of the literature there is little recognition of the importance of these enabling interventions. There is a consensus that when refugees are not working, it is because they no longer possess a will to work, or that when refugees are accepting handouts of food, it is because they can no longer provide their own food needs. However, it seems that there could be an important link between capacities, access and dependency — in order to avoid exhibiting signs of dependency, refugees need not only the capacity to perform an action, but also, access to the requisite resources. For example, in the natural disaster literature, capacity was seen as the combination of physical and non-physical entities such as access to land, plus the skill to know how to farm it (Anderson & Woodrow, 1989). Refugees also need the combination of physical and non-physical entities: access to physical resources as well as existing skills, social structures, etc.. The author believes, in line with Kibreab (1993), that it is the lack of access to resources, promoted by the current relief model, that is the prime reason for the perceived appearance of dependency syndrome among refugees:

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[5] This concept will be further discussed within the presentation of the findings from the field in Chapter Six.

> "...if the contextual environment is unfavourable, the goal of self-sufficiency can remain remote and unattainable no matter how committed the refugees might be to the principles of independence and self-sufficiency" (Kibreab, 1993, p332)

In order to avoid constructing long term dependent communities therefore, it is important to allow refugees access to resources and thus enable them to remain active:

> "...psychological studies of disaster victims have shown that it is important that they be involved in meaningful activities as soon after they have experienced trauma as possible, since participation aids in the psychological rebuilding process." (Von Buchwald, 1994, p234)

In addition to addressing the root causes of vulnerability, it is therefore, equally important that agencies also acknowledge the existence of **capacities** within the communities that they assist. For it is by building on, and supporting these capacities, or coping mechanisms, that **relief provision is ensured to be developmental** (Anderson & Woodrow, 1989) and future resistance to disaster is increased. Ignoring them or overriding them, increases vulnerability and leaves communities worse off than previously (Anderson, 1993).

2.3.3 **Capacity**

Capacities can be divided into two areas — the physical, which includes items such as land, tools, seeds, money, building materials and the non physical, which covers the areas of education, skills, family and community structures, etc. (Anderson, 1993). The combination of physical and non-physical resources gives the degree of capacity to cope with disaster. For example, following the Chittagong cyclone in Bangladesh in 1991, it was noted that :

> "...shelter...was an area where victims were often able to undertake almost immediate action. People set about collecting building debris and reconstructing shelters for themselves. Many moved into public buildings such as schools or factories until their homes could be rebuilt" (Hodgson & Whaites, 1992, p5)

The community utilised their inherent knowledge of shelter construction together with the available physical materials, to address their own emergency needs without outside assistance. Their capacity to cope was high.

In many cases, it has been seen that agencies and donors have curtailed the coping mechanisms of the communities experiencing disaster through unthinking actions (Anderson & Woodrow, 1989; Cuny, 1983; Kieffer, 1977; Taylor, 1976; Winchester, 1992). Winchester, 1992, describes how the Andhra Pradesh cyclone of 1977 disrupted the pattern of normal farming activity and should have given ample opportunity for the farmers, who had already constructed their own emergency shelters, to rebuild their cyclone-damaged homes. However, "...many villages (about 80 per cent...) had been promised *pucca* concrete houses" and they "...preferred to remain in their flimsy temporary bamboo and thatch sheds and wait for the free gift of a concrete house, which they regarded as status symbols" (Winchester, 1992).

Harrell-Bond (1992), reports on the situation of Mozambican refugees who were settled in Swaziland by the chiefs along the border and assigned host families to live with. In return for land, the refugees provided the hosts with labour, a symbiotic and mutually agreed relationship which lasted for four years. Then the UNHCR introduced a food distribution system for the refugees, who reciprocated the hospitality of their hosts by sharing the new donated food ration. By 1990, UNHCR decided that the programme was not functioning for two reasons. Firstly, they had no concept of how many refugees there were in Swaziland (despite the fact that the chiefs had a very accurate knowledge of the resident refugees) and secondly, they 'suspected' that refugees were sharing food with hosts. Refugees were told that if they wished to continue to receive food they must move into camps; a decision that completely ignored the highly successful system that was already in existence and had been set up to fulfil the needs **of** refugees and hosts **by** the refugees and hosts. The UNHCR intervention destroyed a well organised and functional exchange relationship that had developed naturally.

Evidence suggests that agencies believe the innate coping mechanisms displayed in the above example are lost by refugees when disaster strikes:

> "...very often refugees lose not only their material assets (tools, animals etc.) but also the organisation of their whole socio-economic foundation, which collapses..." (Diegues, quoted in Kibreab, 1993, p333)

While it is true that refugees lose the majority of their physical assets through flight, it is unrealistic to suggest that the non-physical innate assets such as culture

and tradition disappear or are lost (Harrell-Bond, 1986; Kibreab, 1993). These are the very tools that can be kept and maintained and used to survive. Many studies have shown the extreme level of coping mechanisms that refugees still retain in spite of the trauma of flight and loss (Christensen, 1987; Hansen, 1990; Harrell-Bond, 1986; Kibreab, 1993; Turton & Turton, 1984; Zetter, 1987). Indeed, the fact that they have become refugees and survived to travel across a border indicates the retention of coping mechanisms and abilities.

The pattern of supporting existing coping mechanisms extends beyond the realms of the individual or family, to religious groups, local authorities, indigenous NGOs and government. Support of, and action through, these indigenous and recognised agencies can make relief assistance more appropriately targeted and its positive effects more sustainable by the target group (Anderson & Woodrow, 1989). Anderson and Woodrow (1989), outline the situation in 1980, when Kampuchean refugees crossed the border into Thailand. Existing Thai NGOs saw that they shared elements of culture and society with the refugees and could therefore offer a lot to the relief programme that the European and North American NGOs could not. The UNHCR constantly refused to allow them to become involved, however, a smaller NGO saw the opportunities for collaboration and started to work with one Thai organisation, a result that led to the relief operation maintaining development opportunities.

A second examination of Degg's account of the Cairo earthquake (1993), shows the efficiency of the Society of Muslim Brothers within Cairo at supplying emergency aid:

> "In the first week the Muslim Brothers had erected tents, emblazoned with the slogan 'Islam is the solution', to provide shelter for homeless families. They prepared hot meals and collected and distributed donations." (Degg, 1993, p235)

The Muslim Brothers, and groups like them, are the main source of social and welfare assistance in Egypt. They are a local and indigenous group providing appropriate, accurately targeted aid in an efficient and organised manner. An organisation that the international humanitarian community should have supported and utilised to channel aid into the area.

Following the earthquake in Kobe, Japan in January 1995, emergency needs, such as search and rescue, were automatically performed first by the disaster victims themselves, those people who were on the site immediately, and secondly by very competent Japanese search and rescue teams (Hayashi & Kawata, 1995). The Japanese government categorically stated to the international community that while it was grateful for all the goodwill coming from overseas, it did not require any external search and rescue teams. Unfortunately certain countries ignored the comments of the Japanese government and sent search and rescue teams anyway. The teams did not arrive until the majority of sites had already been searched by the disaster victims and the Japanese teams, and they were consequently of little use. The most they managed to achieve was to place a huge burden on the Japanese, for the team that arrived could speak no Japanese and had no translators with them, they had no independent transport and thus required logistical assistance, they also required accommodation and food, all at a time when the government had to handle the aftermath of a major earthquake (DHA, 1995). Their actions did little to assist the Japanese and show the necessity of supporting existing mechanisms within a society and not trying to override them. If the systems exist in country, then agencies should target their assistance **through** them and not endeavour to duplicate actions that are already being undertaken.

Unthinking actions such as these reduce the innate coping mechanisms of communities, not only in the short term or immediate aftermath of the disaster, but can also have serious long term effects. Sixteen years after the Peruvian earthquake of 1970, it was noted that local families still maintained a 'handout' mentality, assuming that all agencies were there purely to make large donations of physical goods and money (Blaikie, *et al.*, 1994). This attitude, fostered initially by the actions of agencies who responded to the disaster in the Seventies, made it nearly impossible to initiate any development projects twenty years later.

Activities and programmes that build on existing capacities and reduce future vulnerabilities require the incoming agency to have a thorough knowledge of the situation on the ground. Without an awareness of existing mechanisms and social groupings and support mechanisms, it is impossible to judge whether or not a project will adversely affect long term development. Such knowledge requires accurate needs assessment or a collaboration between the international community and organisations that already exist on the ground.

2.3.4 **Needs Assessment: Addressing Real not Perceived Needs**

As has been indicated above, there are many cases of relief activity undermining local activities and adversely affecting long term development through inappropriate aid interventions. Rectifying this fault either requires accurate needs assessment or collaborative relief responses through existing indigenous organisations. This second option often appears to be the most effective, as it actively builds capacity and therefore sustainability (Anderson & Woodrow, 1989; Cuny, 1983). Many agencies reject the first option, accurate needs assessment, stating that it takes too much time and that relief response is required immediately. There is an element of truth in the statement, it has been said often that if emergency relief does not reach the scene within twenty four hours, then it is wasted and useless as the first requirements are met by the affected population themselves (Davis, 1978; Revel, 1993). This does not mean however, that agencies should not conduct a needs assessment and should race to get in to the disaster area within twenty four hours. On the contrary, in the light of the damage that the unthinking application of relief can do, it is important that agencies do not address emergency situations with purely physical perceptions of what is required. For:

> "...if humanitarian assistance does nothing to prevent future humanitarian emergencies, can it truly be said to be humanitarian?" (Anderson, 1993, p23)

Instead agencies must endeavour to understand the social, political and psychological realities through accurate assessment.

All projects and programmes have a period of needs assessment built into them. However, the way in which this needs assessment is carried out creates problems. Accurate needs assessment requires specific skills and training; it needs to be quick and yet reliable.

The most accurate and swiftest way to gather information about real needs on the ground is to operate through a local counterpart that is already cognisant of the social, cultural and political environments and understands the dynamics of community structures. Alternatively, if agencies have a long established base already operating in the area, then channelling funds through them for relief operations can be equally effective.

It must also be understood that needs assessment is not something that should only be done in the initial stage of the disaster phase. It should be a continual process in order to ensure that humanitarian aid and assistance remains accurately targeted. Recipients' needs change radically as the process of recovery proceeds and programmes must match these changes. The socio-cultural, economic and political characteristics of vulnerability have widely differing recovery periods which need to be recognised in order for the necessary interventions to be made at the appropriate times (Blaikie, *et al.*, 1994).

Evaluation of needs must also recognise the heterogeneity of communities and groups. Variations of cast, class, gender, age, religion and disability, among the target group, give rise to variations in vulnerability. These variations affect the degree to which hazards impact upon individuals, the time taken to rehabilitate and the ability to recover completely from disaster. Needs assessment must therefore take into account the varying needs of different groups and individuals and address them accordingly.

Accurate needs assessment is vital if programmes and projects are going to respond sensitively to existing socio-cultural, economic and political environments. The importance of providing aid that is culturally appropriate has been seen over the past fifty years of relief provision.

Kibreab's (1993), description of refugee camps in Somalia shows the importance of agencies possessing a high degree of cultural understanding. Needs assessment must be carried out by someone who is aware of the socio-cultural background of the target group:

> "...agencies placed reliance on expatriates who did not understand the society or culture. Consequently they failed to recognise local refugee initiatives or traditional structures and concluded that the 'disaster' had broken down such structures and nothing remained. For them it became necessary to bring in western concepts and structures without being aware that these might be alien to those that already existed." (Kibreab, 1993, p 333.)

Without a base level of understanding it is impossible to ascertain accurately the real needs of communities, or to recognise their innate capacities to assist themselves. Thus, traditional coping mechanisms are undermined and future development is prejudiced.

It is also likely that if projects and policies are not based in real needs then the level of response from the target group will be very small. However, where the target group actively participates in designing the programme, then it is more likely to fulfil real needs and be more culturally and socially appropriate and useful to the survivors of disaster.

2.3.5 **Cultural Sensitivity**

Providing relief that is culturally acceptable to the host community is of crucial importance if aid is to support, rather than supplant, the innate capacities of the survivors of disasters and crises. Yet, stories abound within the international humanitarian community of inappropriate food, medicines and shelter being provided in relief situations. The author's personal experience in the post-Yugoslav countries has been of one American agency suggesting a 'hog roast' within a Muslim refugee camp in Croatia as a way of bringing the community together, and one visit to a coconut-filled warehouse in Bosnia, where the author spent considerable time explaining what a coconut was; how to remove the flesh and milk from the shell and husk and what to do with the flesh once it had been removed.

Within the field of shelter, inappropriate and culturally insensitive relief provision seems to be endemic. There is little recognition of the need for shelter to be culturally applicable and based in traditional living patterns of the affected community. There is a common myth that the survivors of disasters are helpless victims unable to function for themselves and grateful for any assistance the international community offers, no matter how inappropriate (Davis, 1978). In reality however, without a basis in existing culture and society, shelter will remain uninhabited and under used; a testament to the inappropriateness of the response. Agencies, donors and manufacturers need to understand the importance of the house within cultures and societies. Rapoport, outlined the significance of housing as far back as 1969:

> "The house is an institution not just a structure, created for a complex set of purposes. Because building a house is a cultural phenomenon, its form and organisation are greatly influenced by the cultural milieu to which it belongs" (Rapoport, 1969, p46)

Houses are formed and structured in response to the geo-physical environment interfacing with social and cultural determinants. They are a product not just of the

actors of the moment of their inception, but also of the collaboration of many people over many generations. It is important to note that the main determinants of housing form are not the physical ones but the social and cultural ones:

> "...many examples from almost all areas of the world can be adduced to show that dwellings and settlements are not the result of physical forces, particularly since the form often changes in areas where physical aspects have not changed" (Rapoport, 1969, p42)

The importance of dwellings being a product of society and culture is largely ignored by agencies and donors, who appear to believe that the survivors of a disaster situation will be grateful for any form of physical shelter that can be found. Over the years this belief has manifested itself through:

- The hemispherical foam dome of the Bayer company which was sent to Turkey in 1969, Peru in 1970 and Nicaragua in 1973 (Cotton, 1974)

- Professor Benjamin's specialised parachute house of 1974 (Benjamin, 1974) which converted into a rigid shell as it fell to the ground from the relief plane

- The Winfield Prefabricated Polyester Shelter of 1970 which required a team of "...54 trained men, twenty to thirty volunteers, a specially designed caravan and limited prefabricated components..." to erect (Winfield, 1970)

- Oxfam's hexagonal foam houses of 1974 which appeared in Pakistan

- Howland's "Bubble" of 1978

- Future Systems' design for an air deliverable, technologically beautiful shelter of 1985, which received considerable coverage within the architectural glossy magazines but no use in the field (Fig 2.7)

- The UNHCR (1993) shelter and environment workshop convened in 1993 in Geneva, where numerous manufacturers displayed their many varied 'universally applicable' shelter types (Figs 2.8 and 2.9)



Fig 2.7. Future Systems' emergency shelter (source: Pawley, 1994, p81)

Fig 2.8. Cardboard house displayed at the Geneva Workshop (source: the author)

Fig 2.9. Conport's steel emergency shelter displayed at Geneva Workshop (source: the author)

This list is representative of a minute fraction of the thousands of designs that have hit the market over the years. The UNHCR is constantly besieged by designers and manufacturers showing their new and improved designs (W. Neumann, Physical and Technical Support Section, UNHCR, private communication, 1993). The majority are characterised by high costs and low occupancy rates if and when they are utilised in the field.

The continued attempts by manufacturers and designers to produce universally applicable emergency shelter 'solutions' for use in disasters, have little basis in the real needs of survivors of disaster and more basis in the agendas of the relief agencies and donors who supply humanitarian aid [6]. Such solutions do not address the longer term needs of **survivors**; they do not support local markets; nor do they give work to the local labour force; nor endeavour to empower communities. They do however support **donor** countries' economies, provide work in the donor nations and visibly promote the work of the aid agencies in the media [7].

Barakat's analysis of, what were seen by the Yemeni government, as emergency housing projects following the 1982 Dhamar earthquake, highlights schemes that were not based in existing cultural and social structures:

> "...The actual people concerned were never consulted on their requirements or expected to participate at any stage of the reconstruction. No effort was made to study, register or understand their traditional life styles, building types, technologies and materials. The damage assessment teams collected only statistical data on the number of houses destroyed, number of occupants and number of storeys of each house, etc.." (Barakat, 1993, p282)

The resulting projects showed that only 1,727 of the 2,646 new houses were occupied and that house forms bore "...no relation" to the traditional house type or acknowledged the traditional construction materials or the traditional usage of space within the house. This 'emergency' programme was actually realised some three to five years after the earthquake (some settlements were still not complete in 1991) and the houses did not correspond to the "...socio-cultural and economic reality".

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[6] The 1993 workshop held by the UNHCR in Geneva to discuss improved shelter response and environment for refugees was attended by twenty manufacturers from fifteen different countries all endeavouring to tout their products.

[7] This will be discussed in section 2.3.7.

As a result of this study, Barakat draws the conclusion that accurate needs assessment is vital: needs assessment that is carried out with an understanding of the local "...socio-cultural, economic and physical conditions" (Barakat, 1993).

2.3.6 **Timing of Provision**

The images of human suffering that are portrayed subsequent to any disaster induce a philanthropic response to help. Unfortunately, it is inevitably a 'knee jerk response' that has little basis in understanding the capacities of the 'victims' themselves or the existing community support structures that will enable survival in the short term. There is a need for agencies and donors to understand the phases of disaster and recovery and realise that there is an appropriate place for their intervention which may not always be in the immediate emergency period.

The earlier discussions in this chapter of the cyclical and spiral models of disaster introduced the concepts of relief, rehabilitation, reconstruction and development. These are the phases into which the aftermath of disaster is divided, they are by no means distinct or discrete phases: they overlap and in some cases can occur simultaneously in different areas of the disaster site.

Definitions of these terms can assist in understanding current practice in aid policies and also point towards areas where improvements can be made in terms of the timeliness of assistance.

Relief is the:

> "...provision on a humanitarian basis of material aid and emergency medical care necessary to save and preserve human lives and enable families to meet their basic needs for shelter, clothing, water and food (including the means to prepare food)" (Aysan & Davis, 1993, p47)

As will be seen in following chapters, the emphasis on the preservation of **lives** rather than **livelihoods** has serious repercussions on what is provided and how. For the purposes of the present discussion, it is important to see that the relief phase is concerned only with the **basic needs** for preservation of life and day-to-day survival.

Following this phase, comes the **recovery** phase, which covers **rehabilitation** and **reconstruction** [8]. This is the period during which actions are taken to enable victims to resume normal lives and their **means of livelihood.** It covers restoration of infrastructure, services and the economy in a manner "...appropriate to long term needs and development objectives" (Aysan & Davis, 1993). In disaster terms, reconstruction implies built–in improvements; so following an earthquake, houses would be reconstructed to resist future earthquake damage, thus increasing the capacities of the inhabitants and reducing their vulnerability.

An understanding of the definitions of these phases combined with analysis of past disaster interventions, shows that international humanitarian aid is not always required in the immediate relief phase. It is most often the case that the immediate basic needs of the affected population are met by the 'victims' themselves or through the elasticity of existing resources (Anderson & Woodrow, 1989; Cuny, 1983; Davis, 1978). In shelter terms, people will construct a makeshift shelter from any materials they can find, or shelter with relatives or take refuge in a public building such as a school or church. This innate human response for self-protection and survival will cover immediate needs and negates the assumption of agencies that there is no time to plan their intervention or take stock of the situation on the ground before acting (Anderson & Woodrow, 1989; Cuny, 1983; Davis, 1978). The most useful **immediate** action that an agency can take is to channel funds through organisations and agencies in the affected country to provide for the real needs of the affected communities (Anderson & Woodrow, 1989).

Agencies who are determined to drop the ubiquitous short term, flat packed, prefabricated, 'emergency shelter' into an area will adversely affect the recovery phase, (Cuny, 1983; Davis, 1978; UNDRO, 1982). The shelter will arrive after the immediate basic needs have been met by the survivors of the disaster — it is therefore, no longer an **emergency** item but by default a **rehabilitation** item, a difference which has three main consequences. Firstly, such an item is likely to remain uninhabited as emergency needs have already been met. Secondly, as a rehabilitation item it will need to last longer than an emergency shelter, which it will fail to do as emergency shelters are not designed to be inhabited longer than a few weeks and are unsuitable for longer term accommodation. Thirdly, as a recovery item, it will do nothing to assist in the restoration of infrastructure or

[8] It will be shown in Chapter Three that these phases differ significantly in war, where conditions of permanent emergency alter the relief phase and subsequent recovery patterns.

economy or services and therefore will add nothing to the local economy or labour force, will not assist in the construction of new improved shelter and will not address the reconstruction of the means of livelihood.

Agencies must therefore be aware of the appropriate time for their intervention and act accordingly. Failure to do so, risks time and money and more importantly, adversely affects the long-term development of the country they are endeavouring to assist.

2.3.7 **Media Pressures on Intervention**

One theory for late, culturally insensitive and inappropriate action from the humanitarian community is that the media adversely affect intervention. The media are rarely on the scene prior to the development of graphic pictures of suffering, and yet the broadcasting of such images can pressurise the humanitarian community to act. Forced to act, the international community will arrive unprepared to do anything other than administer a palliative to the visible symptoms of underlying crisis.

For today's world of television a news story has to be visual to get air time; reports of crisis and disaster situations are full of vibrant images of the starving, wounded, dead and dying (Girardet, 1993). Such reportage does indeed incite international interest and the subsequent pressure can motivate action from the humanitarian or military community. News reports in 1994 of little Irma from Sarajevo and John Major's bewildering reaction to them, show that media coverage can have a powerful effect on government policy and action. It has been reported that US policy is made by CNN (Barakat, 1995). As Girardet, (1993) said of the intervention in Somalia:

> "It is unlikely that the United States would have risked military intervention for purely humanitarian reasons in the Horn of Africa had there not been broad public sympathy for the Somalis' plight, much of it prompted by saturation media coverage" (Girardet, 1993, p 40)

It is true that public pressure can push governments to act, an article by a UNHCR/UNICEF representative reports that:

> "People in their own homes watch history while it is in the making...they can pressurise governments into action, they can help stop the suffering, they can actually change the course of history. And they do." (Foa, 1995, p33)

But how dangerous is such pressure when it originates from an uninformed and sometimes misinformed public? Time worn images of famine or war do not convey reality. They lead to an assumption by the international public that all problems can be solved through the wholesale provision of food and medicine. There is no realisation of the fundamental or root cause of the disaster and consequently the aid demanded and provided is inappropriate. For example, the crisis in Somalia grew principally from acrid clan divisions and subsequent street fighting, shelling and food shortages in 1991. At this stage famine had not gripped the country, however, by the time the media became interested and showed the situation to the world in 1992, the crisis was portrayed as one of people in desperate need of food. There was no effort to explain the root causes of the disaster; the public was left with the impression that "...food could save Somalia." (Girardet, 1993). There was equally no indication that the vast convoys of unprotected food aid that were sent would likely increase the conflict and consequent suffering of those seen starving on the television.

It was unlikely that media interest in portraying the growing tensions in 1991, would have led to earlier involvement by the United Nations through public pressure. However, it would have given background understanding of the situation to all those pushing nutritional solutions to what was essentially a political problem of inter-clan conflict. The Operation Restore Hope that was eventually launched by the United States may have saved a few lives. However, it also allowed the international community to side step its responsibilities through focusing on a manifestation of one symptom of the disease and not the disease itself.

With more agencies and NGOs operating in war situations the images shown and the reporting of the real issues are likely to become even more blurred. If relief agencies wish to remain operating in a country, it is unwise to antagonise the parties in power by uncovering political realities. Reporting of the Ethiopia crisis was a prime example of agencies playing down the reality in order to remain in the country. A situation that was characterised by violence, enforced population clearance, aid abuses and political manipulation was portrayed by the media, reliant on agency reports, as a 'natural' disaster of famine and drought. Such a

misrepresentation of the facts contributed to many potentially preventable deaths (Girardet, 1993). It led to inappropriate and misdirected aid which inevitably adversely affected subsequent recovery and development .

It is a valid point that it is difficult for an agency based in the centre of a war to publicly lay blame on any side, or to openly display partiality, and still remain in the country to carry out work. This again leads to an issue of the timeliness of reporting and consequent action. If situations were reported as they arose, the increased early awareness of potential problem areas could lead to timely action to divert emergencies. If the clan tensions had been reported from Somalia as they happened, rather than after they had blown into all out war, then actions could have been taken in 1991 to try and avert the conflict and deaths (de Waal, 1994).

As far back as 1978, Davis wrote of the commonly perceived myths of disaster relief (Davis, 1978). One such myth was that the survivors of disaster are helpless victims, unable to survive without the good will of the international community. Unfortunately, it is a myth that is still upheld and promoted by the media: it does nothing to encourage accurate disaster relief or true understanding of what is needed in disaster-torn countries. Reporting focuses on 'victims' lying in the ruins of buildings and international search and rescue teams, who are shown to be doing all the work as the host nation stands by wringing its hands. There is no portrayal of the fact that the primary search and rescue needs are usually met by the 'victims' themselves, mobilising to search for friends and relatives. Such biased reporting merely serves to encourage nations in the belief that they must send their own relief and rescue teams to deal with all crises. As reported earlier in this chapter, such an attitude in Kobe, cost the Japanese government a large amount of time and effort in translating for, transporting, accommodating and feeding teams that they had already explicitly stated they did not need.

In the context of war, the coverage provided by the international media is greatly influential not only over what **type** of aid and relief gets sent and **when**, but also to **whom** the relief is offered. Media reporting is rarely, if ever, free from bias and this can have serious effects on the support offered to opposing sides in conflict. As a consequence of biased reporting and relief provision, the level of conflict will be increased and 'humanitarian action' will ultimately promote rather than reduce suffering [9].

[9] This will be discussed further in Chapters Three and Seven.

The symbiotic nature of the humanitarian community and the media is understood, each needs the other to raise finance for continued action. However, agencies need to be trained to utilise the media to promote informed commentary on the realities of disaster and war if the aid provided as a consequence is going to be truly useful. At present, agencies implement big and visible projects to show the fund-donating public how effectively their money is being used (Duffield, 1994). Donors too favour the visible over the discrete, images of fields of emergency shelters or planes being filled with relief goods illustrate to the voting public that the government is fulfilling its responsibilities (Borton, 1993). In shelter terms particularly, the highly visible is seldom the most appropriate solution. Camps of prefabricated shelter units or blue plastic tents sporting the UNHCR logo, may visibly prove activity from donors, but do not show the consequent long-term harm of such schemes on the recovery and rehabilitation of the affected communities.

2.4 INTEGRATION

2.4.1 **Integration**

Integration is the second pivotal theme of this thesis, as identified from the literature. Harrell-Bond (1990) defines integration as:

> "...something which occurs when host and refugee communities are able to co-exist, sharing the same resources (economic and social) with no greater mutual conflict than that which exists within the host community" (Harrell-Bond, 1990, p124)

The definition is simple and, as she states, does not stand up to detailed analysis, especially in situations such as Bosnia where the host community is already living within the arena of war. However, as a starting point it is a valid definition.

Based on the points raised so far in this chapter, it is evident that in order for relief to have long-term, sustainable, positive effects on development and reconstruction, it needs to support indigenous coping mechanisms. It has been seen that refugees and the survivors of disasters are not the incapable and helpless beings that they are often portrayed as, but are capable and self reliant in the presence of enabling interventions. The sum of their physical and non-physical capacities enables them to survive and cope. This implies both an *a priori* and an organised access to social, economic and physical resources. In many situations the refugee coping strategies are affected by rules and regulations that deny their interaction with hosts (Wilson, 1992). If refugees are to maintain their innate capacities, the humanitarian

community must be more committed to improving the access of refugees to the existing physical and social structures of the host, than it has demonstrated itself to be in the past (Wilson, 1992).

For refugees, access to such resources requires that the host government operates policies that promote integration of incomers and hosts, a requirement that meets with difficulties. It means that refugees should be given access to the same employment opportunities, educational and health benefits as the host. However, in countries which are struggling to maintain such benefits for their own citizens, allowing refugees access to such facilities is seldom straight forward.

For example, Chimni's (1994) examination of the situation in India shows that employment opportunities are rarely granted to refugees. Refugees from Tibet, taking refuge in India, were issued with certificates of identity which theoretically made them able to apply for work. However, a lack of Indian citizenship meant that most employment opportunities were still closed to them. Refugees from East Pakistan in Bangladesh were categorically refused the right to work. The state they took refuge in already had an unemployment level of 2.5 million and the state believed that providing refugees with opportunities of employment would lead to "...social and economic tensions within th[e] country" (Chimni, 1994). However, the refugees did often get involved in informal, economic activity as their labour was offered at cheaper rates than that of the host population and was thus more acceptable to host landlords. This activity created tensions with the host labourers (Chimni, 1994).

The implementation of integration policies by the host government is usually the result of a range of factors such as the scale of the influx of forced migrants, the economic situation of the host country and the health and welfare status of the population of the host country. In an interesting comparative study, Smawfield (1993), notes the differences of treatment received by Mozambican refugees by neighbouring countries. The Zambian government made it clear that refugees could stay if they wished whereas the Malawian government stated that it was never a possibility for the refugees to stay permanently. The relative scales of the influx on both countries and the levels of existing provision of resources to nationals dictated the response of both governments and therefore their policies on integration for the refugees. In Zambia, where the influx represented only a small percentage increase, refugees were fully integrated, in Malawi where the influx was greater and existing

resources tighter, refugees were assisted but never integrated. In education terms they attended separate schools and were taught the Mozambican curriculum, whereas those in Zambia attended the same schools as the hosts and were taught on the Zambian curriculum.

The desire to see refugees integrated with hosts does not imply that refugees should be completely assimilated into the host community and lose their cultural identity. For refugees who have lost many physical assets, the maintenance of their non-tangible qualities of culture and tradition is very important. Therefore, integration merely implies that refugees are given access to existing resources so that their own capacities and coping mechanisms are supported.

2.4.2 **Host — Incomer Conflict**

Refugee law is still based on the 1951 United Nations Convention, which was set up after the Second World War to outline actions in the event of population movements from East to West. The convention was formed to meet the requirements of refugees moving from the East to developed countries with high resource levels. It concerned individual rather than mass movements of populations and laid the onus for responsibility on the country of asylum (HRH, El Hassan Bin Talal, 1993).

Today's reality is far removed from this circumstance and yet the law remains the same. Refugee crises are now characterised by mass movements, hundreds of thousands of individuals crossing borders simultaneously. Frequently, the host country becomes the place of asylum by virtue of its proximity rather than an intrinsic ability to provide assistance. Environmental and economic impoverishment mean that receiving countries can be swiftly overburdened by an influx of refugees. When refugees are entering an environment where the hosts are already competing for scarce resources, the provision of aid and relief assistance becomes a very sensitive issue.

At present, mandates suggest that relief assistance is given only to refugees or displaced persons. The host community do not get consideration or help even though their level of suffering may be on a par with that of the incoming community. As Harrell-Bond remarks:

> "...[a] project that discriminates among members of a poor community is likely to create antagonisms, the results are more serious in cases where the beneficiaries are strangers with no local rights." (Harrell-Bond, 1990, p127)

Where the local population is living on the margins of survival, any programmes that favour incoming refugees with resources and facilities over the host population are likely to create conflict and increase tensions (Chambers, 1986). Competition for those resources that exist such as timber, water or firewood becomes intense. In areas of Africa, where regions are already environmentally depleted, the arrival of thousands of refugees gathering timber and brushwood for shelter construction and fuel, causes severe tensions with the local community and can result in refugees scavenging for wood after dark to reduce the possibility of attack (Chambers, 1986).

Construction of health or educational facilities that are aimed solely at benefiting refugees increases rifts between the incoming and host communities in areas where the hosts' access to such facilities is negligible. In order to deal with these imbalances in provision, the UNHCR has adopted the principle of local parity: a principle which dictates that refugees reach no higher level than the host population through relief assistance. The principle does not answer the problem that develops in areas where the hosts' standard of living is below the subsistence level. In these situations 'parity' would suggest that if the local population were starving then refugees also should starve. A more acceptable solution, where the host population is worse off than the refugees, is to include them in the relief programme. Failure to do so is likely to result in "...the impoverishment of the poorest inhabitants of the host areas" (Callamard, 1994).

Difficulties are increased in areas where refugees are ensconced in camps rather than self-settled. Here, the impact of refugees is much more intrusive on the host population, as vast numbers of refugees concentrated in one area will swamp local job markets and place uneven demands on resources such as water, food, fuel and timber. The resultant increased competition for resources leads to conflict between hosts and incoming groups. As Wilson (1992) outlines:

> "Great concentrations of refugees relative to local populations swamp local socio-economic capacities, and create a new and much more limited type of economy. This is one reason why refugees in camps and settlements have generally found it so difficult to become self-sufficient" (Wilson, 1992, p229)

In war situations, the level of provision for refugees becomes even more delicate, as over provision for incoming refugees and refugee-centric approaches to relief serve only to increase existing ethnic rifts between populations. Reinforcement of such ethnic rifts encourages conflict and while conflict exists, reconstruction and development are not viable. Agencies must therefore be aware of the potential for their aid provision to increase conflict and govern their actions accordingly.

It should also be noted, however, that while competition for the same scarce resources can create conflict, there are also many examples of healthy symbiotic relationships developing between the hosts and incoming migrants. Christensen, (1982), notes that refugees in Somalia developed barter relationships with the host community that were of mutual benefit to both communities:

> "...The food exchange has a social impact...It prevents refugee camps from becoming segregated areas. It prevents antagonism between highly subsidised non-food-producing groups and less, or non-subsidised-food-producing poor groups residing in the same localities." (Christensen, 1982, p27)

Callamard (1994), remarks on Chamber's comments that Thai hosts have benefited economically from Laotian refugee camps, as witnessed by the illicit markets set up at the camp gates. She also outlines the effects of Mozambican refugees in camps on the local Malawian hosts:

> "...the camp under study came to play the much needed role of a vibrant market-place which fulfilled local market needs while providing business opportunities where there used to be few. Moreover, the refugees' income-generating activities, centred around the trade of the assistance programme, have allowed for some cash accumulation within the camp and resulted in an increased commoditization of exchanges at the local level." (Callamard, 1994, p41)

Such mutually beneficial relationships point to the validity and value of socially integrating refugees into the host population. This is not to suggest that refugees should be encouraged to abandon their culture and heritage and become as one

with the host community, nor that they should be abandoned by the international system and left to sink or swim in a free-market situation. Rather that they should be allowed access to those resources that are required to maintain their productivity and livelihoods in a way that maintains their independence.
For, as Wilson notes, (1992), at present, refugees suffer:

> "...the worst kind of institutionalization: one which both restrains their ability to meet their own needs, and yet is itself starved of adequate resources to meet their needs and too politically emasculated to secure their rights." (Wilson, 1992, p232)

2.5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This chapter has broadly examined a range of issues, identified from the literature, essential to the understanding of the provision of relief in natural disasters and refugee crises in order to develop a framework of issues to analyse performance in war. This analysis has identified two main themes that run through the literature covering natural disasters and refugee crises:

- Vulnerability and capacity
- Integration

These central themes form the basis for both the following chapter's examination of humanitarian provision in war and for the analysis of the shelter programmes and policies in the Republic of Croatia presented in Section Two. Of critical importance to the following analysis is the concept of **imposed vulnerability,** which was introduced in this chapter and will form a core of subsequent analysis in Chapter Six. This central premise has been outlined primarily in the work of Black (1994); within the discourses on dependency theory in the work of Harrell-Bond and Kibreab (Harrell-Bond, 1986, 1990, 1993; Kibreab, 1993) and mooted within the work of Zetter on access and labelling (Zetter, 1987).

The extreme climate of war makes it more crucial that agencies' actions and operations are appropriate and sensitive. The necessity to understand and address social, cultural and political root causes in order to promote peace and ultimate reconstruction and development is paramount. Thus it is essential that agencies can identify and address the human element in relief programmes so that they can build on capacities, reduce vulnerabilities where possible and avoid imposing higher levels of vulnerability on the target group through their actions.

The next chapter examines the provision of humanitarian relief in war situations. It extends the discourse concerning the central themes of vulnerability and capacity and integration to the context of war, persecution and violence.

CHAPTER THREE: HUMANITARIAN RELIEF IN WAR

3.1 INTRODUCTION

Chapter Two introduced the two central themes identified within the literature on natural disasters and refugee crises:

- Vulnerability and capacity
- Integration

This chapter builds upon these two discourses by analysing the literature covering the practice of humanitarian relief in war. It begins by discussing the character of war and outlining the parameters for action that conflict defines. With the proliferation of wars world-wide and the increasing level of action by the humanitarian community within them, it is necessary to understand how the environment of war affects the possible programmes and actions of relief agencies. This chapter moves to understand the effects that war and violence have on the central themes of vulnerability and capacity, and integration. Thus, following an introduction to the arena of war, the two central discourses will be discussed within the framework of their component parts:

i. Vulnerability in the environment of war
   - Vulnerability as constructed by wealth; political affiliation; ethnicity and gender

ii. Capacity in the environment of war
   - Coping mechanisms
   - Relief to Development Continuum
   - Changes in the humanitarian community
   - Accountability

iii. Integration
- Conflict reduction and peace building

3.1.1 War Revisited: The Complex Arena for the Humanitarian Community

In the last ten years, the international community has coined the term 'complex emergency' to cover the events of the Horn of Africa and the Transcaucasus regions. It states that such emergencies are 'complex' because they are characterised by "...war, political instability and the collapse of state institutions..." (DHA, 1995a). The author believes, in line with Duffield (1994b), that the term is actually a misnomer and is utilised to evade pinpointing the crux of the problem: ultimately the situations defined as complex emergencies are wars and internal conflicts.

The term was first utilised during conflict in Mozambique in the 1980's, to play down the **political element** of the problem and allow the UN to conduct negotiations between RENAMO (Mozambique National Resistance) and the government (Adams & Bradbury, 1994). The term 'complex emergency' is not a description of the situation as it would appear to those citizens directly involved in it; to civilians on the ground they are in the midst of war, not complexity. The label 'complex emergency' was derived **by** the international community **for** the international community and describes the complexity that is induced by their own actions within a war. As Duffield states:

> "If one were to give a definition of complex emergencies, it would be that they relate to the emergence of protracted political crises in the now economic and strategically marginal areas of the global economy....**Complex emergencies also encapsulate the problematic intervention by North America and West Europe.**" (Duffield, 1994b, p9, emphasis added)

The new arena for the international community is **war,** either within weak, or 'failed' states, where the political powers have been seen to collapse and cease to function, as in Angola; or in strong states where the political structure is still vibrant as in the Former-Yugoslavia (Duffield, 1994b).

These wars, within which the humanitarian community is now acting cause a level of devastation unlike that of any natural disaster. War lays waste to infrastructure and communication links; systems of government and social support; the natural and the built environment; markets and commercial networks; social structures and support mechanisms; human skills and country knowledge base and educational opportunities for generations of children and teenagers. It throws thousands of citizens to the edge of abject poverty and leaves a legacy of social and economic

destruction for decades to follow. So, while natural disaster may destroy the physical and built environment, it does not as war does, directly destroy the social and political structures that underpin a nation and would assist in recovery. This total devastation of all mechanisms makes recovery from war a slow and difficult process. It means that agencies who chose to supply relief in wartime, must operate with immense care and awareness in order to avoid further damaging coping mechanisms and increasing the level of suffering and destruction.

Since the international community first intervened against a nation's sovereignty in Iraq in 1991, NGOs, agencies and donors have been berated for continuing to make inappropriate and damaging interventions. Many critics believe that the reasons for the humanitarian community's poor performance are based in a crucial lack of understanding of the circumstances and characteristics of war (Adams & Bradbury, 1994; Barakat, *et al.*, 1995; de Waal, 1994; Duffield, 1994b; Macrae & Zwi, 1994; Slim, 1995a; Templar, 1994).

One indicator that the actions of the international community are misdirected, may be the response of the 'beneficiaries' to the relief workers of today. In the hostile atmosphere of current crises, relief workers seem to have lost their previous innate immunity to attack. Over the last three years more aid workers have met their deaths through working in 'complex emergencies' than in the whole of the previous decade (Duffield, 1994b). Some have been accidentally caught up in the cross fire, others deliberately targeted and some have died as the result of attacks on the humanitarian community. The war-torn environments that these agencies are working in, depleted of resources through conflict, construct aid workers as targets of appropriation and violence (Duffield, 1994b; Weiss & Minear, 1993). Some of the new NGOs have been born into this environment of danger and violence, for others, the experience is radically different to their usual sphere of action and consequently highly dangerous. Both new and old require a higher and more acute understanding of operation in war in order to both protect themselves and make their actions effective and appropriate.

3.1.2 **Permanent Emergency**

In natural disaster there is a desire to promote rehabilitation and reconstruction. The government, nation and international community endeavour to assist in all phases of relief and recovery. In war, where there are situations of contested governance, factions will try to prevent the rehabilitation and recovery of certain

sections of the population. Aid will be diverted or stopped and convoys attacked to prevent delivery to certain areas or to re-apportion supplies to opposing warring factions (DHA, 1995a; Duffield, 1994b; IFRC, 1993).

The relatively clear stages of recovery from natural disaster illustrated in Chapter Two are noticeably absent in war. There are no clearly defined stages of relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction. War situations are increasingly of long duration, especially when it is in the interests of the powerful to prolong the process (IFRC, 1993; Macrae & Zwi, 1994; Weiss & Minear, 1993). As Adams and Bradbury state:

> "Treating conflicts and the complex emergencies they generate as short term problems, fails to appreciate the nature of the current wars which have proved to be durable, more pervasive in their destruction of people, communities, and infrastructure than 'natural' disasters." (Adams & Bradbury, 1994)

This attribute of internal conflict means that agencies can find themselves acting in a period of 'permanent emergency' developed and encouraged to support the powerful (Adams & Bradbury, 1994; Duffield, 1994b). The state of permanent emergency means that the international community finds itself responding with military, humanitarian and developmental relief at the same time. This blurs the traditional, though inappropriate, divisions that existed between relief and development [1] (Stiefel, 1994). In situations of war, unpredictability and crisis are the normal environment within which agencies have to act. Programming therefore, needs to be open to constant re-interpretation. Implementation of a tightly planned relief and development package will lead to loss of time and funds as situations suddenly change (Adams & Bradbury, 1994).

3.1.3 **Root Causes**

As in natural disasters, wars have underlying root causes that can be addressed to diffuse tension and prevent conflict. El Bushra's (1994) model illustrates conflict as a process and outlines the areas where intervention is possible to prevent outright war (Fig 3.1).

[1] The contrived divisions between relief and development will be discussed further on in this chapter.

Even after war has begun, the dynamics and environment change as the conflict progresses. This mutating path needs constant and flexible monitoring and assessment if aid agencies are going to respond to it effectively and appropriately to reduce the tensions between incomers and hosts and lower the level of conflict. For instance, war in the former Yugoslavia began as a result of deepening economic crisis and consequent fragmentation in the 1970s. The economic gap between the republics widened and grew, leaving Slovenia and Croatia with increasing prosperity and Serbia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Bosnia-Hercegovina lagging behind (Magas, 1993).



Fig 3.1. The process of conflict (El Bushra, 1994)

The circles represent critical thresholds — "...moments when a situation is poised to move either in a positive or negative direction, and is susceptible to influence" (Adams and Bradbury, 1994, p 27). It is at these points that intervention is possible to prevent war or the resurgence of war.

This war then, was initiated as a result of economic imbalance. However, over the past five years it has changed and developed a revengeful character based on personal vendettas and individual ethnic tensions. This has been reinforced by war-time elections that have returned parties to power who "...actively seek to define citizenship on ethnic terms." (Duffield, 1994b).

3.1.4 **Support for Remaining Capacities**

It is necessary to address war as a separate area to 'natural' disasters and refugee crises not just because of its extreme political and social context, but also because the damage caused by war is the most extensive and far reaching of all disasters. The vast extent of the damage requires the mass efforts of a nation's population to reconstruct. In order for any war torn nation to recover therefore, there is a need to build upon a surviving indigenous base of human and material resources. Reconstruction can only proceed if it is based on surviving networks and facilities. As stated in the York Charter for Reconstruction after War:

> The use of local resources, both human and material, is essential for an exhausted post-war economy to recover." (Barakat & Cockburn, 1991, p 23)

This means that it is vitally important that any relief action during war supports whatever coping mechanisms remain functional and encourages new support structures to grow and form. Any international agency going into a war zone unaware of the specific and specialised need to support such structures will do irretrievable harm.

In addition, therefore, to understanding the issues discussed in Chapter Two, agencies acting in war must also be aware of the new imposed parameters of operating in a conflict zone. They must be aware of the potential for their actions to increase the level of conflict or existing tensions (Barakat, *et al.*, 1994). They must broaden their understanding of the concept of vulnerability to the new parameters of war. They must be aware of the value of negotiation skills, conflict resolution and propaganda analysis. As Slim (1995) suggests, today's crises require a "...fundamental reappraisal of the relief worker's essential identity".

This chapter will, therefore, proceed to examine the actions of the humanitarian community in war and conflict. It is not a review of shelter specific experiences, indeed the literature specifically covering the provision of **emergency shelter in**

war is sparse and ill defined [2]. Most relevant papers concentrate either purely on the actions of the humanitarian community or the provision of food aid in war, none look directly at emergency shelter provision for refugees and displaced persons in war. However, these same papers do contain many relevant and parallel lessons that need to be understood in order to evaluate the provision of shelter in the Republic of Croatia and develop guidelines for improvement. The following discussion outlines some of the crucial difficulties of operating within war, in order to further develop the central themes of vulnerability and capacity and integration that underpin the analysis of provision of shelter for refugees and displaced persons within war.

3.2 VULNERABILITY IN THE ENVIRONMENT OF WAR

In natural disasters it was seen that the poor were the most vulnerable to hazards. In war, vulnerability is not solely the province of the poor, but can also have its roots in wealth, politics, ethnicity and gender. The primary difficulty is that while in natural disaster the suffering of the survivors is 'unintended'; in war, the civilian population is the **deliberate** target of aggression and acts of violence. Famine, migration, injury and death are not accidental but are the sought after results of victimisation from warring factions (Adams & Bradbury, 1994). This means that entire groups or factions can suddenly become vulnerable purely by political or ethnic association, their wealth or gender.

3.2.1 **Vulnerability Constructed by Wealth**

Unlike natural disasters, in war it is often the rich who become vulnerable on account of their wealth (Duffield, 1994b). The persecution of the Dinka in Southern Sudan in the Eighties illustrated this very clearly. In Sudan's second civil war the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), drew support from many groups in the South, primarily from the Dinka who had been excluded from participation in government since the 1970s (Adams & Bradbury, 1994). In 1983 the central government was faced with increasing problems, greater tribal activity by the Baggara of the West and the SPLA of the South, in addition to increasing demands from the international community for payment of debts (Keen, 1994). Oil newly discovered in the South, which could have alleviated the government's problems,

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[2] As stated in the Prelude to this thesis, there is a paucity of literature on shelter for refugees from, and persons displaced by, war. There is, however, a growing body of literature covering reconstruction following war, which of necessity, stresses the importance of relief and rehabilitation policies during war (for example, Adams & Bradbury, 1994; Templar, 1994; Duffield, 1994a; Barakat & Cockburn, 1991, Barakat, *et al.*, 1994).

was being controlled by the SPLA. Therefore the central government encouraged the Baggara to conduct raids on the rich Dinka of the south, stealing the cattle and selling them to the North of Sudan and operating a scorched earth policy (Keen, 1994). By 1988, the famine that hit Sudan and primarily the Dinka, caused deaths at one of the highest ever recorded rates in the world (Keen, 1994). Cattle raiding meant that the Dinka lost their means of survival in difficult times. They could not draw on the traditional coping mechanism of reciprocal assistance within their community as those who had no cattle had nothing to reciprocate with. Their natural wealth made them vulnerable to attack and as a result of the attacks, they could no longer resist adverse conditions and fell victim to the famine that was covering the country.

3.2.2 **Vulnerability Constructed by Political Affiliation**

In war, the primary vulnerable groups can be created by political affiliation (Slim, 1995). For instance, as well as being constructed by wealth, the attacks on the Dinka had a political basis. The root of their vulnerability was their initial lack of political legitimacy (Adams & Bradbury, 1994). As Keen notes in his paper of 1994,

> "...it was precisely the assets controlled by the southern Sudanese groups (notably the Dinka) — for example, their land, livestock, and newly discovered oil — which exposed them, **in the context of extreme political powerlessness**, to exploitative processes that created and constituted famine." (Keen, 1994, p121, emphasis added)

The persecution of the Dinka was part of a long term process of "political delegitimisation" (Duffield, 1994b). Political vulnerability was also the root of suffering of the Banto, Rahanweyne and Reer Xamr in Somalia as well as the Tutsi, Twa and Hutu moderates in Rwanda (Adams & Bradbury, 1994).

Political vulnerability encompasses entire social strata and is no respecter of age, social position or degree of wealth. The characteristic of war is that long term political tensions can explode to make entire cross sections of society vulnerable almost overnight (Slim, 1995).

3.2.3 **Vulnerability Constructed by Ethnicity**

In war, ethnicity is also a strong determinant of vulnerability. As with political vulnerability, members of an entire ethnic line can become vulnerable to

persecution over night (Duffield, 1994b). The case of the Iraqi Kurds is a prime example of the speed at which vulnerability can manifest. In just two weeks at the beginning of April 1991, the refugee population in Iran ballooned from 50,000 to 560,000. It was the "...fastest refugee movement in the forty year history of UNHCR" (De Almaida E Silva, 1991).

Ethnic vulnerability is exemplified by activities within the former-Yugoslavia. In Bosnia, 'ethnic cleansing' has resulted in an estimated 1.1 million refugees who have fled the country, 800,000 internally displaced persons and hundreds of thousands dead and missing (US. Committee for Refugees, 1993). Indeed, the UNHCR documents that it currently assists 2,740,000 ethnically vulnerable refugees, displaced persons and other beneficiaries within Bosnia-Hercegovina alone (UNHCR, 1994a).

3.2.4 **Vulnerability Constructed by Gender**

Intrastate war in particular constructs women as a highly vulnerable group and thus they require the cognisant protection of the international community. War can create a new role for many women as household heads or breadwinners which can increase their own and their family's vulnerability to attack (Adams & Bradbury, 1994; Nguyen-Lazarus, 1995). Men maybe targeted for killing or conscripted, which leaves women as the household heads. In the change of role that war can bring, women often must take over tasks previously performed by the men. Women therefore have to undertake jobs such as foraging for fuel and firewood which increases their vulnerability to injury from land mines and attack. Additionally, the threat of violence towards women leads to a reduced mobility and this can have extreme cumulative effects on the family where women have become the main providers of food and shelter (Adams & Bradbury, 1994).

War also creates an environment of high vulnerability to attack, rape and persecution (Adams & Bradbury, 1994; Nguyen-Lazarus, 1995) and consequently women's major vulnerability lies in the threat of sexual attack. Rape and violence towards women now appear to be part of the arsenal of the soldier in combat (Adams & Bradbury, 1994; Nguyen-Lazarus, 1995; Slim, 1995). This new weapon means that agencies need to be aware of the consequent different requirements of women for psychological, medical and material assistance (Adams & Bradbury, 1994). Despite establishing guidelines for protection of women in 1985, to date the UNHCR has failed to implement them and enforce the condemnation of

atrocities against women in Bosnia, Somalia, Mozambique or Rwanda (Elmadmad, 1996). Consequently both the women and their families continue to be a highly vulnerable section of the population.

3.2.5 **Implications**

In the same way as vulnerability to natural disaster can be identified and addressed to reduce the level of suffering in subsequent disasters, it should also be possible to address vulnerability to war and conflict, diffusing tensions before they ignite into all out war. As Boutros-Ghali states in his agenda for peace:

> "The most desirable and efficient employment of diplomacy is to ease tensions before they result in conflict — or, if conflict breaks out, to act swiftly to contain it and resolve its underlying causes. ...Given the economic and social roots of many potential conflicts, the information needed by the United Nations now must encompass economic and social trends as well as political developments that may lead to dangerous tensions" (Boutros-Ghali, 1992, p13)

The humanitarian community also needs to address the new structure of their target groups. Whereas natural disasters produce survivors mainly from the rural or urban poor, the broader categories of vulnerability to the hazard of war, mean that the humanitarian community finds itself assisting a wide cross section of the affected population. New understanding is required to work with the diverse range of skills and capabilities from the upper class urban professional to the rural peasant farmer.

Action in war, also requires agencies to understand and support the affected population's own coping mechanisms. This process is more complex in war than in natural disasters, as opposing factions will deliberately target and destroy community's mechanisms for coping.

3.3 CAPACITY IN THE ENVIRONMENT OF WAR

3.3.1 **Coping Mechanisms**

In war, coping mechanisms can be broken down by systematic violence. This approach was utilised, for example, by the Baggara against the Dinka in Sudan and ultimately resulted in the Dinka succumbing to famine. The acknowledged mechanisms for individuals to resist famine are firstly, dependence on traditional food stuffs; secondly, sale of key assets and finally non-market strategies such as gathering wild food and berries (Blaikie, *et al.*, 1994; Keen, 1994). In Sudan, there

were four key processes which ensured that the Dinka would be unable to operate any of these coping mechanisms to resist famine. Firstly, raiding left the communities without the cattle and grain stores that they traditionally relied on for food. Secondly, the Dinka sold what assets they had in order to buy grain. However, grain prices rose sharply as a result of intimidation and collusion and thus it was impossible for the Dinka to purchase enough food for adequate nutrition. Thirdly, non-market strategies were curtailed by the opposing military forces restricting Dinka movement. Finally, the relief aid that was delivered was blocked by political groups and failed to reach the Dinka (Keen, 1994). These combined actions meant that the traditional and innate coping mechanisms of the group were systematically destroyed by opposing factions, thereby increasing the Dinka's risk of succumbing to disaster and death.

In Bosnia-Hercegovina, the coping mechanisms employed by the urban households, are seen as being very similar to those coping strategies utilised during famine. Curtis, (1995) compares the coping strategies of Bosnian Muslims with those of famine affected communities and finds that, excluding the pre-crisis stage and the nutritional effects on children [3], the response to coping with war has followed a similar path to that of coping with famine. As access to resources became restricted for Bosnian Muslims, food, fuel, water and electricity were harder to attain. Restrictions on movement combined with political sanctions meant that many Muslims lost their jobs and their income. Many households therefore, engaged in selling their assets in order to survive — commodities such as televisions, carpets, videos and furniture, were sold for low prices in the market place to raise income (Curtis, 1995). This income still did not provide access to food however, as most stall holders refused to serve Muslims and policed the operation by checking identity cards before serving customers (Curtis, 1995).

For those living in East Mostar, essential services such as electricity and water were also cut off by opposing forces. Although water could still be obtained in theory from the Neretva river, in practice, sniper activity meant that this coping mechanism was also curtailed. As a final resort, many sought to leave the areas where they were in danger and take refuge in safe areas. However, even distress migration was beyond the means of many, as the Croats and Serbs charged high

[3] Curtis found that many of the Bosnian refugees had been surprised by the sudden onset of the war and were not prepared in any way for flight or war time survival. It was also noted that while in Africa during a famine situation children will often miss meals, in Bosnia parents and grandparents would go without their meals in favour of the children.

prices for the essential relevant papers. These costs pushed the possibility of flight out of the reach of families who had already sold their assets to buy food and warmth (Curtis, 1995). Thus, continuing conflict and aggression towards a particularly vulnerable ethnic group served to curtail their coping mechanisms.

This systematic destruction of coping mechanisms is a characteristic of the violence of internal war and conflict and needs to be understood and addressed by the humanitarian community acting in war. Failure to support coping mechanisms encourages dependency and promotes a state of permanent emergency (Duffield, 1994b, Adams & Bradbury, 1994).

3.3.2 **Relief or Development? A Community in Crisis**

The pressures of acting in war, and the new parameters that such involvement brings, are not the only changes for the international community. Coupled with the change in the arena of involvement are changes in the humanitarian community's structure. Increasingly it is NGOs, with their lack of governmental affiliation, who provide the safety net in times of crisis (Duffield, 1994b). More often, the support they give is on a reduced budget and yet the money is expected to do more and solve greater, longer, crises than ever before. Such changes to the system of humanitarian aid have led to new concerns and increasing debate over many aspects of the structure of the humanitarian community. The political concerns and funding policies of the donors are the prime factors determining what aid is given, how and to whom. In order to improve current praxis in relief programmes, it is necessary to investigate the motivations and concerns of donors and the responses of the humanitarian community.

In the past there has always been a clear, and misdirected, distinction between relief and development fuelled by the modernist paradigm. Development was seen as a normative process of progression from poverty and vulnerability to wealth and security (Duffield, 1994a). Crisis and relief were seen as distinct and separate programmes of action that interrupted the development process. This division is exemplified by the structure of agencies and organisations that contain both a relief department and a development department. This artificial division has increased the damage done to affected communities, nations and states by emergency relief programmes in past disasters (Anderson & Woodrow, 1989; Cuny, 1983).

As was seen in Chapter Two, relief aid is defined as those items necessary to "...save and preserve human lives" (Templar, 1994). It is this emphasis on the saving of lives to the exclusion of livelihoods that causes so many problems currently in the many states of permanent emergency that exist around the world. If affected communities are constantly provided with emergency assistance that only endeavours to save lives, then a dependence on the external assistance will inevitably develop through curtailment of innate coping mechanisms. (Barakat, *et al.*, 1995; Templar, 1994). Relief aid must focus on the preservation of livelihoods as well as lives if it is to become developmental (Ellis, 1995a). Without an emphasis on maintaining individual's abilities and means of survival, self-rehabilitation and self-reconstruction become impossible and longer term social welfare assistance becomes necessary (Ellis & Barakat, 1996a).

The humanitarian community must move beyond the modernist concept of development assistance, which dictates that development is only temporarily interrupted by crisis and relief — a paradigm that even regards conflict as a transitory set back (Barakat, *et al.*, 1995; Duffield, 1994a). Relief is part of development, it is a 'developmentalist concept' (Duffield, 1994a); the two should not be seen as separate processes that occur independently of each other. The pernicious nature of war and the manner in which it is manifest, mean that development cannot continue as if nothing had happened. The total destruction of social, political, economic and environmental mechanisms requires massive inputs of human skills and resources, as well as economic inputs, to rebuild, reconstruct and consequently develop (Barakat & Cockburn, 1991). If the skill base of the war torn nation is to be in a position to rebuild and reconstruct after war, then its capacities need to be maintained during the years of emergency. This means that relief must focus on the maintenance of livelihoods as well as saving lives (Ellis & Barakat, 1996a; Ellis, 1995a).

3.3.3 **Changes in the Humanitarian Community**

The competition for funds between the two separated areas of relief and development has always been intense, however, recent developments in the international system have meant that funds available for development projects are steadily dropping (Adams & Bradbury, 1994; Borton, 1993; Stiefel, 1994; Templar, 1994).

Total overseas development assistance peaked during the late Eighties at US$53 billion and has been static ever since, with a swift increase in the recipient population, this static figure represents a per capita reduction (Duffield, 1994b). While development assistance has decreased, the emergency relief budget has risen dramatically. In 1982-83 the British Overseas Development Administration (ODA) spent 2-3 per cent of its overall aid budget on emergency relief, by 1992 that figure stood at over 10 per cent (Templar, 1994). The European Union spent 15 per cent of its total aid budget on emergencies in 1986, by 1991 this had risen to 21 per cent (Borton, 1993) (Fig 3.2).



Fig 3.2. Global disaster relief as a proportion of global overseas development assistance (Source: Duffield, 1994a, p39)

These reductions on development spending in favour of relief assistance, have led to agencies and donors concerning themselves with the 'relief to development continuum' (Adams & Bradbury, 1994; Stiefel, 1994; Templar, 1994). Through providing relief that positively affects long term development it is hoped that the money provided for relief will compensate for the lack of development funding available. This has powerful effects on the way that agencies are able to act, for the aim is that relief projects be made developmental.

This new trend away from development and towards relief is of great concern. While it is beneficial that agencies are finally being encouraged to make their relief projects have positive long term effects, it is alarming that this is being done at the expense of development. Since the 1950s it has been argued that development funds are insufficient, and yet, instead of being increased, they are being replaced by relief funding. This means that countries such as Somalia and Rwanda that have been devastated by war; countries whose social, economic and administrative structures have been destroyed, are not offered the injection of increased assistance they need to rebuild. Instead they receive a "...drip-feed of basic survival commodities" (Duffield, 1994b) from the safety net of NGOs still working in the country.

Not only is the development funding being taken over by relief, it is also important to note that the relief assistance that is provided rarely meets the level required. Although more agencies are involved in more crises all over the world, the reality is that resources rarely meet the demands upon them. In 1993, this lack of funding was evidenced by the UN's attempts to raise funds for twenty six 'complex emergencies', on average they received only 57 per cent of the amount they requested (Duffield, 1994b).

To further complicate the issue, it is becoming increasingly obvious that donors will only respond to appeals to aid countries that are not of strategic importance to them, when there is public and media pressure to do so. As Keen noted of the famine in Sudan (1994),

> "Widespread press coverage of famine mortality in the autumn of 1988 significantly changed the balance of risks for the donors. As Peter Cutler has argued in relation to donors' shifting response to famine in Ethiopia in particular, the advent of widespread publicity on the famine meant it was now more risky to do nothing than to take vigorous action. Bryan Wannop...said:
> 'The press blew the whistle [on the famine]. If it hadn't been for this international public exposure, nothing would have happened...'"
> (Keen, 1994, p120)

Inevitably this attitude, developed since the end of the Cold War, means donors will only act when the suffering, starvation or mass migration have reached colossal proportions; when emergencies become loud, headline catching and demand attention (Weiss and Minear, 1993). This means that it is impossible to

then address the root causes of the problem — the only course of action is to provide the vast trucks of nutritional and material aid, with all the implications of increasing the level of the conflict and of ensuring the survival of the victims only to go back into war again.

The lack of interest in 'quiet' crises was exemplified by Somalia in 1992. The world was horrified to learn that half a million children under the age of five had died in that year in the war in Somalia and pushed the international donors to help; however, nothing was done to assist the 13 million children that died during the same period through poverty. Yet, based on the discussion in Chapter Two on addressing the root causes of disaster, it is evident that money spent on preventing disaster is far more effective than that spent after a disaster. As Weiss (Weiss & Minear, 1993) states, the:

> "...aberration is particularly unsettling because every dollar expended in silent emergencies is an estimated ten to twenty times more effective than in loud ones." (Weiss & Minear, 1993, p7)

The international strategic importance of the disaster affected country is also reflected in the levels of relief assistance given when disaster does strike. For example, the post-Yugoslav countries receive US$140 per beneficiary compared with Angola's US$58 and Sudan's US$18 (Duffield, 1994b). If donor nations have a vested interest in the affected country then the relief payments subsequently rise — the geographical proximity of the Former-Yugoslavia to the UK, Germany, France, etc., and its perceived potential as a consumer of goods and products, doubtless accounts for the intense donor interest and the money invested in retaining potential refugees within the borders of the post-Yugoslav countries.

Thus it would appear that there is an accumulation of difficulties for the humanitarian community:

- A reduction in spending on development
- A replacement of development assistance by relief projects
- An under funding of relief projects
- A reluctance by donors to respond to situations prior to their becoming major crises

These difficulties are compounded by an increase in the numbers of inexperienced humanitarian practitioners in war. The number of NGOs has grown rapidly over the past ten years. They have added to the multiplicity of problems outlined above through unknowing and inappropriate action.

3.3.4 **Contract Culture**

The humanitarian situation at present reflects an institutionalisation of short term relief assistance and a reduction of agencies who operate long term development projects. This stems from an increase in competitive tendencies that arose in the 1980s between NGOs. Prior to the end of the Cold War, the international community would not violate the sovereignty of another country and therefore could only provide relief and assistance if invited to by a recognised host government. The Biafran War of 1970 set a precedent for the politically 'neutral' NGOs to operate in countries without the authorisation of the State (Adams & Bradbury, 1994). As the NGOs were in-country, it was easy for the donor governments to channel money through them into the affected country. During the Cold War, therefore, one way for donors to get relief funds into conflict bound countries was through the NGOs or the ICRC. Both types of organisation maintained that they were neutral and could thus operate in cross-border or cross-line programmes. However, the ICRC constructed neutrality as a need for agreement to its presence from all warring factions, thus, it frequently found itself delayed in gaining access to the affected country (Borton, 1993). The NGOs constructed neutrality as eschewment of politics and external monitoring of operations. Thus with a 'less rigid' attitude towards neutrality, they became the main channel for donors' funds (Fig 3.3).

	1976	1982-83	1990
Governments	95.2%	12.3%	5.9%
UN agencies	0.15%	24.3%	10.5%
ICRC/Red Cross	4.4%	20.1%	16.2%
NGOs	**0.0%**	**39.7%**	**37.0%**
EC commission and others	0.25%	3.4%	30.4%*

Fig 3.3. European Community emergency aid disbursement by agency type (Source Borton, 1993, p192, emphasis added)

* This high figure is attributable to the action taken by the EC and the IOM in 1990 during the Gulf War Repatriation exercise

This trend continued during the Eighties, when weakened state structures in Africa meant that donors increasingly relied on NGOs as a channel for funds (Borton, 1993). "Changing donor policy meant that previously illicit cross-border operations gained de facto recognition at the expense of nation-state sovereignty." (Duffield, 1994a). Thus NGOs have become of increasing importance in humanitarian relief **not through a higher operational knowledge or greater level of expertise** but, through a willingness to act independently of the situation they are in.

Such a system, where governments and donors channel money through NGOs, leads to increasing competitiveness among the NGOs. In order to survive they must tender and bid for available funds from the donors. It is questionable whether this competition engendered by the contract culture leads to good practice in relief situations. The practice of competing for bids leads to uncertainty as to whom exactly the client of the NGOs is: the recipients or the donors?

3.3.5 **Accountability**

The international aid business is one of the biggest un-regulated markets in the world. There are no standards by which NGOs, agencies or donors are judged; there is no professional body that governs their working practice and yet their decisions affect millions of lives all over the world and their expenditure runs into billions of dollars (Walker, 1995).

The new contract culture described above, suggests that accountability is weighted to the donor-agency relationship and not the agency-beneficiary tie. Agencies who are careful with donors' funds and provide maximum visible assistance for the least money spent will undoubtedly receive further contracts from that donor. This, in turn, suggests that those agencies who have the donors' interests at heart will receive more commissions than those whose concerns lie with the survivors of war or disaster (Walker, 1995). This issue of accountability has huge cumulative effects on the types of projects that are implemented and the way in which they are valued and judged to be successful. If the international community truly wants to make its relief projects developmental and supportive of innate capacities, for whatever motivation, then the issue of accountability is of crucial importance (Ellis & Barakat, 1996).

Chambers English Dictionary defines accountability as being "...liable to account; responsible; explicable", and goes on to outline "account" in terms of both a moral

responsibility and financial, numerical procedures. This suggests therefore, that agencies should be accountable both in human and moral terms to those they assist, as well as being able to track numbers of goods transported and delivered and unit costs. At present, there is a palpable lack of moral and humanitarian accountability and a surfeit of cost/benefit analysis (Ellis & Barakat, 1996; Harrell-Bond, *et al.*, 1992).

As soon as the international community assumes the right to interfere in a situation there are a range of questions that need to be answered. For the donors, questions of immediate concern are: How many people are involved? What are their material needs to survive? How can we transport those needs to the affected area? Who will distribute them and police the distribution when the items arrive? In other words, the donors' main preoccupation seems to lie with counting things; both people and material goods [4].

Where such counting becomes an obsession, agencies can actually disrupt intrinsic coping mechanisms of communities. Harrell-Bond's report (1992) of the situation among Mozambican refugees in Swaziland, who were moved from their self-settled and self-sustaining areas within the host community into camps because the UNHCR had no concept of the number of refugees in the area and could not control the food distribution, is a case in point.

The author contends that there are also substantive questions that should form in the first stages of a crisis over psychological, social and cultural needs of the affected population **and** the host population and the rights, abilities and capacities of both the affected and the host population. These are the questions that in reality rarely get asked or considered. A 1992 paper covering the way relief is allocated to refugees (Harrell-Bond, *et al.*, 1992), introduces the idea of donors perceiving their actions as giving gifts, but giving only to those deemed deserving or worthy — those who are totally destitute or starving. This pre-condition required for the receipt of aid fosters the view that any gift will be gratefully received. As the paper states:

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[4] During discussion with a member of UNWHO, the author discovered that one view of the initial reaction of donors is as follows:
"How many refugees are there?", " X."
"OK, with each camp taking Y number of refugees, that makes X divided by Y number of camps at $Z each - here's the cheque to cover it."

> "Does the giver bear any responsibility for the appropriateness or adequacy of the gift? In the context of giving food to starving human beings it is generally assumed that any food will do." (Harrell-Bond, *et al.*, 1992, p207)

It is understood that agencies will wish to keep track of expenditure and the goods distributed and try to ascertain the numbers of people they have assisted. This thesis does not contest that 'counting' is necessary, however, what it does not countenance is counting to the exclusion of moral obligation and the detriment of humanitarian perspective. Agencies should do both and therefore they must be accountable to both the donors and the target community.

The apparent lack of trust and faith that agencies have in recipient communities ensures that agencies are unwilling to be accountable to them. The lack of trust stems from experience of affected populations that might exaggerate their needs or artificially increase the numbers in the family to get more aid or steal goods and food from storage areas. The situation is one of Catch 22, as agencies who set up systems to guard against theft because they do not trust recipients, convey the message to the recipients that they are not to be trusted. This transforms recipients into individuals whose survival tactics are to exaggerate need, trick donors and find alternative means of gaining aid (Anderson, 1993). As Harrell-Bond states:

> "...this is not some peculiar moral deficiency of refugees, but represents a normal response to an impersonal system to which they feel no obligation." (Harrell-Bond, *et al.*, 1992, p 211).

Thus, for example, when a member of the family dies, to prevent rations being cut refugees will seek ways to conceal the death from representatives of aid agencies.

A lack of accountability to the recipients, ensures that aid is provided on a numbers assisted for the lowest cost basis. A basis which negates innate coping mechanisms and does nothing to build capacity within the affected population. Such a policy encourages dependency on external assistance which neither promotes development nor reduces vulnerability to future war or hazard.

3.4 INTEGRATION

It was shown in Chapter Two that integration is something which occurs when host communities and refugees can co-exist, sharing the same resources with no

greater mutual conflict than exists in the host community (Harrell-Bond, 1990). In a war situation, the practice of integrating refugees with hosts so that they can co-exist without increasing the level of conflict that exists between the groups, is highly sensitive. Agency actions that are construed as partisan or preferential can increase and spread the tension and violence of the war. There are therefore two options open to the humanitarian community providing relief in war. They can ensure that their actions are non partisan and encourage the understanding and peaceful integration of incomers and hosts. The alternative policy is to segregate and marginalise the incoming refugees and displaced persons and so avoid any possible confrontation by removing the contact that the incomers have with the host community. This latter option allows the refugees and displaced persons no access to existing resources and therefore no opportunity to utilise their own capacities and coping mechanisms. As stated in Chapter Two, it is important that refugees and displaced persons are given access to the resources and social systems that promote the maintenance of independence and productivity. Thus, it would appear that the integration of incomers with hosts, rather than the segregation of incomers from hosts, is the desired objective. Is such integration possible in a war situation where fear and suspicion are high and all are competing for scarce resources?

3.4.1 **Conflict Reduction and Peace Building**

As was stated earlier in this chapter, conflicts are becoming longer. As this is the case, it follows that one of the actions of humanitarian intervention should be to endeavour to reduce the length of the conflict and not prolong it. Development cannot occur without minimal peace (Anderson, 1993; Barakat, *et al.*, 1994). Peace is an essential precondition for reconstruction and development, as such, relief projects that aim to be developmental, should encourage the establishment of peace as well as physical and social capacity (Ellis & Barakat, 1996).

There seems to be an assumption that conflict can only be resolved at the international or state level, which has led to responses that focus on the strengthening of international or regional institutions (Adams & Bradbury, 1994). It is possible for relief interventions to reduce tensions in war at a national level. For instance, the ICRC organised the provision of a blanket distribution of food in Somalia. They ensured that the food came into the conflict zone from multiple entry points and was distributed with the Somalis having extensive and close involvement. The equitable and unbiased distribution reduced looting and conflicts

over scarce food supplies and did not increase the inter-group tensions or rivalry (Adams & Bradbury, 1994). However, other examples show that operations at the national level are not effective. For example, imposed attempts to control the fighting through outside military intervention have a poor track record. The 'safe areas' created in Bosnia are an obvious case in point: for two years they essentially froze the conflict and offered little future for those who were sheltering inside them, as was indicated by the increasing rate of suicide (Adams & Bradbury, 1994). It is also acknowledged that by gathering the Bosnian Muslims together in one place it made it very easy for the Serb forces to carry through their policy of ethnic cleansing when they were ready.

There are international laws and conventions that are in place to reduce the suffering of civilians in war and assist in the reduction of the levels of violence:

- 1949 Fourth Geneva convention which protects civilian populations in times of war
- 1951 UN convention on the status and legal protection of refugees
- 1951 UN convention on the prevention of, and punishment for, the crime of genocide, specifically authorising the UN to act to prevent genocide.
- 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW)
- 1980 Land mines protocol, which aims to regulate the use of land mines.

In times of war, however, adherence to these regulations seems to be the exception rather than the rule: acts of genocide are widespread in the wars in Bosnia and Rwanda; land mines are an enduring and constant threat both during and after wars all over the world, as their cheap price means that they can be deployed in large numbers and kill indiscriminately (DHA, 1995a) and, with the increase in intrastate war, civilians are targets not accidental victims. Although the protocols exist, it seems that :

> "...as soon as [States] are directly or indirectly involved in an armed conflict, most [will] qualify, interpret, or simply ignore the rules of humanity, evoking state interests and sovereign prerogatives. Political considerations prevail over humanitarian requirements and humanitarian concerns are used to further political aims" Independent Commission on International Humanitarian Issues, quoted in (Minear & Weiss, 1993, p11)

With such widespread disregard for the international legislation, it would seem that there is more chance of instilling conflict reduction at the **micro level** by focusing on the civil society. Participatory and integrated action at the lower levels can greatly assist in the implementation of peace or in preventing an escalation of conflict, as witnessed in Somalia and in parts of the post-Yugoslavia where many local peace groups are trying to mediate between factions and reduce ethnic tensions (Adams & Bradbury, 1994).

Peace can be built at all levels and in many ways. While it may not be possible for donors and agencies to operate on the macro level and stop war and conflict outright, it is within the power of all to act in a manner that does nothing to increase ethnic rifts or levels of tension within communities (Ellis & Barakat, 1996a).

A report from the NGOs and peace building workshop held in Afghanistan in 1994 (Barakat, *et al.*, 1994) notes that the local community mistrusted the NGOs because of evident "...nepotism and favouritism in funding and implementation". Such partiality is something that NGOs need to avoid when working in conflict, as perceived bias increases the tensions that exist between communities. Maintaining complete impartiality is hard to implement on the ground in conflict; the difficulties of getting all sides to agree to any intervention are understood. It is also possible that in order to act to the benefit of all and maintain an impartial policy, agencies may find themselves supporting factions and regimes whose actions they find morally corrupt.

There are many examples of agencies that have deliberately biased mandates (Soroya & Stubbs, 1994). A *prima facie* example is the UNHCR, an organisation that defines its work purely in terms of refugees. Among the refugee and displaced person communities of the post-Yugoslav countries such a biased attitude has caused tension and increased ethnic rifts (Soroya & Stubbs, 1994), an issue that will be further investigated in Chapter Seven. UNHCR provides for the needs of the refugees and the needs of the displaced and host communities are left to other organisations to fill, as Stubbs and Soroya outline in their paper:

> "...relief models have exacerbated tensions between refugees, internally displaced people and local communities. As each of these groups receives different help, from different agencies, based upon different assumptions and philosophies, it is not surprising that

> divisions are exacerbated. It is not hard to imagine how accusations about one group being favoured, or privileged at the expense of others, can link in to an ethnicised nationalist agenda." (Soroya & Stubbs, 1994, p8)

As the numbers of NGOs acting in war grow, there is increasing risk of their actions contributing to the war economies that they aim to reduce. In Somalia, NGOs, the ICRC and the UN all pay 'freelance militia' large sums of money to protect their staff, premises and the provision of relief supplies through conflict areas (Adams & Bradbury, 1994). In doing so, they are making direct contributions into the war economy and thus fuelling the continuation of conflict. The vast numbers of NGOs operating in Afghanistan assist in freeing the men to engage in combat; by feeding and supporting their women and children, the NGOs enable the men to leave and fight, knowing that their families will be cared for while they are absent (Barakat, 1995 personal communication). Would it not be better to offer the men who see economic security and life purpose by serving in the militia an alternative employment that would support ultimate peace and development?

It is possible for agencies to act without compounding the levels of conflict, Anderson (1993) outlines several projects that promoted peace and cross-faction integration during warfare. One of her examples covers the establishment of a children's magazine called *Sawa* in Lebanon. Each edition included stories of the history and culture of Lebanon so that "...children, who could not know of them across fighting lines, could learn of a common Lebanese heritage" (Anderson, 1993). The publication included blank pages for the children to write on and send back to the magazine for publication in the next issue, in the hope that a sense of shared culture could be developed on which to build if peace came. One reader submitted a peace pledge that was published and subsequently signed by many children and their parents. It is a small example and may seem insignificant, but it shows the ways in which humanitarian aid can act in order to promote an understanding and a wish for peace at the micro level. Establishment of communication at this level can open up a framework for conflict resolution at the macro level of state and nation (Adams & Bradbury, 1994; Anderson, 1993).

3.5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This chapter has looked at the recent changes in the humanitarian system and has outlined the following issues facing relief agencies acting in circumstances of war and violence:

i. The complex arena for the humanitarian community
- Permanent emergencies
- Root causes
- Support for remaining capacities

ii. Vulnerability in the environment of war
- Vulnerability as constructed by wealth, political affiliation, ethnicity and gender

iii. Capacity in the environment of war
- Coping mechanisms
- The relief to development continuum
- Contract culture
- Accountability

iv. Integration
- Conflict reduction and peace building

It seems that the problems left facing the humanitarian community are legion and insoluble. If the lessons learnt from action in natural disasters are combined with the lessons that need to be learnt for action in war, then it would appear that the international community will have to be re-staffed by a race of superhuman characters. As Slim (1995) outlines, the 'new' aid workers need to be aware of political issues; they need to possess negotiating skills and understand conflict analysis and management; they need to be able to see through propaganda and understand the complexities of the new urban terrain and the altered 'clientele'; new aspects of vulnerability must be identified and understood; human rights must be monitored; they must understand the requirements of permanent emergency situations characterised by chaos and the unexpected; they must be impartial and understand the need to build peace with every action and constantly be aware of the danger that the humanitarian practitioner, no longer a protected species, is now in.

This discussion of the environment of war raises many questions over the actions of the humanitarian community. Unlike action in natural disasters the choices in war are not so clear cut — the results of intervention are unpredictable and hard to foresee. Therefore to act in war, the model of intervention developed through natural disasters requires amending and reformatting to encompass the highly politicised and unpredictable nature of war.

From the literature reviewed in this chapter and the previous one, two central discourses have emerged:

- Vulnerability and capacity
- Integration

Their component parts suggest a framework of concerns that need to be addressed when assessing emergency shelter provision in war.

3.5.1 **Vulnerability and Capacity**

Chapter Two introduced the notion of vulnerability and stated that in natural disasters it was primarily the poor who were most vulnerable to hazard. From the literature discussed subsequently in Chapter Three, it can be seen that in war, the concept of vulnerability takes on many new layers and aspects. Vulnerability is no longer solely the province of the poor. Political affiliation, ethnicity, gender and wealth can make entire cross sections of society vulnerable to war. It is important that the root causes of these vulnerabilities are understood by the humanitarian community acting in war in order to avoid increasing the level of suffering.

Chapter Two also introduced the concept of imposed vulnerability, as cited in the work of Black (1994); discussed within the discourses on dependency in the works of Harrell-Bond and Kibreab (Harrell-Bond, 1986, 1990, 1993; Kibreab, 1993) and reinforced by Zetter's discussion of institutionalised dependency as a product of labelling individuals 'refugee' (Zetter, 1987). This concept is a core issue within this thesis as it deals with the effects of the humanitarian community's actions on individuals **once they have become refugees or displaced persons**. Harrell-Bond's seminal work of 1986, argues that the manner of refugee assistance promotes dependency by usurping the decision-making and organisational capacity of refugee individuals and communities (Harrell-Bond, 1986; Black, 1994). In this chapter it has been mooted from the review of the literature, that it is important to

important to maintain the productive capacity of a society during war, in order to facilitate reconstruction in the post-war period. By imposing higher levels of vulnerability on, and increasing the dependency of, refugee and displaced populations during war, the humanitarian community can adversely affect post-war reconstruction. Thus, the literature suggests, it is important to maintain refugees' and displaced persons' capacity as productive social beings during the time in exile. It is these concepts that will form the framework for the analysis of the field data presented in Chapter Six of this thesis.

3.5.2 **Integration**

In Chapter Two the social, psychological and cultural value of integrating incoming populations with hosts was illustrated. It was also shown that the refugee-centric approach to relief provision, that favours incoming populations with resources and facilities over host populations, is likely to create conflict and increase tension. In this chapter, it has been mooted from the analysis of the literature, that when the humanitarian community is acting in war situations, where rivalry and conflict for scarce resources are endemic, the possibilities to further inflame the tensions through biased or unthinking actions are far greater. The process of integrating and providing for incoming populations in a war situation is a highly sensitive issue.

The potential for relief programmes to exacerbate tension and conflict and the potential for participatory and integrated action to assist in instilling peace, are themes that are developed further in Chapter Seven where the findings from the field will be reviewed.

These central discourses of vulnerability and capacity, and integration, and their component categories, form the framework for the analysis of emergency shelter provision for refugees and displaced persons in the Republic of Croatia. The following chapter introduces the fieldwork in Croatia and outlines the methodology utilised to illicit data for the study.

CHAPTER FOUR : REFLEXIVITY, FLEXIBILITY AND INNOVATION: THE METHODOLOGY OF RESEARCH UNDER FIRE

4.1 INTRODUCTION

The issues derived from the literature reviewed in Chapter Two and Chapter Three emphasise the importance of agencies understanding the vulnerabilities and capacities of the target community prior to project design and enactment. In order for agencies to support the capacities of the target group; provide culturally sensitive aid; utilise existing resources; reduce conflict and preserve livelihoods, it is essential that they are fully cognisant of the context of their actions — they must understand the people and the location; the social, cultural, economic and political environments. This requires that agencies conduct pre-project assessment and evaluation of the real needs and requirements of the affected population.

The author's understanding of this requirement has driven the way in which data was collected during this study. One central belief was that the reason behind misdirected aid provision lay partly in the inability or the unwillingness of the humanitarian community to ascertain and address real needs: this belief was reinforced by the literature review that was conducted. Thus this study was devised primarily to understand the impact of provision on the affected population; to determine the positive and negative effects of shelter provision on the recipient communities and host population. This was done simultaneously with questioning the agencies and the host government, in order to understand the economic, social and political opportunities, restrictions and agendas governing their provision. However, the primary emphasis has always been on ascertaining the effects of shelter provision on the refugees and displaced persons themselves.

Being cognisant of this necessity, it was felt to be important to endeavour to understand the impact, relevance and sustainability of each project as well as the efficiency and effectiveness[1]. Many projects appear to be evaluated purely in terms of efficiency and effectiveness by the aid agencies that instigated them, largely

[1] These five components for evaluation are constituents of a framework for evaluators of development projects devised by the Evaluation Department of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Samset, 1993)

because they are primarily accountable to the donor rather than the target group[2]. In other words, projects are evaluated with little consideration of the way they affect the target group. For example, if this framework of evaluation were applied to a fictitious housing project, the aim of which was to improve housing conditions for refugees through the construction of prefabricated housing units, the following scenario would hold true. The project would be said to be **efficient** if a large number of houses had been constructed for the least expenditure and if this same number of houses could not have been built in any cheaper or less time consuming way. So if the unit cost of the housing was low, the project would have been deemed efficient. **Effectiveness** is a measure of the extent to which the initial purpose has been achieved. So in the fictitious project, this could be measured by the number of houses that had been built, the number of families assisted and the extent of improvement to the infrastructure supplying the houses (Samset, 1993).

Both of these measures assume, but do not attempt to verify, that the initial purpose of the project was correct and that provision of housing units was what the community needed. Neither component examines the positive or negative effects of the project on the refugee community.

In order to gain a balanced and holistic picture of the hypothetical project it would also be necessary to understand the **impact, relevance and sustainability** of the project. In this fictitious case, therefore, to understand the impact of the project it would be necessary to see whether the project had any planned or unplanned negative or positive effects on the refugee community **and** on the host community. So, did the provision of constructed housing units curtail the abilities of the refugees to construct their own homes? Did it reduce income generating opportunities among the community or did it supply employment? Do the host community now live in worse housing conditions than the refugees and how has that affected the integration of the refugees into the community? To understand the relevance, it is necessary to ascertain if the project was tailored to the refugees' needs. Did they really require houses to be built for them or where they able to build for themselves? Did they feel that housing was the primary need or was there greater demand for agricultural implements or health care? How did the construction of a refugee settlement fit in with the local authority's plans and the recovery and development strategies of the host government? The degree to which the project is relevant will, in turn, strongly affect the long term sustainability of

[2] This issue of accountability was previously discussed in Chapter Two

the project. Only if the recipient community themselves class the project's purpose as their primary need will they invest the time, effort and money into continuing and sustaining it after external support has been withdrawn (Samset, 1993). In the case of the hypothetical housing project, sustainability could be evaluated by measuring the occupation levels of the settlement; the degree of upkeep and repair exhibited within the settlement and the extent to which the units have been extended and adapted to individual needs.

4.1.1 **Structure of the Chapter**

The data for this thesis was gathered to generate an understanding of the impact, relevance and sustainability of a range of shelter projects within the Republic of Croatia.

This chapter presents the ways in which this data was collected. Section two of the chapter, outlines the methodologies that have underpinned the data collection. The fieldwork is described in section three, where the experiences of the author are utilised to initiate a discussion on the appropriate methods for data collection under fire [3]. Section four describes the methods by which the author has maintained the direction and focus of the study through peer review. The chapter concludes by presenting a set of general lessons distilled from the author's experience. The lessons are presented to further the discussion over appropriate methods to utilise when researching under fire.

4.2 METHODOLOGY

To evaluate and study the built environment it is necessary to utilise methodologies that can address the interactions between people and the physical environment and aid understanding of the built environment as it interfaces with social and cultural values. As Sinha outlines:

> "This will entail moving away from a deterministic model, in which the ability to generalise and statistical corroboration is emphasised, to one which seeks to understand the subjective experience of individuals and views unique events as keys to useful insights." (Sinha, 1991, p17)

Qualitative research methods enable understanding of the way people relate to, and are affected by, the built environment. They allow the researcher to capture the

[3] This discussion has been continued through publication of the author's findings in *Disasters* (Barakat & Ellis, 1996)

significance of housing for its inhabitants, as well as the wider political and economic structures that lie behind the shelter provision (Sinha, 1991). Such qualitative techniques can enable the researcher to understand the changes that new shelter forms bring about in lifestyles, in a way that quantitative techniques fail to do. As Peattie suggests "...information about processes and about invisible structures is not readily derived from counting things" [Peattie quoted in (Hamdi, 1991) p82]. Highly structured methods, such as surveys and questionnaires, may permit easy replication of the research process, but they do not capture underlying meanings. Indeed, in the field of housing, such techniques will result in little more than lists of what is wanting in the built environment (Hamdi, 1991; Sinha, 1991).

In addition to the parameters prescribed by researching the built environment, the researcher in war has other areas which govern the methodologies available for use due to the complexity and ever changing circumstances of war. Primarily, it is impossible for the researcher to be completely aware of all the aspects of the situation of war **prior** to entering the field. No amount of investigation undertaken before entering the field will completely prepare the researcher for each and every eventuality that they will find on the ground in the war zone. Thus, the war researcher needs to utilise flexible and open techniques that encourage chance learning and the discovery of the unexpected and unpredictable. This again points to the use of qualitative methodologies such as observation techniques and unstructured interviews, or what Chambers calls, "sitting, asking and listening":

> "Sitting, asking and listening are as much an attitude as a method. Sitting implies lack of hurry, patience and humility; asking implies that the outsider is a student; and listening implies respect and learning. Many of the best insights come this way. **Relaxed discussions reveal the questions outsiders do not know to ask, and open up the unexpected**." (Chambers, 1983, p 202, emphasis added)

The researcher must also realise that there are some research techniques that are completely dysfunctional in a war situation. The use of a structured rigid questionnaire for instance will elicit little useful data. In war, people's response to questioning is affected by fear and suspicion (Barakat, 1992) and the appearance of a researcher brandishing a clipboard and survey form will only enforce their concerns and compromise the information elicited. Structured interviews evoke similar suspicion (Barakat & Ellis, 1996).

4.3 FIELD WORK

The researcher in war is governed by a multitude of unpredictable parameters which tightly control appropriate and possible action. Personal safety; shifting battle lines and alliances and restrictions of movement are all concerns that have regulatory effects on the researcher in war. These restraints negate the use of highly structured methods and require the researcher to be reflexive, flexible and innovative.

There is a paucity of information on the subject of data collection in war [4]. The most relevant publications to date come from the field of development studies. The work of Robert Chambers (1983) and his analysis of the "Development Tourist" and subsequent proposition of "Rapid Rural Appraisal Techniques" provides some transferable ideas as do the studies by Dudley (1993) and Sinha (1991). From these works, it was possible for the author to develop a range of techniques for the study of the built environment in war time.

War imposes severe restrictions on time available in the field, access to documented data, freedom of movement in the field and gaining access to the field[5]. These restrictions all suggest that the war researcher has to utilise a range of data collection methods in order to gather information.

4.3.1 **Chance Learning**

With information so hard to come by, the researcher must do everything possible to encourage chance learning. The researcher in war cannot predict when, where or how it will be possible to learn something, a fact which produces the dichotomy with established method in academic institutions. Some researchers have, for instance, told of the advantages of giving locals lifts and chatting in the back of a jeep on the way to the research site (Barakat, 1992, 1993; Dudley, 1993). Such a proposal meets with little enthusiasm within the realms of rigid research protocol. In the course of the field work for this thesis, much was learnt through many circumstances that could never have been predicted by the researcher. For instance, whilst waiting for a UNHCR driver to collect the researcher and translator from outside one collective centre, the researcher found herself in the middle of an argument that blew up between the resident refugees and displaced persons over

[4] The doctorate thesis of Sultan Barakat being the one notable exception that the author found (Barakat, 1992), dedicated as it is to the study of the reconstruction of the built environment after war.

[5] These concepts will be discussed in greater depth later in this chapter.

perceived preferential treatment by aid agencies of one group over the other. A scene which indicated much about the underlying tensions in the centre, but which could not have been predicted when planning the field visit.

This is not to suggest that the researcher in war situations should merely wander around in the field waiting for a chance encounter that will make all clear. What it does propose is that the war researcher must acknowledge that there are parameters that affect action in war and that the methodology utilised therefore must be flexible enough to address that.

4.3.2 **Range of Techniques**

Data collection in war requires the use of many different methodologies if it is to be successful: a technique that is often referred to as triangulation. Triangulation is regarded differently within the social sciences by adherents to various paradigms (Blaikie, 1991). To the positivist, triangulation is a way of overcoming problems of bias and validity; data gained through one method can be 'cross-checked' with data gained from another method or source, regardless of ontological or epistemological concerns, to establish veracity. It is a way of trying to overcome the perceived problems of bias that exist within qualitative research. To the interpretevist, triangulation is used to establish the existence of phenomena or values on some variable (Blaikie, 1991) not as a philosophically based attempt to establish one absolute truth. Different viewpoints of the same object increase our understanding of it. For example: "...a man is a mass to an engineer, but a bundle of neuroses to a psychiatrist" (Kirk & Miller, 1986).

The use of multiple techniques is an acknowledgement of the restraints that the circumstances of war put upon the researcher. It is necessary for the researcher to maintain a chameleon adaptability to data collection, blending into perceived contexts and situations. To function effectively the researcher in war has to utilise all the collection techniques at their disposal and realise the "... benefits of inventiveness and improvisation in methods of appraisal and research" (Chambers, 1983). Thus, the author believes, in line with the interpretevist model of triangulation, that multiple techniques should be used in the environment of war to establish an holistic understanding of the subject under investigation.

Thus, throughout the field work for this study, a number of inter-related techniques were used in order to elicit data. The researcher used three main methods to obtain

as full and holistic picture of the situation as possible within the constraints of war. Having spoken with others in the field, it was concluded that, throughout the two periods of field study, direct observation, participant observation and semi-structured interviews should be used and existing archival data sought where it was available [6].

4.3.3 **Pre-field Preparation**

The need to be flexible means that the researcher must be very well briefed before arriving in the field (Barakat & Ellis, 1996). A basic knowledge of the geography of the country, the history of current conflict and the location and scope of alternative research sites were found to be useful during the field work for this study.

An elementary grasp of some key words and phrases of the Croatian language assisted in getting from site to site and was of some use when trying to gather information, as well as a way of displaying courtesy to the local population.

Additionally, the need for the researcher in war to be autonomous and independent cannot be too highly stressed. In a situation when the local population is in extreme difficulty and resources are limited, the researcher should not create an extra burden. This kind of autonomy requires meticulous preparation before entering the field. The researcher needs to be well equipped with all the physical requirements for gathering information (Barakat & Ellis, 1996).

4.3.4. **Programming**

Chambers (1983), in his seminal work on data collection among the rural poor, outlines six biases which contribute to researchers obtaining unrepresentative information:

spatial : where issues of comfort and ease of access determine what the researcher sees

project: the researcher is drawn towards sites where contacts and information are readily available — inevitably a site that has been investigated before by many other researchers

[6] The author consulted with Dr Sultan Barakat, Dr Eric Dudley, Dr Roger Zetter and Dr Geoffrey Payne, about the appropriate methodologies for the study prior to entering the field.

person: articulate key informants are not always representative of the typical opinions of a community and yet, because of their position and ability to communicate, they are often the only ones spoken with by the researcher

season: researchers have a marked tendency to conduct research in foreign countries only during periods of pleasant weather, thus many of the most severe problems faced by a community go unobserved.

diplomatic: diplomatic expediency can lead to selectivity over which projects are shown to the researcher

professional: professional specialisation generates a focusing that can lead to researchers missing links between processes

A conscious attempt was made to avoid falling into the traps of these biases in both periods of study.

4.3.4.1. Spatial bias

Although initially written to cover biases that existed in development research, where all effort appeared to be based on easily accessible urban sites rather than the remote rural areas; understanding this bias made the researcher aware of the necessity to try and investigate all types of situations. Consequently sites were visited that were within cities and towns (e.g. Varaždin 1 and 2, Hotel International), on the periphery of cities and towns (e.g. Špansko, Rokovci) and located far away from existing urban centres (e.g. Gašinci) (Fig 4.1).

4.3.4.2. Project bias

It has been stated that researchers are drawn to conduct research in camps and collective centres because they hold a captive audience for study and therefore are easy for the researcher to access (Stubbs, 1995). However, in Croatia, such behaviour would then result in an unrealistic study as, with the majority of forced migrants living in private accommodation, the conditions faced by the minority would be used to support a general argument about the majority (Ellis & Barakat, 1996; Stubbs, 1995).

To avoid such bias, a conscious effort was made to conduct research among those living in private accommodation as well as in the camps and collective centres. This was made possible through the offices of the ODPR, who maintain a census of all the registered refugees and displaced persons throughout Croatia and could thus provide details of locations and addresses of privately accommodated migrants.

Fig 4.1. Map of Croatia showing the location of the sites visited (source: the author)

4.3.4.3. Person Bias

The random way in which informants were selected guarded against this bias. There was never a decision to seek out the community leaders and speak only with them. In the camps and collectives, informants were chosen by the researcher randomly selecting houses to visit without prior knowledge of the resident family. If the inhabitants were happy to be spoken with then the interview would

progress[7]. Several families were selected in this manner in each location. The process meant that a wide range of informants were interviewed, ranging from lawyers, teachers, architects and artists through to farmers, agricultural hands, refuse collectors and factory workers.

4.3.4.4. Dry Season Bias

It was anticipated at the beginning of the project that there might be substantial differences between the conditions for the refugees and displaced persons in winter and in summer, especially within the camps and settlements. Conditions that may be perceived to be satisfactory in summer when families could extend their living environment beyond the confines of the shelter, might become unsatisfactory in winter when the family would be largely house-bound. For this reason there were two periods of field research, one in the summer months of August and September 1994 and one in the winter during January and February 1995.

4.3.4.5. Diplomatic Bias

The necessity to gain permission from the ODPR to conduct research in refugee and displaced persons accommodation caused some concern that it may not consequently be possible to avoid this bias: it was difficult to see how the researcher would be able to ensure that bad examples of accommodation were visited as well as good. However, it transpired that through the efforts of the local partner in the field, access was allowed to all camps and settlements without any attempts at concealment of those that were not acceptable [8]. In convincing the government to back the project, the partner in the field had demonstrated the benefits to be gained from allowing full access to all types and levels of accommodation. She argued that it would only be possible to write a fair report if access was given to a complete range of accommodation, otherwise an incomplete picture of the government's efforts would be presented.

[7] None of the households approached in this manner refused to be interviewed; the usual pattern was an enthusiastic and hospitable welcome and a willingness to talk.

[8] The connections with the Study Centre for Reconstruction and Development will be discussed later in this chapter

4.3.4.6. Professional Bias

Chambers states that when professionals visit the field each sees only that which corresponds to their discipline. So,

> "...a hydrologist enquires about the water table, a soil scientist examines soil fertility, an agronomist investigates yields, an economist asks about wages and prices, a sociologist looks into patron-client relations...a doctor investigates health and hygiene and a family planner attempts to find out about attitudes to numbers of children. ...[Such] narrow professionalism of whatever persuasion leads to diagnoses and prescriptions which underestimate deprivation by only confronting part of the problem" (Chambers, 1983, p23)

To avoid possible professional biases during the study of Croatia, firstly, semi-structured interviews were used to enable informants to set their own priorities of importance and secondly, a reflexive approach to data collection was employed. Reflexivity requires an acknowledgement that researchers are part of the social world and "...are able to reflect upon [them]selves and [their] actions as objects in that world" (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1983). During the field work, therefore the research process was turned back upon the researcher in an attempt to understand the effects of the researcher on the data collected, and the ways in which the researcher's own perceptions might affect the type of information that was collected. Only through the process of constantly questioning and evaluating the process while in the field and during analysis following the periods of field study, is it possible to expand the field of study beyond the constraints of professional bias.

4.3.5 **Gaining Access and Identifying Gatekeepers**

Gaining access to the field can be extremely difficult in war situations. Freedom of movement in the field inevitably requires permission from government or similar high level institutions, as well as permission from those manning military roadblocks, checkpoints etc.. In any research situation, those in authority will be cautious about giving access, but in war, the level of concern over giving researchers freedom of movement grows exponentially.

Without a contact in the field who can speak the local language; introduce the correct people; talk to the right officials and generally assist in easing the way on the researcher's behalf, the struggle to actually get into the field will be long and hard. The ideal situation would be to enter into partnership with a local counterpart

who would assist the researcher in gaining access to the field (Barakat & Ellis, 1996)

This was indeed born out by the researcher's own experiences during both of the field trips to Croatia. Prior to the first trip to Croatia in August 1994, five months were spent trying to make contacts and establish connections. From the researcher's own contacts[9] and from published lists of agencies working in former-Yugoslavia, twenty four aid agencies and individuals were contacted and the leads they gave were followed up. Only four of these approaches received positive responses and of those, only two were in a position to help in the field. Ultimately it was meeting and subsequently forming a partnership with Marija Kojaković of the Study Centre for Reconstruction and Development in Dubrovnik that enabled the researcher to conduct the field work at all. It was she who smoothed the researcher's way into the field by persuading ODPR to give the necessary permission to visit and live in the camps and collective centres around Croatia.

It transpired that the researcher had written to the people in the government office that Marija eventually persuaded to grant permission for the study, however, the researcher had received no response to letters and, lacking a common language, had been unable to follow up the initial request with phone calls. When Dubrovnik was reached half way through the first period of field study and it was possible to sit down and talk with Marija face to face, it became clear how hard it had been, even for her, to persuade the government to give the researcher permission to conduct the study.

> "...finally managed to meet with Marija on Wednesday evening...she explained to me the difficulty she had in getting the Croatian Government Office to agree to allow me to do this study... Professor Rebić [Head of the Croatian Government Office for Displaced Persons and Refugees] agreed to let me go into the camps and let me have the information in the end...this was only agreed at the last minute [10]. (Field notes, August 1994)

It became clear that the reason for the ODPR's reluctance to grant the researcher permission to study in Croatia was previous experience of individuals and

[9] The author attended the First International Workshop on Improved Shelter Response and Environment for Refugees held by the UNHCR in Geneva in 1993. Many contacts with aid agencies were made here as well as meeting field officers working in the former-Yugoslavia.

[10] The researcher found out in Dubrovnik that it was not finalised until two days before her departure from England for Croatia.

organisations that had been condemnatory of the government's policies and practices. A willingness on behalf of the researcher to share the findings of the investigation prior to publication seemed to assist in smoothing the passage.

Even with the permission of the government and the assistance of Marija and many others in the field, it was still difficult to progress in the field [11].

> "Friday
> Arrived in Osijek at 10.30 and found Nada Arbanas at the ODPR office in Avenija Europska. She said everything was organised for my visit - though this turned out to be inaccurate. It transpired that Monday is a Public Holiday **and** that the camps and centres are all closed for visiting on the weekend and that there was no translator or transport that I could use" (Field notes, August 1994) [12]

This was just one of many difficulties on the first visit which arose because of the researcher's lack of knowledge of the Croatian language and an uncertainty as to exactly what was expected of the researcher by others.

The second period of field study offered still further problems in terms of access. This time, it took four days to receive a second written permission from the ODPR to resume the field study, in spite of prior assurances that all was in order. With only two weeks free to spend in the field it was necessary to spend four days trying to find ways in which officialdom could be circumnavigated in order not to waste valuable time. Without the researcher's prior knowledge of the possibilities and alternatives gained during the first field trip, and the flexibility to act upon that knowledge, valuable research time would have been lost.

Hammersley and Atkinson write that the researcher should be cognisant not only of those who have the power to grant access to the field, but also of those who **perceive** that they have the power (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1983). In situations of civil war this is crucial as the government may no longer retain control over certain warring factions and groups. This means that gaining government approval to pursue a line of research will not always mean that all settings in the field are

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[11] See Appendix B for copies of permission letters.

[12] This situation was subsequently resolved when the researcher visited the UNHCR offices on the floor below and explained the situation fully to the head of office. Denis de Poerk provided a vehicle and persuaded one of his staff to translate and drive over the weekend. Without their assistance the time in Osijek would have been wasted and the researcher is very grateful for their kindness and help.

still open to the researcher (Barakat & Ellis, 1996). For the author, this necessity was spelt out during the second field trip, when trying to gain access to one of the camps in Zagreb. The author's letter of permission from the ODPR did not assist the passage into the camp. Indeed, when the author asked the head of the camp resident's committee if it was possible to look around the answer was "...no, it was not possible. Delegations were always coming and people had had enough". The letter from the ODPR and the author's British citizenship, sparked a tirade against both the Croatian and British governments which was concluded with the opinion that "...such visits [as the author's] got them nowhere and did nothing for them and they did not want anymore" (Field notes, February 1995).

War offers many restrictions on the researcher's movement, the above illustrations are just a few examples. Restrictions can also come from the mining of areas or the unpredictable shifting of lines of battle. The complexities of a civil war make it very difficult for the researcher to gain access to the field and to pass gatekeepers. For this reason the researcher in war needs to be very flexible and adaptable. Personal experience of data collection in war leads this researcher to conclude that although it is advisable to try and plan the visit before going into the field, marking out where to go and what to see; the realities of war often mean that well planned schedules will have to be broken (Barakat & Ellis, 1996). The implications are that if the researcher still wants to achieve the objectives of the field visits, then there is a strong need to be **flexible**, both in the time tabling of the visit and the methods chosen to elicit data (Barakat, 1992).

While this may be an acknowledged necessity in some of the social science literature, such a suggestion runs counter to positivist methodological thinking, where such flexibility is seen to represent a lack of validity and to be "...subjective, impressionistic, idiosyncratic and biased" (Burgess, 1984). However the parameters of war all conspire to force the researcher to maintain a flexible and chameleon approach to data collection. Attempts at adherence to set timetables or strict methodologies will result in the researcher returning from the field empty handed.

4.3.6 **Limitations on Time**

In war, it is impossible to predict the amount of time that will be available in any one location. There are many uncontrollable variables that govern the possibilities open to the researcher. There are cultural constraints of the working hours and

practices of local colleagues; renewed fighting or shelling or a shift in the battle lines can cut a field visit very short; personal constraints of finance for time spent in the field and difficulties in obtaining permission for entry into the field: all these aspects can severely curtail the time available for gathering information (Barakat & Ellis, 1996).

Further constraints on time will be imposed by the magnitude of war and its multi-sectorial effects. In order to gather a representative cross section of information and to avoid the propaganda-fed bias that could come from collecting data in only one area, data in war should be gathered from different areas within the conflict affected country. This implies a series of short case studies conducted in different locations and reduces the amount of time free to be spent in each area. This was the approach taken by the researcher [13].

One way of compensating for the possible constraints on time imposed by war is to devise a checklist of observations (Hamdi, 1991) that can facilitate direct observation. Physical indications of social processes that can be clearly seen through direct observation and will give an indication of the underlying situation (Barakat & Ellis, 1996). For example, in Barakat's study of Yemeni resettlement villages, he used the extent to which the settlement had been transformed in order to measure the degree of acceptance of the housing (Barakat, 1992, 1993). The category of investigation was broken down into observable, measurable indicators, such as:

- Number of occupied houses
- Emergence of new houses self built within the settlement
- Maintenance and modification of the housing units
- Establishment of gardens, plots, etc.

With such a checklist, it was possible to get an overall picture of the level of acceptance of the settlement purely through walking around and directly observing (Barakat, 1993). In a study of the success of self-settled refugees in Zambia, Hansen speaks of using indicators such as possession of white goods (refrigerators, etc.) and electrical equipment, furniture, vehicles, etc., to gain a visible measurement of income and wealth (Hansen, 1990).

[13] See Appendix A for the full list of sites visited

In an effort to maintain an open minded approach it is necessary for the researcher to be reflexive and constantly review these indicators and add or change them to respond to knowledge accrued of the situation on the ground (Barakat & Ellis, 1996). The daily practice of making field notes was utilised as a good opportunity to reflect on the gathered information and adjust the checklist accordingly.

To enable the maximum use to be made of every opportunity to visit a camp or settlement no matter how swift, the author made a checklist of physical indicators that could be noted during visits [14]. This list was added to and amended as the time in the field progressed and the researcher became aware of new parameters.

The observation checklist was especially useful where time was short and where there were restrictions on the use of other techniques such as interviewing. For example, when visiting the previously mentioned camp in Špansko, Zagreb the researcher walked through the camp prior to finding the camp resident committee's chief. Access to further investigate the camp was then refused. However, the trip was not wasted as during the researcher's walk to find the manager certain indicators had been noted, which allowed comparisons to be made later on when the researcher visited the sister camp Špansko 2. The following extract illustrates a few of these indicators:

> " I arrived at Špansko 1 - a barrack of subdivided, brown wood board sheds with fibre cement roofing. There were strings of washing everywhere and women sweeping the paths between vegetable plots containing rows of spring cabbage. Firewood was neatly stacked against the units. There were many cars most of which bore the Vukovar licence plate. A tractor and trailer were parked by the side of the plot and most of the windows had lace curtains up at them." (Field notes, February 1995)

The lace curtains, tidily stacked fire wood and activity of path sweeping indicate an effort to invest in the accommodation through making it more visually acceptable. The vegetable plots show investment of time and money and a drive to utilise all available opportunities to improve the situation. The cars bearing the Vukovar licences show that this is a camp of displaced persons rather than refugees and give a measure of the degree of retained wealth. Although only a brief section, it shows how a comparison can be made with Špansko 2, a camp for refugees which was visited after Špansko 1. Here, the firewood was thrown in piles and no attempt was

[14] See Appendix C for checklist

made to utilise the surrounding land for gardens or vegetable plots. The windows displayed not lace curtains, but rags stuffed around the frames to keep out draughts. There were no cars visible and rubbish and waste littered the site. The atmosphere was all together different [15]:

> "... we arrived [at Španska 2] and all I could hear was loud wailing coming from inside one of the units. A woman who was squatting on a pile of firewood in the early morning sun, rushed off into the barracks as we approached, returning a minute later with a woman[16] who looked tired and fed up..." (Field notes, February 1995)

The checklist was useful in situations of limited time but, when the occasion arose where more time was available, then the opportunity was taken to utilise other forms of data collection such as semi-structured interviews or group discussions in informal, familiar and secure surroundings.

4.3.7 **Limited Information**

In war, it is increasingly difficult to obtain basic information such as records or maps either because they have been destroyed or because they are held under restricted access, or in some cases, where new settlements have been constructed, maps have not yet been produced. A good knowledge of the situation that existed pre-war can address some of these issues, as can the creation of one's own maps and records of information while in the field utilising basic survey methods, sketching and photographs (Barakat & Ellis, 1996).

Such documentation of an area can be used to serve a dual purpose. It is often the case that a tangible focus enables people to meet and talk more freely, as it gives everyone a physical process upon which to concentrate and enables relationships to be built across it in a non-confrontational manner (Dudley, 1993). For instance, when the researcher first arrived in the camp of Gašinci [17], it was found that, despite earlier assurances to the contrary, there was no translator and no contact who spoke English. The researcher had little idea of the situation as it existed but a need to utilise the opportunity to learn as much as possible. Thus, the researcher utilised the process of documentation of the camp to provide an opportunity to initiate contact with some of the inhabitants.

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[15] These inferences will be further discussed in Chapter Seven

[16] The camp spokeswoman

[17] The researcher stayed here for a week, living in one of the units with a nurse and her two daughters.

There was no map in existence of the camp of Gašinci at that time, so the researcher started to sketch one out, measuring huts and units and sketching the different types in a deliberate and visible manner (Fig 4.2).



Fig 4.2. Sketch map of Gašinci created by the author (Field notes, August 1994)

Within a couple of hours, there was a small band of children assisting the researcher, pointing out omissions in the map and encouraging the inclusion and sketching of their houses (Fig 4.3). Many of the children were learning English in the school, and through meeting them the researcher was invited into their homes and introduced to their families. The disturbance caused by the group attracted the attention of others in the camp and in this way the researcher met Derviš Kerović who had lived in the camp for a year. He could speak English and offered to help with interviewing some families in the camp[18]. In this way the camp was mapped, the structures recorded and much was learned about social structures and processes through informal and non-confrontational conversations.

[18] He and his sister also became, and continue to be good friends, and the researcher is grateful to them for their easy friendship and great kindness.

This technique of using the physical obvious show of documenting the camp was useful in Gašinci, however, care was taken over where else the technique was used. In a war, there are people who will be suspicious of seeing someone obviously noting structures and creating maps or sketching. It is essential that the researcher is sensitive to the tensions and context within which they are working or risk losing, at the very least, the data that they have collected and whatever freedom of movement they possessed (Barakat & Ellis, 1996).

Fig 4.3. Sketches of Gašinci Camp taken from the author's field note book (August, 1994)

4.3.8 **Self-presentation**

Self-presentation while in the field is very important and it has a considerable effect on the type and level of data which is collected (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1983). Not only is body language important but also dress; speech and demeanour; travelling companions and the manner in which the researcher arrives in the field.

In terms of dress, it is necessary to be cognisant of the type of people that will be spoken with and how they will respond to the way of dress. For instance, a smart professional appearance may assist in gaining information from a government official, but the same appearance will severely affect the type of information given to the researcher by the community. In war, an innate suspicion of officials asking questions develops. People worry as to the potential negative consequences of

their statements and so will try to give what they perceive to be favourable answers. Conversely, in war where all are competing for scarce resources, informants may also view the appearance of a perceived official as a chance to try and improve their situation by giving an exaggerated or distorted picture of the conditions (Barakat & Ellis, 1996).

People have a tendency to tell you what they think you want to hear (Chambers, 1983; Dudley, 1993), they will categorise you from their own experience and adapt their information accordingly. Thus, when the researcher was working in refugee and displaced persons camps, very casual dress was maintained which resulted in more open relations and free flowing information. It also guarded, to a certain extent, against falsely raising people's expectations that the purpose of the visit was to provide money or aid or to immediately improve the situation that the informants were in.

To a certain degree, it is difficult to avoid raising people's expectations. In war and relief situations, communities become so used to foreigners moving around their camps, settlements and homes identifying worthy causes for their expenditure, that merely by being a foreigner in the camp expectations of assistance are raised (Barakat & Ellis, 1996). For this reason, the researcher always tried to clarify her own agenda to those that were spoken with, emphasising her student status, the hopes for the work that was being done and the long term nature of the study. It has been found that outlining the reasons for the study to those that are involved can be beneficial (Barakat & Ellis, 1996). The researcher found that when people were informed that their experiences were of interest, and that it was hoped to use them to try to help others in similar situations, they were very willing to help. There was also an element of relief that someone was interested in their situation:

> "Thank you for coming - at least somebody thinks about coming to visit us" (Andrić family, Osijek, January 1995)

> "...I am happy that finally someone is coming to see how we live" (Displaced woman in Trgovački Dom, Osijek, August 1994)

The way in which researchers present themselves to the informants in terms of demeanour is crucial. It is very important to try and be sensitive to both the culture in which the researcher is working and to respect the pride and dignity of the people (Barakat & Ellis, 1996; Chambers, 1983). Understanding the culture and

traditions and the social structure is not only respectful, but can offer opportunities for learning. For example in Yemen, joining the men "...chewing qatt; the local substitute for alcohol..." provides "...good occasions to question and listen". (Barakat, 1993). In Croatia and Bosnia, the ritual of brewing and drinking coffee provided the perfect opportunity for talking informally and learning in a casual environment through story telling.

The way that the researcher chooses to arrive in a given research field can also affect the type of data that they then receive. In war, it is often the case that the only people who can get access into and out of certain places are the aid agencies or the military. Whilst getting transport with one of these groups may be beneficial in getting physically to the field, arriving in the community, settlement or camp in a jeep emblazoned with an agency logo or with military plates, will result in informants associating you with that group and consequently providing biased data. In order to guard against such bias, when the author did get lifts with members of the UNHCR, the vehicle was parked away from the research site and the remaining distance was covered on foot. This was especially important in Croatia, as many people mistakenly believe that UNHCR is a subsidiary of the openly despised UNPROFOR[19], and it was thought that this could jeopardise the progress of the research or adversely affect the data that was received.

4.3.9 **Translation**

If the researcher has to operate through a translator, it is essential that they are of a similar disposition and degree of understanding. It is counter-productive for the researcher to try to dress and act in a sensitive manner if the translator is not doing likewise.

In one situation, one of the author's translators appeared for work dressed in a suit and tie, and prior to entering the house into which he and the researcher had been invited, said,

> "...don't touch anything, don't eat anything and don't accept a drink - everything is dirty." (Field notes, January 1995)

[19] A fact evidenced many times by the graffiti we found scrawled in the dirt of the jeep when we returned to it after interviews.

An attitude such as this can be easily read by those being interviewed and is insulting as well as potentially detrimental to the research. It takes a lot of work on the behalf of the researcher to undo the damage that it causes in the interview situation .

The best translators were those who came from the refugee or displaced community themselves, as they were recognised by those being interviewed and were sympathetic and understanding to the informants. They also gave the researcher an opportunity to talk freely with the translators themselves about their own experiences:

> "...Vesna turned out to be an architect as well. She was from Sarajevo and spoke excellent English. It was a relief to be able to talk to someone fluently without the encumbrance of a translator..." (Field notes, January 1995)

4.3.10 **Impartiality**

All researchers come into a research setting carrying their own constructed ideological baggage; concepts and assumptions about a situation that are idiosyncratic. This is even more relevant in a war that has been extensively covered by inevitably biased media reporting. It is difficult to avoid collecting data that fits into a preconceived notion of the situation. It is also incredibly difficult to remain impartial and to retain an analytical standpoint when directly faced with the suffering caused by war. Sitting and talking with the victims of rape or with those who have been maimed or lost members of their family, deeply affects the researcher. It is impossible, and undesirable, for the researcher to try and remain unaffected and unresponsive to such suffering or even to remain neutral. However, the researcher should endeavour to retain a degree of balance by consciously trying to gather information from all sides and all levels to present an impartial picture (Barakat & Ellis, 1996).

To travel the field looking, listening and learning from all possible sides and sources and constantly assessing the viewpoint is the closest the researcher can come to impartiality when working in a war situation. Thus, an open minded and reflexive approach was maintained allowing the author to constantly address and adjust her perspective.

4.3.11 **Stress**

A final consideration is the importance of researchers being aware of the stress that both they and the informants are under. It is important to accept that sometimes the trauma experienced by the informants may mean that they will not participate in any form of questioning, conversation or investigation. When informants are as heavily traumatised as refugees from war, the researcher should have the sensitivity to respect their needs and not to force the situation by asking questions. In this case, if necessary, the researcher should fall back on other data collection techniques, such as direct observation, rather than persistent questioning.

Where the researcher is conducting interviews with the survivors of war, they should also be aware of the potential effects on themselves. Constant and intense exposure to the horror of war and the terror experienced by its survivors have a deep effect. The nightly catharsis of writing field notes was found to help in controlling the extremes of emotion that experiencing war and listening to account after account of suffering and violence can bring (Barakat & Ellis, 1996).

4.4 LEARNING TOOLS

Throughout the study, attendance at conferences and workshops and the dissemination of the research findings among others in the field, were important components in keeping the research directed and relevant. Additionally, valuable information, not available through the literature, was obtained from attending conferences and workshops and this helped in directing and focusing the study.

Of primary importance in directing the study was the author's attendance at the "First International Workshop on Improved Shelter Response and Environment for Refugees", which was held in Geneva in June 1993 by UNHCR. The workshop was convened because UNHCR recognised from the actions undertaken in the Gulf region and the former-Yugoslavia, that they were acting in a new arena, assistance now being needed in war-torn, developed nations with cold climates. This presented a set of circumstances far removed from their conventional field of activities in developing nations with "...warm or moderate climatic conditions" (UNHCR, 1993). They were also finding that the sequence and scale of emergencies "...prohibited in-depth analysis" (UNHCR, 1993).

This workshop established an overwhelming need to examine the actions and projects of the humanitarian community in cold climate, developed nations affected

by war, in order to distil lessons that could be disseminated back into the international relief community to improve response. It is for this reason, that the research presented in this thesis focuses on the Republic of Croatia. Being a war-torn developed nation with a cold climate it offers a perfect arena for study of the new problems facing the international humanitarian community.

The findings developed during the research process were disseminated among those working in the field to test their applicability and accuracy. This was first done at the "Settlement Reconstruction in Croatia Workshop" held in Dubrovnik from the 12-16 September 1994 by the Study Centre for Reconstruction and Development and the Post-war Reconstruction and Development Unit, University of York. The author's contribution was a paper entitled "An Evaluation of Shelter Projects for Displaced Persons and Refugees in Croatia" (Ellis, 1994). This presentation was made during the last week of the first period of data collection in the field and thus enabled the author to gain valuable feedback from the participants on the initial findings of the research. It gave the author the opportunity to share her initial findings with a local and international audience. It also helped in establishing contacts for the second stage of data collection [20].

The "Emergency Planning Conference '95", held in Lancaster in July 1995, provided another opportunity for the author to check the findings of the research within the humanitarian community. The author's paper was entitled "Issues in the Planning of Emergency Accommodation for Refugees and Displaced Persons Residing in the Republic of Croatia" (Ellis, 1995). This conference also presented the opportunity to gain up-to-date and first hand information on some natural disasters such as the Kobe Earthquake (Hayashi & Kawata, 1995) and these have been used to inform other sections of this thesis.

Of the most use to the researcher was the international workshop that was instigated and organised by the researcher together with Dr Sultan Barakat of the Post-war Reconstruction and Development Unit, University of York. This workshop held in October 1995 in Luton was structured so as to permit the findings of the research to be discussed and debated by the assembled participants. Invited attendants at the workshop were members of the ODPR, representatives of aid agencies working with shelter projects in Croatia, academics and professionals

[20] This workshop was attended not only by many international experts but also by many members of the ODPR and representatives of the Croatian Red Cross and the UNHCR in Croatia.

specialising in the field of shelter for refugees and shelter in war, social scientists and shelter manufacturers and suppliers. As well as presenting one of the overview papers that initiated the workshop and outlined the findings of the research project (Ellis, 1995a), the author also directed the working groups so that discussion ranged over:

- The types of shelter provision and their effects on the recipient communities and host communities
- The existence of linkages between relief and development / reconstruction
- Possibilities for implementing developmental relief in a war environment

Through the discussion of these topics it was possible to subject the findings of the research to peer review and thus determine their accuracy, strengths and weaknesses [21].

As a final method of validating both the findings of the research and the methodology used to support it, the author has produced two refereed papers, co-authored with Dr Sultan Barakat. Of these papers, one outlines the findings of the research:

"From Relief to Development: The Long Term Effects of 'Temporary' Accommodation on Refugees and Displaced Persons in the Republic of Croatia"

and the other the methodology used for data collection in war [22]:

"Researching under Fire: Issues for Consideration when Collecting Data and Information in War Circumstances, with Specific Reference to Relief and Reconstruction Projects"

4.5 CONCLUSIONS

By way of a conclusion to this chapter, some general lessons have been distilled from the text. It is understood that no two situations are identical and thus there is little point in trying to make firm rules and regulations governing the actions of the researcher in war. However, it would seem that in view of the paucity of

[21] The findings of this workshop and a list of participants are contained in Appendix D
[22] These papers have been refereed by the panel of *Disasters* journal and appear in the June 1996 issue.

information covering this area, it would be beneficial to those researchers who also work in the environment of war to try to suggest some guidelines.

- Flexibility and innovation in approach to data collection are important
- Collaboration with a partner in the field aids access and progress when in the research setting.
- Care needs to be taken with the way in which researchers present themselves when entering the research setting and when conducting the data collection
- Extensive preparation prior to entering the field is beneficial
- Looking and listening, rather than simply questioning, can avoid inciting fear and suspicion and increasing suffering
- Keeping fixed appointments to a minimum gives flexibility to utilise unforeseen opportunities and maximise the potential for chance learning
- Creation of a checklist of physical indicators of underlying social structures can facilitate fast information gathering when time is short
- Reflexivity and maintaining an open mind helps to achieve impartiality
- Sensitivity to the culture and the people encountered during research is important
- Autonomy and independence stop the researcher becoming an added burden on the community
- Talking with a broad range of people in many locations can assist in balancing the propaganda
- Awareness of the dangers of war — land mines, snipers, increased levels of suspicion, etc., is crucial for maintaining personal safety. Unplanned actions can jeopardise the safety of the researcher and others.

- It is important to realise when enough is enough and not get so obsessed by the process of data collection that harm or offence is caused to the community or the suffering of others is increased

- Subjecting the research findings to the analysis of others in the field focuses and refines the research

The following four chapters in Section Two of this thesis, will outline the results obtained from the use of these research methods and means of data collection while in the field.

SECTION TWO

LESSONS FROM THE FIELD

CHAPTER FIVE: THE DESTRUCTION OF YUGOSLAVIA

5.1 INTRODUCTION

5.1.1 **Structure**

This chapter serves to introduce the case study material by providing essential background knowledge of the last years of the former-Yugoslavia. To analyse and understand the underlying motivations behind shelter programmes and the policies and decisions that underpin them, it is necessary to have a basic knowledge of the machinations of the war and its peripheral effects.

To this end, the chapter begins by describing the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's slide into war and continues by outlining the main characters in the war, the shifts in allegiance and the history of phenomena such as the UNPAs (United Nations Protected Areas). This first section of the chapter does not attempt to provide a full chronology of the war in the post-Yugoslav countries. However, it does present certain key facts that the author feels have directly affected the development of the refugee and displaced person situation, and hence the shelter policies and programmes in Croatia.

The second section of the chapter presents the quantitative data which describes the size of the refugees and displaced persons' community and its population characteristics; the finance required to support such a community and the range of shelter programmes implemented to address their needs and requirements. Such descriptions contribute to inform the discussions and analysis contained within Chapter Six and Chapter Seven.

5.1.2 **The Current Situation**

At the time of writing, the Dayton Agreement has just been signed and with the exception of some Serbian activities in Sarajevo and Croatian activities in the Mostar area, the agreement seems to be holding [1]. It appears that the bitter war of the past five years is over and it is now time for the refugees and displaced persons

[1] The Dayton Agreement is a peace deal between the three main warring parties, brokered by the United States of America in the Autumn of 1995. It was drawn up in Dayton, Ohio.

to return to their homes. The level of destruction evident within Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina leads one to question how this return will be accomplished. Current news reports suggest that the ethnic cleansing which has taken place over the past five years, ensures that the return of some to their homes will mean the expulsion of others.

A journey through Bosnia-Hercegovina, or the once occupied territories of the Republic of Croatia, shows clearly the intensity of the physical destruction left in the wake of the war. The profusion of nationalistic graffiti daubed on the walls of remaining structures demonstrates the intensity of emotion, hatred and deep seated fear still felt by all sides. Slogans such as "Free Bosnia or Death", *"Samo Sloga Srbina Spašava"* ("Only Unity can Save the Serb")[2] or representations of the chequered shield of Croatia are all clearly seen around the damaged and destroyed towns and villages of the post-Yugoslav countries. Orthodox churches, mosques and catholic churches, physical symbols of the religious affiliations of the Serbs, Muslims and Croats have been shelled and burnt, demonstrating the essential conflicts between the factions. In Serb held areas, Croat and Muslim houses have either been destroyed or taken over by Serbs; in Croat areas the surviving residences of Serbs provide shelter for Croat and Muslim refugees and displaced. The economies of Croatia, Bosnia-Hercegovina and Serbia, afflicted by hyper-inflation and structural reforms prior to the war, have now been destroyed by the five years of conflict.

In this environment of destruction, millions of refugees and displaced persons who have spent the years of the war in exile in either post-Yugoslavian or third countries such as USA, Germany, Sweden and Norway need to return home. The investment required for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of these people's lives and livelihoods, and the Yugoslavian countries that once supported them, will require immense financial and physical inputs both internationally and nationally. It has recently been estimated that it will require US$5 billion to 'kick start' the Bosnian economy alone and that even this amount will last only three months (Elliott, 1996). Simultaneously, the level of emergency aid that keeps the refugees

[2] A slogan that is represented by the Serb icon of the symmetrical cross marked with four Cyrillic S's (c's in the Latin alphabet), the two left hand ones being mirror images of those on the right



and displaced persons alive, warm and fed in the camps and settlements throughout the former-Yugoslavia will need to continue. The level of social welfare support must also increase as people start to return and try to rebuild their homes and lives.

Has the way in which relief assistance was provided during the war anticipated and provided for this return of diaspora communities? Has the emergency aid addressed the longer term rehabilitation and reconstruction requirements that would follow the establishment of peace, or have projects been concerned only with the short term needs of the population? To attempt to answer such questions it is necessary first to establish the origin, nature and driving force behind the refugee and displaced person population.

5.2 THE FALL OF YUGOSLAVIA

5.2.1 **The Interregnum: 1980 - 1988**

The interregnum opened with Tito's death in May 1980 and so began Yugoslavia's slide into self-destruction. His death caused genuine grief, which would have intensified had there been foreknowledge of the events to come:

> "We all cried, but we did not know we were burying Yugoslavia" (Silber & Little, 1995, p. *xxvii*)[3]

To govern in his wake, Tito left in place a collective leadership which came to power on the 4th May 1980. This collective federal Presidency was made up of equal representation from the six component republics[4] and two autonomous provinces[5] of Yugoslavia, and was lead on a rotational basis by each of the representatives (Crnobrnja, 1994; Silber & Little, 1995) (Fig 5.1). This presidency was an attempt to maintain and promote equitable relations between the disparate ethnic groups of Yugoslavia. Knowledge of the ethno-nationalistic conflicts in Yugoslavia during World War Two, had impressed upon Tito that such a presidency was the only viable solution to the preservation of a unified Yugoslavia (Glenny, 1992).

This federal presidency endeavoured to create the public impression that, following the death of Tito nothing had changed, that Yugoslavia was still viable and stable.

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[3] A statement made by one ethnic Albanian Communist functionary

[4] Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia, Slovenia, Macedonia and Montenegro

[5] Kosovo and Vojvodina were nominally parts of Serbia but practically were politically equal and in possession of full representation on the Federation

They rode on the back of Tito's reputation and failed to deal with the burgeoning economic and political undercurrents (Crnobrnja, 1994) .

Fig 5.1. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Source: Silber & Little, 1995)

By the time of Tito's death, Yugoslavia was already in the grips of an economic crisis which had started in earnest in 1979. The problem was hidden from the Yugoslav public, the state bodies and the Party, but by 1980, foreign debt stood at US$18 billion and the trade deficit for that year alone was US$3.5 billion. The economic problems were deep rooted in the policies of the previous twenty years, with their emphasis on industrial processes entirely dependent on imported raw materials, purchased using hard Western currency, and an extractive industry that was systematically neglected. There was simultaneously, no investment in agriculture, transport, energy production or health care (Crnobrnja, 1994).

By 1981, the social, political and economic inequalities were producing high levels of frustration among the population. Frustrations that blew up in Kosovo, where there was a major student riot against the social conditions at the University. The riot left eleven dead and was widely televised and publicised.

By 1984, Yugoslavians were experiencing rationing of petrol, electricity, sugar and flour. The commission that had been set up by the presidency to stabilise the economy in 1982, had spent two years doing little more than tinkering with the problem. There was no attempt to tackle the problems of social ownership that were seen to be fuelling the crisis. Indeed, the commission seemed only to serve to divide the presidency and bring nationalist concerns to the agenda (Crnobrnja, 1994).

As the political leaders of the republics began to gain strength, they found themselves trying to explain a developing economic crisis to their people without blaming systematic causes, as to do so would involve self blame. The popular solution was to blame others. Croatia and Slovenia complained of the support they had to give to the less-developed republics, who in turn complained of terms of trade that favoured the developed republics. As two separate commissions failed to solve the problems of Yugoslavia, and the allegations between republics of who was to blame increased, it became obvious that the presidency could no longer hide behind the facade of the Titoist model. Radical changes would have to be made to endeavour to prevent the increasingly nationalistic tendencies overtaking Yugoslavia.

Such reforms were shouldered by the Croatian Federal Prime Minister Ante Marković who took office in 1989 at a time when inflation stood at 2000 per cent per annum. He attempted to bring economics to the centre stage, to consolidate the economic situation in order to create a platform for deeper social changes and overcome the increasing attractiveness of nationalistic solutions. In a package of reforms the Dinar (FRY national currency) was linked to the German Mark; imports were liberalised creating increased competition for the domestic market thus forcing poor producers to close down or improve. A large scale privatisation plan was set in place that radically changed the ownership structure. The reforms did start to significantly improve the situation , within a short time the inflation fell back to 60 per cent per annum and price increases were almost nil by 1990. To many his policies were seen to be in place too late — Yugoslavia was already deemed to be ungovernable (Crnobrnja, 1994). Reforms of policies controlling the finance of the JNA and the determination of wage rates ultimately thwarted Marković's attempts at reform. The discussion that raged over these two issues within the presidency provided the forum for the republics and provinces to begin to differentiate their positions. Increasingly, **national** concerns were voiced by the

representatives and the confrontations and disputes within the Yugoslav federation grew.

5.2.2 **The Rise of the Land of Mordor: the Campaign for Greater Serbia**[6]

By 1987, the ethnic and national element of the crisis in Yugoslavia was clearly visible and publicised by the press. In their documentation of the death of Yugoslavia, Silber and Little lay the kindling of Serbian Nationalistic tendencies at the door of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts whose memorandum cataloguing national grievances was published in a mass-circulation daily, *Večernje Novosti* (Silber & Little, 1995). In the document, it was alleged that Serbs had been in an unjust position since World War Two and that their very existence was threatened. It was stated that they were politically and economically discriminated against by the Croatians and Slovenes and that those in Kosovo faced total genocide (Silber & Little, 1995). Extracts of the memorandum published in the paper accused Croatia and Slovenia of conspiring against Serbia and stated that:

> "...Serbs in Croatia have never been as endangered as they are today. The resolution of their national status must be a top priority political question." (Silber & Little, 1995, p30).

The memorandum tapped a vein of concern endemic throughout Serbia, further, it gave courage and force to a Kosovan Serb protest group that had established in the months after an uprising of ethnic Albanians in 1981. By 1987, the message of the memorandum had taken root among the Serbian population of Yugoslavia. To dispel tensions in Kosovo, the Serbian President, Ivan Stambolić, was invited to Kosovo for talks with the local leaders. In a miscalculation that cost him his career, Stambolić sent Slobodan Milošević [7] in his place to calm the Serbs and reinforce the Albanian leaders.

On the day of the meeting, a crowd of Kosovan Serbs, inspired that Belgrade was taking notice of their perceived plight, gathered outside the meeting room. Through incitement, the protesters became violent, throwing rocks at the police and the building. In the hope of quietening the crowd, the Albanian President of Kosovo asked Milošević to speak to them and calm them. The speech was to set the future for Yugoslavia:

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[6] By 1991, foreign journalists were calling Serbia the land of Mordor. A reference to J. R. R. Tolkien's "...dark vision of a fallen kingdom" (Glenny, 1992).

[7] Milošević was leader of the Serbian Communist Party in 1987

> "No one should dare to beat you. You should stay here. This is your land. These are your houses. Your meadows and gardens. Your memories. You shouldn't abandon your land just because it's difficult to live, because you are pressured by injustice and degradation. It was never part of the Serbian character to give up in the face of obstacles, to demobilise when it is time to fight...you should stay here for the sake of your ancestors and dependants. Otherwise your ancestors would be defiled and descendants disappointed. But I don't suggest that you stay, endure, and tolerate a situation you're not satisfied with. On the contrary, you should change it with the rest of the progressive people here, in Serbia and in Yugoslavia." Slobodan Milošević, 24 April 1987, as quoted in (Silber & Little, 1995, p 37).

The Serbian political structure was set to change and Milošević saw the power to do it in the Serbian people. In a series of manipulated meetings, controlled press releases and media reports, Milošević ensured the destruction of Ivan Stambolić as president of Serbia. By January 1988, the interregnum that had opened with Tito's death, closed when Milošević became the undisputed leader of Serbia.

5.2.3 **1988-1995: The Death of Yugoslavia**

By the Summer of 1989, Milošević's nationalistic campaign had reached a peak. In the Serbian press, the Knin area of Croatia was openly being referred to as "Krajina", and the head of the Croatian Communist League was increasingly called "Ustaša" (the term for the Croatian fascists of World War Two) In Krajina, retired army generals and politicians from Serbia were fostering armed rebellion against the Croatian party. The force of Serbia had already overthrown the authorities of Kosovo, Vojvodina and Montenegro. In an attempt to retain its authority, at the December 1989 congress, the Croatian Party followed Slovenia and opted for multi-party elections the following spring.

When the elections came, Franjo Tuđman and his party HDZ (Croatian Democratic Union) won the poll. Tuđman was a nationalist and like Milošević built his power on mobilising his people. The taunts and operations of Milošević's men in Croatia, provoked Croatian nationalist pride and opened the way for Tuđman. However, the ethnic mix of Croatia and the encitement of the Knin Serbs would not make his job easy. Prior to the war the areas now known as United Nations Protected Areas had a Serbian majority in population terms (Figs 5.2 and 5.3).

Fig 5.2. Serb populous areas of Croatia prior to the war - areas which later became three of the four UNPAs (source: ODPR, 1995)

It was in these areas that the Serbs mobilised to gain independence from Croatia:

> "It has not occurred to us to dispute the right of the Croatian Nation to secede from Yugoslavia, if that nation decides of its own free will in a referendum...but I want to make it completely clear that it should not occur to anyone that a part of the Serbian nation will be allowed to go with them. Because the history of the Serbian nation in the Independent State of Croatia is too tragic to risk such a fate again" Milošević speaking to Belgrade Student Rally, March 1991, quoted in (Silber & Little, 1995, p142)

MUNICIPALITY	NATIONAL STRUCTURE (1991)		
	CROATS	SERBS	MUSLIMS
Benkovac	13553	18986	25
Donji Lapac	44	7854	22
Dvor	1395	12591	31
Glina	8041	13975	62
Knin	3886	37888	31
Kostajnica	4295	9343	119
Obrovac	3761	7572	15
Titova Korenica	1996	8585	93
Vojnić	116	7366	436
Vrginmost	4043	11729	123

Fig 5.3. National structure of Serb populous areas of Croatia (source: 1991 National Census data)

Both Slovenia and Croatia wanted secession from Yugoslavia. Each had held referendums in 1990 which had left little doubt that the populations wanted independence from Yugoslavia. For Slovenia, the decision was relatively simple, Milošević had already made it clear that he would not fight to keep them in Yugoslavia, by June 1990 they were ready to move. For Croatia however, the decision was harder; the trouble in the Knin area and in Eastern Slavonia, the boycotting of the referendum by the Krajina Serbs and the knowledge that Milošević would use Croatian secession to enforce a redrawing of the borders of Croatia to give the Krajina Serbs autonomy, made the decision more difficult.

Slovenia declared independence on 25 June 1991, the Serbs put up little resistance. The JNA, the Serb controlled Yugoslav People's Army, did move into Slovenia. However, the conflict was brief and Slovenia was only at war for ten days.

During the Summer of 1991, the Krajina Serb forces steadily extended the territories that they held in Croatia. Whole communities moved from these territories overnight during this undeclared war. The Dalmatian coast became full of the displaced and dispossessed. The Croatian National Guard, despite the

numbers of volunteers, were ill-equipped and ill-prepared and could do little to stop the advance of these JNA backed troops.

In August 1991, simultaneous attacks on Kijevo in Krajina and Vukovar in Slavonia, left Croatia in little doubt that it was now at war. All JNA barracks in Croatia were besieged by the Croatian Guard, barricades erected and windows sandbagged. Fighting erupted in a broad arc around the territories that the Serbs had taken. These territories represented between one quarter and one third of Croatia and were linked by Serb held corridors through Bosnia.

By the autumn of 1991, the United Nations had become drawn into the conflict. Cyrus Vance presented the UN peacekeeping operation on December 11th 1991 as an annex to the report of the Secretary General. The peacekeeping force (UNPROFOR) was proposed to create "...conditions for peace and security, essential for the negotiation of a complete solution to the crisis" (Baletić, 1994). In Croatia, UNPROFOR mobilised to protect the four regions of Serb-occupied territory: UNPA North, South, East and West. As the war started to rage in Bosnia, the situation in Croatia grew calmer and by mid-May 1992, UNPROFOR were installed in the UNPAs.

5.2.4 **Refugees from Bosnia-Hercegovina**

By April 1992, the war had spread into Bosnia-Hercegovina, causing the largest movement of refugees and internally displaced persons yet witnessed in the conflict. While all wars produce refugees and displaced persons, it was estimated that by the end of 1993, the conflict in Yugoslavia had produced 4.2 million, that is one fifth of the pre-war population of Yugoslavia (Klein, 1994) and one fifth of the total number of refugees in the world. The largest displacement occurred in the first six months of 1993 as the war intensified in Bosnia-Hercegovina (Klein, 1994). By April 1993, the war was no longer Serb against Croat and Serb against Muslim. After a winter of tension, the Croats and Bosnian Muslims started to fight each other, a situation that endured until the US brokered Croat-Muslim Federation was formed in February 1994. Tensions began in the Croatian populous areas of Bosnia-Hercegovina, which under the control of Mate Boban, became the Croatian state of Herceg-Bosna. For the Bosnian Muslim refugees who had already fled into Croatia to seek sanctuary, this new turn of events caused further problems and increased tensions between the groups of displaced Croatians and Bosnian Muslim refugees.

Since 1992, the ethnic cleansing of Bosnia-Hercegovina had caused thousands to flee from the North and centre of Bosnia. Their escape route was either to the Croatian Dalmatian coast around Split, or up into the Croatian capital Zagreb and areas of Slavonia. Croatia was already caring for thousands of displaced persons who had moved in 1991. Now, in the Summer of 1992, Croatia announced that it could take no more refugees and requested help from the international community.

The effects of Croatia's ban on refugees meant that Bosnian Muslims still trapped in Bosnia, with no escape into Croatia, now had to flee across Bosnia into government held areas. By April 1993, the UN had been pushed into a position where they had to take some action to protect or evacuate the growing numbers of displaced persons held within Bosnia. Starting with Srebrenica, they established 'safe areas', and thus the international community finally committed themselves — morally if not practically — to the protection of one side against another. However, the mandate that governed these areas, that combined elements of peace keeping and peace enforcement, meant ultimately that the areas were highly vulnerable to attack (Silber & Little, 1995). In the end, these safe areas assisted in the process of ethnic cleansing, gathering as they did Muslims together in one area, until the Serb forces were ready to move, surround and attack the areas, as witnessed in Srebrenica in 1995.

Thus, at the time of the first field visit into Croatia in August 1994, the situation stood as follows:

- The Croatian - Bosnian Muslim conflict of 1993 was over and the federation had been in place for six months
- UNHCR was in place as the lead agency, controlling and co-ordinating all activities of international aid agencies in the post-Yugoslav countries
- The Republic of Croatia was host to 198,230 displaced persons (from the occupied territories of Croatia) and 190,772 refugees (Muslims and Croats from Bosnia-Hercegovina and Serbia)
- The United Nations Protection Force was in place in the UNPAs maintaining a tenuous peace in the Serbian occupied territories within Croatia
- One quarter of Croatian territory was occupied, effectively disabling infrastructure connections between the North and the South of the country

5.2.5 **Why Study Croatia?**

Croatia is highly representative of the new field of action for the humanitarian community. The war here reflects the shift, as discussed in Chapter Two, from inter to intra-state and thus has constructed civilians as the prime victims. Aid has to be provided to civilians located within a country still at war and thus subject to scarcity of resources and widespread destruction. The level of intervention by the international community of aid agencies, humanitarian organisations and donors has been incredibly high. The environment within which they are working is one of high nationalistic feeling and political prejudice. These aspects conjoin to make Croatia the ideal arena for study. Thus, an analysis of the way projects and policies are implemented by the international community is essential to improve future action and intervention in other similarly affected countries.

The amount of emergency aid and relief to the refugees and displaced persons within the post-Yugoslav countries over the past five years by both the international community and the host countries has been immense. UNHCR figures for March 1994 show that there were 3,766,000 refugees and displaced persons residing within the former Yugoslavia (UNHCR, 1994a) all requiring support, 532,000 in Croatia, 2,740,000 in Bosnia and Hercegovina and 301,000 in Serbia. In the same report, aid to Bosnia and Hercegovina through UNHCR is shown to measure 22,475 million tonnes of food and non-food items during the month of February 1994. Croatia, received 9,357 million tonnes over the same period, Serbia 3,126. Thus, for a country bearing only one fifth of the number of refugees and displaced persons that Bosnia-Hercegovina hosts, Croatia receives a far higher degree of international assistance. Much of this anomaly may well be explained by the ease with which affected communities can be accessed in Croatia as compared to Bosnia-Hercegovina. However, regardless of the reason for this bias, it is this high level of international aid going into Croatia and the variety of international shelter relief projects being undertaken there, that make it an appropriate case for study.

5.3 THE CROATIAN CONTEXT

In August 1994, the Republic was host to 379,908 registered refugees and displaced persons (representing 8.86 per cent of the domicile population). The laws governing the rights and care of these groups were set up in 1991 by the Croatian Government, with the passing of the Regulation of the Status of Displaced Persons, which was later amended in October 1993 to the Law of the Status of Displaced

Persons and Refugees (ODPR, 1995). These laws state that registered displaced persons and refugees are entitled to:

- necessary accommodation
- nutrition
- financial allowance (depending on the type of accommodation and the height of individual income)
- assistance in psycho-social adaptation
- education of children
- health protection (refugees are only entitled to receive free primary and emergency health care)
- humanitarian aid
- assistance in satisfying other vital needs

At the height of the displaced person's crisis in November 1991, the Government of the Republic of Croatia established the Office for Displaced Persons and Refugees to care for the needs of the forced migrants.

The ODPR estimates that the costs of caring for its refugee and displaced population run to US$528 million annually (ODPR, 1995) with accommodation costs accounting for US$203 million per annum. This financial burden is met by the state budget, the UNHCR and other donations (Fig 5.4). Those refugees and displaced persons accommodated in hotels cost the Croatian government 6.7 German Marks per person per day (US$140 per month) for room and full board [8] and US$210 per person per month for those in the camps and settlements (Mossberg, *et al.*, 1994).

The size of this economic drain is hard to bear for a country whose economy is simultaneously being destroyed by war. In 1991, Croatia's GNP decreased by 23.4 per cent and by the same amount again in 1992 (Baletić, 1994). During the war approximately 30 per cent of the industry has been destroyed, 1,870 kilometres of main roads have been disrupted by the occupation of territories and the rail network covering two thirds of the territory has been paralysed. It is estimated that 12 per cent of the housing stock has been destroyed and damaged, a figure that

[8] Whilst the hotels are full of refugees and displaced there is no chance to resume the tourism trade. Many hotel managers are pushing to have their hotels freed from providing accommodation. However it is estimated that it will cost between US$1000-2000 per bed to renovate the hotels.

cannot be confirmed as a maximum until a full survey has been done of the former UNPAs.



Fig 5.4. Financial burden of accommodation costs carried by organisations in Croatia during 1994 (source: ODPR, 1995)

In June 1995, ODPR data shows 389,002 registered refugees and displaced persons, returnees and refugees in transit in the Republic of Croatia [9] (the latter two categories are distinctly in the minority, with only 4,061 returnees and 4,525 refugees in transit) . Since May 1994, the total has started to rise steadily again due to refugees being sent back to Croatia from the third countries where they had temporary resident status. 56,000 Croatian Nationals are due to return to the Republic from third countries.

Of the total numbers of refugees and displaced currently in Croatia, 78.52 per cent (305,449) are living in private accommodation. The remaining 21.48 per cent (83,553) are in organised accommodation (ODPR, 1995). Of the total number of registered individuals, 198,230 are displaced persons and 190,772 refugees. Both are reasonable evenly distributed in the private accommodation, though in the organised accommodation, displaced persons have the majority of places (Fig 5.5).

[9] Between August 14 and September 21 1995, the number rose rapidly again to 406,173 due to increasing intensity of ethnic cleansing in areas of Banja Luka and Vojvodina. Of these, 21,750 were accommodated in organised accommodation.

TYPE OF ACCOMMODATION	REFUGEES	DISPLACED PERSONS
Organised	30, 845 (36%)	52, 708 (64%)
Private	159, 927 (52.3%)	145, 522 (47.7%)

Fig 5.5. Breakdown of numbers of refugees and displaced persons in different accommodation types (source: ODPR, 1995)

The largest numbers of refugees and displaced persons are located in the Zagreb region followed by the Osijek area of Eastern Slavonia. The distributions of refugees and displaced persons correspond closely to the areas of occupied territory and the escape routes from Bosnia-Hercegovina previously mentioned (Fig 5.6).



Fig 5.6. Occupied territories in Croatia and the UNPAs, the distribution of refugees and displaced persons corresponds to the areas of occupied territory (source: Jean, 1995)

5.3.1 **Basic Typology of Accommodation Types for Displaced Persons and Refugees**

Private accommodation covers those families that are staying either with host families (20 per cent) or are living independently, which is broken down into those who have their own accommodation and pay rent; those who have their rent paid by an organisation; those living alone without paying rent, for example, in a summer cottage, and those who are illegally squatting in empty housing or on vacant land (Mossberg, *et al.*, 1994). Costs for those living in host families are largely met by the host family. This has resulted in the creation of a large number of 'social cases' who also require financial assistance from the Croatian government. In fact, there are now more social cases requiring assistance than refugees or displaced persons in private accommodation (Fig 5.7).

BENEFICIARIES	NUMBERS
displaced persons	186,005
refugees	192,614
social cases	237,408

Fig 5.7. Target beneficiaries living in private accommodation, January 1994 (source: Mossberg, et al, 1994)

There are 597 camps, settlements and centres that are termed 'organised accommodation' in Croatia. There are two basic types; those interchangeably called **camps, settlements or villages** (the terminology used usually depends on the affiliations of the speaker) and **collective centres**. Camps, settlements or villages are defined as accommodation that has been specifically newly built for use by refugees and displaced persons. The **camps** most usually consist of small, prefabricated, 'temporary' buildings located *en masse* on a flat site. Camps of this nature that will be discussed in Chapter Six and Chapter Seven are Čepin, Rokovci and Karlovac (Figs 5.8, 5.9 and 5.10) which were constructed by the GTZ and Kutina which was built, and is still managed, by the DRC (Fig 5.11). Gašinci is also defined as a camp, but is of a slightly different origin in that it was originally an army barracks. Within its boundaries there are the original army huts as well as newly provided prefabricated units of two basic types (Fig 5.12). The other variant

on the basic camp is that of Mićevac which is of a more 'permanent' nature and thus constructed of concrete breeze blocks (Fig 5.13). It was designed and primarily financed by the ODPR and intended to provide accommodation for orphans or students once the displaced population return to their original homes.

Nasele Prijatelstva, Čepin, Eastern Slavonia

Accommodates 2590 Displaced persons
0 Refugees

Managed by the ODPR, Built by the GTZ

Camp

Fig 5.8. The camp at Čepin (source: the author)



Blace Camp, Rokovci, Eastern Slavonia

Accommodates 2120 Displaced persons
0 Refugees
Managed by the ODPR, Built by the GTZ

Camp

Fig 5.9. Blace camp at Rokovci (source: the author)

Gaza, Karlovac, south of Zagreb

Accommodates 1870 Displaced persons
33 Refugees

Managed by the ODPR, built by the GTZ

Camp

Fig 5.10. Gaza camp in Karlovac, close to the border of UNPA North (source: the author)

DRC Camp, Kutina, border of UNPA North

Accommodates 307 Displaced persons
873 Refugees

Managed by the DRC and Residents' Committee, built by the DRC

Camp

Fig 5.11. Danish Red Cross camp in Kutina (source: the author)

Izbjeglice Centar, Gašinci, Đackovačka Satnica, Eastern Slavonia

Accommodates 0 Displaced persons
3100 Refugees

Managed by the ODPR, army camp with additions built by various agencies

Camp

Fig 5.12. The 'Refugee Centre' at Gašinci (source: the author)

Mićevac Camp, Mićevac, south of Zagreb

Accommodates 530 Displaced persons
0 Refugees

Managed by the ODPR, built by the ODPR

Camp

Fig 5.13. The 'permanent' camp at Mićevac (source: the author)

Collective centres are defined as buildings that have been adapted from their pre-war use, they are most usually public buildings and therefore provide mass accommodation in one structure. For example, on the Adriatic coast and in the capital Zagreb, the hotels that once accommodated tourists and business men, are now collective centres for refugees and displaced. Examples of such accommodation are the Hotel Posejdon on the island of Korčula and the Hotel International in Zagreb (Fig 5.14). Also on the coast, buildings that were purchased and used by companies as holiday homes for their workers now accommodate refugees and displaced persons.

Further inland, there are barracks that used to be used to house blue collar workers close to factories or industrial complexes which now serve as collective centres. Reference will be made in Chapter Six and Seven to such accommodation in Velika Gorica, in Zapruđe and Špansko (Fig 5.15, 5.16 & 5.17). The old billets of the Yugoslav People's Army also provide accommodation. The two examples which will be discussed are the two barracks in Varaždin, Prihvatni 1 and 2 (Fig 5.18) and Depađansa Vojarna in Osijek. The latter is also known as the Gašinci Annex as it houses the overflow of refugees from Gašinci camp (Fig 5.19).

Hotel International, Zagreb

Accommodates Approx. 400 Displaced persons
0 Refugees

Managed by the ODPR, hotel - half of the building still functions as a hotel

Collective centre

Fig 5.14. Interior of one room at the Hotel International (source: the author)

Barracks, Velika Gorica, Zagreb

Accommodates Displaced persons and Refugees (number unknown)

Managed by the ODPR, formerly accommodation for construction workers

Collective Centre

Fig 5.15. Barracks at Velika Gorica (source: the author)



Zapruđe Barracks, Zagreb

Accommodates 658 Displaced persons and Refugees

Managed by the ODPR, formerly accommodation for construction workers

Collective Centre

Fig 5.16. Zapruđe Barracks, Zagreb (source: the author)

Španska Barracks, Zagreb

Accommodates 0 Displaced persons
Approx. 360 Refugees

Managed by the ODPR, formerly accommodation for construction workers

Collective centre

Fig 5.17. Španska barracks, Zagreb (source: the author)

Prihvatni Centar 1, Varaždin, Northern Croatia

Accommodates 63 Displaced persons
724 Refugees

Managed by the ODPR, formerly a JNA army barracks

Collective centre

Fig 5.18. Prihvatni Centar 1, Varaždin (source: the author)

Depanđansa Vojarna, Gašinci Annex, Đakovo, Eastern Slavonia

Accommodates 0 Displaced persons
271 Refugees

Managed by the ODPR, formerly a JNA barracks

Collective centre

Fig 5.19. Depađansa Vojarna, Collective Centre, Đakovo (source: the author)

More imaginative, though not necessarily more appropriate, solutions come from re-used postal trains that have been shunted onto a side line and refitted to accommodate refugees and displaced persons, such as the Wagon Village in Ivankovo (Fig 5.20). Shipping containers, fitted with doors and windows can be located quickly and simply and provide alternative accommodation. Reference will be made to an example in Velika Gorica (Fig 5.21). Many schools and student accommodation were used as shelter in the initial stages of the crisis to provide a swift emergency response and some are still utilised to date. For instance, the Građevinski Školski Centar in Osijek and the Đacki Dom Graditjelskih Strukha in Zagreb (Fig 5.22 & 5.23).

Wagon Village, Ivankovo, Eastern Slavonia

Accommodates 44 Displaced persons
82 Refugees

Managed by the ODPR, former postal train, converted and located by Cap Anamur

Collective centre

Fig 5.20. Ivankovo Wagon Village (source: the author)

Shipping Containers, Velika Gorica, Zagreb

Accommodates Approx. 35 Displaced persons and Refugees

Managed by the ODPR, located by ODPR

Collective centre

Fig 5.21. Shipping Containers at Velika Gorica (source: the author)

Građevinski Školski Centar, Osijek, Eastern Slavonia

Accommodates 172 Displaced persons
1 Refugees

Managed by the ODPR, fomerly a secondary school converted with assistance from the IRC

Collective centre

Fig 5.22. Građevinski Školski Centar, Osijek (source: the author)

Đački Dom Graditeljskih Štruka, Zagreb

Accommodates 605 Displaced persons
5 Refugees

Managed by the ODPR, formerly part of a graduate college, most of the college still functions
Collective centre

Fig 5.23. Đački Dom Graditeljskih Štruka, Zagreb (source: the author)

5.3.2 **Aid Provision**

In theory, monthly payments (termed 'cash grants' by implementing agencies) are made to the registered refugees and displaced persons by the ODPR. These payments are financed by the Croatian government, in the case of displaced persons, or the UNHCR in the case of refugees. In practice, it is not always possible to meet all the payments. In 1993, UNHCR's budget for Croatia allowed only six of the twelve payments to be made, and in 1994, nine payments were made instead of the planned eleven (Mossberg, *et al.*, 1994).

Displaced persons receive a payment of US$18 (approximately 100 Kuna[10]) per month from the Government whether they are in private or organised accommodation. Unemployed displaced persons receive a further US$9 per month in line with all Croatian citizens. Retired displaced persons still receive a pension from the Croatian government, but retired refugees will not receive a pension as they have Bosnian papers. Only privately accommodated refugees received the payment of US$18 per month from the UNHCR (it is distributed via ODPR) until the end of 1994, in 1995 it was cut by 50 per cent. Refugees in collective accommodation do not receive a cash grant, as all costs are said to be met by the centre or camp. Both groups also receive family packages which include basic food and hygiene items, although these too have been reduced since 1 June 1995. Family packages were filled largely through donations, primarily from the European Union which in June cut its donation from 6000 tonnes per month to 3000 tonnes per month (ODPR, 1995). This means that the social cases that used to receive these packages as well, have now been dropped from the recipients. About 38 per cent of host families now qualify for some type of benefits as a result of taking in refugee and displaced families.

The grants made to refugees and displaced persons are not enough to support them and need to be subsidised from other sources to provide a comfortable living standard. With unemployment levels currently very high in Croatia (16 per cent) it is not easy to gain work. Refugees are not prevented from working in principle, however, labour laws state that no job may be taken by a foreigner if there is a Croatian citizen to fill the post, thus work for refugees is harder to come by. This is reflected in the figures for employment which show 27.54 per cent of the potential working population[11] of refugees unemployed and 3.07 per cent employed. As compared to 19.13 per cent unemployed displaced persons and 20.59 per cent employed (ODPR, 1995). Some of the displaced persons who were employed by firms located within the UNPAs prior to the war, are still paid a retainer by the firm or have secured jobs in the sister branch where they are located outside the occupied territories. Numbers of refugees and displaced persons do work illegally or in seasonal and short term jobs.

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[10] Kuna being the Croatian currency that replaced the FRY Dinar

[11] Children, pupils, students, retired persons and those who did not complete this section of the government census form (17,541 refugees and displaced persons (4 per cent) left it blank) are not counted as working population.

5.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The data in this chapter provides the background reference material for the following discussions of shelter provision in Chapter Six and Seven. The situation within which the humanitarian community is acting in Croatia is an indeterminate one where there is neither outright war nor total peace. At the time of the periods of field study, two thirds of Croatia was free territory and peaceful, one third was occupied by Serb forces and Croatia, as a nation, was still engaged in combat against the Serbs within Bosnia. A tentative federation existed between the Croatians and Bosnians following their year of conflict in Bosnia. The United Nations Protection Force was keeping an uneasy peace in the occupied zones effectively ensuring that displaced Croatians could not return home. The Republic was host to many thousands of refugees and displaced persons who held different degrees of legitimacy and were provided for by many different international and national organisations with little cross co-ordination or referencing.

These are the conditions which form the background to the field data analysis that follows. The analysis is divided into two chapters which cover the two central themes of this thesis:

- Vulnerability and Capacity
- Integration

CHAPTER SIX: IMPOSED VULNERABILITY AND REPRESSION OF COPING STRATEGIES

6.1 INTRODUCTION

Through presentation of the findings of the investigation in Croatia, this chapter informs the vulnerability and capacity discourse initiated in Chapter Two and Chapter Three. In these chapters, the importance of understanding and addressing vulnerabilities and capacities in natural disasters, refugee situations and wars was discussed. It was seen to be important that the humanitarian community supports the coping mechanisms and capacities of refugees and displaced persons during relief operations, as only in this way does relief facilitate development or rehabilitation and reconstruction. In the light of the mass devastation that war causes, the need to retain the strength and capacity of refugees and displaced persons during the years of exile or displacement becomes crucial (Ellis & Barakat, 1996, 1996a; Ellis, 1995a).

Chapter Two introduced the concept of *a priori* and imposed vulnerability. *A priori* vulnerability being a condition of either poverty or wealth, geographical location, political legitimacy, ethnicity or gender that exists prior to a hazard occurring. Imposed vulnerability being that which is forced upon an individual by the conditions in which they find themselves after the hazard has occurred. For individuals of the Former-Yugoslavia, their ethnicity and geographical location made them vulnerable to attack when war began, this was their condition of *a priori* vulnerability. This condition, combined with the hazard of war, forced them to migrate. The findings of this study show that once they had fled and were sheltered in Croatia, repressive relief policies, operational in some locations, undermined innate coping mechanisms and enforced an imposed vulnerability. This imposed vulnerability is the degree to which the livelihoods of the refugees and displaced persons, and their capacities as productive social beings, are put at risk by the application of restrictive and authoritarian shelter programmes.

The pressure and release model initially presented in Chapter Two, has been adapted by the author to show the progression from *a priori* to imposed

vulnerability (Fig 6.1). Such a model illustrates the cumulative nature of vulnerability as imposed by repressive relief programmes and policies.



Fig 6.1. The progression from a priori to imposed vulnerability using the pressure and release model (source: the author)

The findings from the field study in Croatia will be adduced to show that it is a **lack of enabling interventions** that ensures that refugees and displaced persons are reliant upon handouts, not a **lack of individual motivation or ability**. This chapter will present data to illustrate that in the accommodation where refugees and displaced persons have access to resources and where their own innate coping mechanisms are supported by cognisant intervention, there is no laziness, lack of aptitude, absence of creativity or unwillingness to invest energy in self-sufficiency. All signs that the literature designates as symptoms of dependency are missing.

Only in the camps and settlements where the access to enabling interventions is denied and centralised control systems are in place, are the refugees and displaced persons dependent on external assistance. In such accommodation, the lack of support affects not only their ability to function in the situation of exile, but also

negatively affects their long term ability to return and reconstruct their lives and livelihoods as it undermines innate capacities (Anderson, 1993). The work of Kibreab (1993) and Harrell-Bond (1986), among others, reviewed in Chapter Two, shows that when coping mechanisms and capacities are undermined, future development is prejudiced. The author believes, in line with Barakat (Ellis & Barakat, 1996, 1996a), that reconstruction is also prejudiced by relief that denies access to enabling interventions. This belief was reinforced during the discussions in the working groups at the workshop on improved shelter response held in Luton in 1995 (Barakat & Ellis, 1995). In order to reconstruct, it is necessary to build material and psychological reserves in exile, to cushion the initial period of return. Even when such reserves are unlikely to be sufficient to fully support return, the knowledge that they exist gives courage and ability to return and reconstruct. For those who have no such reserves, the thought of return, though desired is also debilitating, for it is coloured by fear over survival and means of support.

The findings will show that investment in refugees and displaced persons while in exile, through supporting their innate coping mechanisms and allowing them access to existing socio-economic structures, promotes their independence and autonomy and thus retains their capacities as productive social beings. In the light of the mass physical, social and economic investment required for post-war rehabilitation and reconstruction, retention of productive capacity is important both on an individual and a national level (Barakat & Cockburn, 1991).

6.1.1 **Structure of the Chapter**

To understand the manner in which emergency shelter provision can undermine capacities and coping mechanisms, and impose vulnerability on refugees and displaced persons; the discourse has been divided into three component sections:

- Decision making
- Organisational capacity
- Access to resources

These categories have been derived from the work of Harrell-Bond (1986) and Kibreab (1993) and validated through presentation by the author at conferences and in journals [1].

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[1] i. International Workshop: Towards Improved Shelter and Environment for Refugees and Displaced Persons within the Post-Yugoslav Countries, Luton University (Ellis, 1995)

Harrell-Bond's seminal (1986) work, reviewed in Section 2.3.2 of this thesis, argues that dependency is increased by relief regimes that usurp the **decision making** and **organisational capacity** of refugees. The same section outlines Kibreab's (1993) work which promotes the hypothesis that the lack of **access to resources** fostered by the current relief model, is the reason for dependency among refugee individuals and communities. These three themes are the essence of the vulnerability and capacity discourse.

To facilitate the presentation of the discourse in this chapter, the author has further divided Harrell-Bond's category 'decision making', into two smaller sections:

- Choice and control
- Personal performance of familiar tasks

Thus, the findings presented in this chapter to support the discourse on imposed vulnerability and repression of coping strategies, are structured as follows:

i. Decision making
    - Choice and Control
    - Personal performance of familiar tasks
ii. Organisational capacity
iii. Access to resources

6.2 DECISION MAKING

6.2.1 **Choice and Control**

The level of personal control and the degree of choice retained by the refugees and displaced persons are significant components of vulnerability that is imposed. The less autonomy refugees and displaced persons are allowed to retain while in exile and the more they are prevented from utilising their ability to fill their own needs, the greater their enforced reliance on outside assistance becomes with the result that they are more vulnerable in the long term. This imposed vulnerability occurs not because of the aid that is provided *per se*, but rather the **manner in which** it is provided. For example, it is not that organised shelter is a bad solution in itself, but

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ii. IRAP Conference on Forced Migration, Moi University, Eldoret, Kenya (Ellis & Barakat, 1996)
iii. Ellis & Barakat, (1996a), refereed paper in *Disasters* Journal

if those in such accommodation are segregated, marginalised and not supported to be self-sufficient, then the accommodation is a disabling solution. The way shelter aid is provided in many cases curtails and denies the innate coping mechanisms of refugees and displaced persons by adopting systems of rigid centralised control. Such policies of control deny the capacities of refugees and displaced persons to help themselves and thus promote a long term reliance on external aid or social welfare assistance making them less able to return home and rebuild their lives.

6.2.1.1 Flight

Patterns of lack of choice and control can be traced from the instant that refugees and displaced persons are first forced to leave their homes. The testimonies of both refugees and displaced persons illustrate that from the first threat of danger, choice is curtailed and the passage into exile is controlled by others. For many it is the first experience of a pattern of life that will persist throughout their time in exile.

> "We didn't know that we were going to end up here. When we were in Banja Luka and we were preparing for the trip we were told by the Red Cross that we would be going to Sweden straight away. But they tricked us because we were stopped on the frontier in one small place and we lived there in a tent camp for a while. My baby was born there. From there my family was brought here to Gašinci because they didn't have papers and people without papers get sent to collective centres. I was sent to hospital in Zagreb because of my baby and then later I was brought here to join my family. We have been here for eight months now." (Bosnian Muslim Refugee family from Gašinci camp, February 1995)

> "I am from Bosanski Šamac, I had a flat there. I was taken from there and put in a concentration camp with my son. He is still there, but I was sent away. I didn't want to leave my son, I didn't want to go anywhere and when I was leaving that camp I didn't know where I was going. I was brought here to Gašinci by the Red Cross and have stayed for three years." (Bosnian Muslim Refugee family from Gašinci camp, February 1995)

> "Firstly we were living in our home in Bosanski Šamac, then the war started and we moved to my sister's in Slavonski Šamac. We were there two days before the fighting surrounded us again, so we all moved again. This place too became caught up in the fighting so we left for Slavonski Brod. We were there for two or three days before we could check in with the Red Cross who got us out." (Croatian Refugee family in Varaždin camp, February, 1995)

Even those in private accommodation retain little control or choice over their ultimate destination:

> "This is the seventh place that we have lived in over the past three years. We have been living in and around Osijek first with my brother-in-law, then my best man, and so on. People told us that we could stay as long as we wanted, but then after a couple of months, we get asked to leave because it is too crowded or there is no money. So we have to find another place" (Displaced Croatian couple from Eastern Slavonia living in Osijek, January 1995)

It is inevitable that in the first stages of crisis when many thousands of people are flooding into a country there will be confusion and disarray. In such conditions, there have to be organisations that can take control and guide people to positions of safety. The chaos and confusion regarding the ultimate destination of refugees and displaced persons or the possibilities to leave for a third country are regrettable, but understandable in the initial rush of the crisis. In 1991, in Croatia, when the first movement of displaced started, there was no centralised governmental organisation to co-ordinate activities. Even after the establishment of the ODPR, the situation was still chaotic as those appointed did not possess the experience to deal with such crises or have the power to enforce decisions:

> "The Office for Displaced Persons and Refugees is hopelessly understaffed and does not possess any direct-decision making competence" . (Kreutner, (1993), speaking of ODPR's performance in August 1992 when ODPR had been in existence for eight months)

> " ...the role of, and the assumptions made by the ODPR (as well as the calibre of some of the staff, it has to be said) is a major question" (Stubbs, personal communication, March, 1995)

The initial lack of choice or control retained by the migrants during flight can be explained by the chaos and disorganisation, however, the perpetuation of such a lack of autonomy is both detrimental and disabling. Instead of personal control being returned to the refugees and displaced persons at the earliest opportunity, centralised control systems are retained and perpetuated in the name of efficiency. A lack of control from the most basic to the highest level endures in many of the 'emergency' accommodation types throughout Croatia.

6.2.1.2 Personal Space

At the most basic level, residents lack control over personal space and retain no degree of privacy within the accommodation. In this way, temporary shelter is a constant reminder to individuals, not only of how much they have lost, but also how little they have left, for not even personal space belongs to the individual anymore. Shared accommodation means control over space is divided among the previously unacquainted inhabitants ensuring that overriding individual control over personal space is removed. The loss is particularly debilitating when refugees and displaced persons compare their past with their present situation:

> "It was really nice back there. We had everything....It was a big house, measuring eight by eight metres which was just the house. We had a basement below, a big kitchen. There was cellar, where I stored my wine and then a cold room to keep the meat that I cured. I had a boiler room for machinery for heating, a big stove for central heating. A garage of course. A special room for smoking meat. Space for the chickens, a special room for my tools and pig houses for the pigs I kept. At least twenty pigs a year were raised. Then we had built ourselves a root store and a structure where we stored the corn. Further down we had two rows of fruit trees, land for corn and vegetables. Then one nice place like a small arbour where we could sit and see the grapes hanging all around us.
> Now we have no space, we are sharing a few rooms in somebody else's house. We cannot bear it, after all that we had and built up for thirty or forty years, now this is all." (Displaced persons living in private accommodation in Osijek, January 1995)

Shared accommodation, whether organised or private, leaves residents with no privacy and little or no personal space. The Građevinski Školski Centar in Osijek is a converted secondary school that provides collective accommodation, mainly for single persons. Each room is a dormitory that contains bunk beds and a few wardrobes (shown in Fig 5.22, p134). Personal space is reduced to the area of the bed, multiplied by the vertical distance between it and the bed above, or the ceiling, and a portion of a wardrobe. There is no partitioning to offer privacy, no way of delineating a personal and private space. The rationale for the high densities of residents per room, is that as single persons rather than families, the residents do not require more space. Those who share the rooms are of the same sex and mostly elderly and thus it is seen to be acceptable to accommodate them in such a manner. However, the inappropriateness of the solution can be seen through the choice that the inhabitants make to sit in the corridors with their

friends all day rather than staying in their rooms with individuals whom they have no choice but to share an unsought for intimacy (Fig 6.2).



Građevinski Školski Centar, Osijek, Eastern Slavonia

Accommodates: 172 Displaced persons
1 Refugees
Managed by the ODPR, former secondary school

Collective Centre

Fig 6.2. Residents prefer to sit with friends in the corridors rather than in their rooms (source: the author)

A similar concept is utilised within Varaždin, where female residents whose husbands are fighting in, or have been killed by, the war, are located together. Here the beds are more spread out and are singles rather than bunks which at least gives the individuals accommodated here a greater volume of space. Varaždin is an improvement on the Građevinski Školski Centar as here, some attempts have been made at partitioning using a donation of hospital screens (Fig 6.3).Which at least allows for some degree of demarcation of private space. The screens do not however, allow for individuals or families to control the light and noise that they get in their personal space, as the screens are only fabric and finish a metre or so

below the ceiling level. In a room which is shared by young children and elderly women, this causes tension and disruption.

Prihvatni Centar 1, Varaždin, Northern Croatia
Accommodates: 63 Displaced persons
724 Refugees
Managed by the ODPR, former JNA barracks

Collective Centre

Fig 6.3. Hospital screens are used to provide some partitioning (source: the author)

The camp of Gašinci is constructed of three basic shelter types. In the larger units, those that were the original army huts, accommodation is shared between several families. In these huts of 9.7 by 6.3 metres, where usable space is restricted by a pitched roof that slopes from the ridge height of 3.35 metres to an eaves level of 0.5 metres, there are as many as 15 beds (which gives 4m² per person) with no partitions between them. Those who have been in the camp for a long time have managed to get hold of spare sheets which they have draped around certain beds to provide some privacy. As in Varaždin, this provides nothing more than visual

screening. The lack of elementary privacy ensures that there is little chance to retain a normal family life; both inter, and intra, family relationships become very strained.

> "I don't know how it can be otherwise, we have no choice, here no one has their own privacy" (Refugee speaking in Gašinci camp, February 1995)

With Gašinci being a transit camp for refugees, families are coming and going all the time. This creates problems within the camp, as those who remain in the camp for a long time resent the constant rearrangement of living space and the disruption to their lives caused by new comers.

> "...I would also like to live here with only people who will stay here until they return home. I do not like to live with people who are here for a couple of months and then leave. I can't stand people coming and then leaving, it's upsetting." (Refugee from Gašinci camp, February 1995)

Within Gašinci, there is a highly protective attitude towards space, with the result that when new refugees are due to arrive in the camp, families will physically remove free beds from their units and hide them, in order to persuade the management that there is no room for more people in their units (personal communication, UNHCR field officer for Gašinci, February 1995). The reaction is far worse in the winter months when the intense cold and wet force refugees to remain inside the unit, where they are constantly together with one another.

The protective attitude is combined with increasing fear on behalf of the long term residents from Banja Luka of the new refugees arriving from the Bihać pocket. Many of these new arrivals are accused of following Babić, the rebel Muslim leader of that area. With space in the camp being at a premium, the management has to locate the newcomers with previously resident families, the results are clearly visible. Existing residents strew the floors of the units with rubbish and verbally abuse the incomers to try and force them to ask to be relocated (personal communication, UNHCR field officer for Gašinci, February 1995).

When refugees have so little left, the maintenance of what they do have becomes of vital importance to them. Each gain in space they achieve when a family moves

out is held on to savagely. Improved levels of privacy when other families leave are too precious to be given up lightly:

> "It has been much more difficult in this room than it is now. In the past we have had to share with strangers, sometimes with whole families. It was difficult then, now we have the room to ourselves and have done for some time which is better. But my sister lives in accommodation on the coast in Orebić, there they have their own privacy, even their own bathroom and a piece of corridor. That is good but this is bad.... None of the places where we get put can be home, we know that. What is important is privacy wherever you are. To have a place where you can make your own schedule and not have other people to work round" (Croatian refugee from Travnik, in Depađansa Vojarna Collective Centre, Gašinci Annex, February 1995)

The findings suggest two essential criteria governing the allocation of space to refugees and displaced persons in collectives and camps. Firstly, the distance maintained between those deciding where refugees and displaced persons should live and the refugees and displaced persons themselves. Secondly the reality of the long term status of what is wished by the Government to be temporary accommodation.

The former issue revolves around the ODPR and aid agencies endeavouring to optimise densities in accommodation. If a certain type of shelter is listed as being able to take four persons, then it must take four persons. For instance, the inhabitants of one of the shipping containers visited in Velika Gorica were a gentleman of sixty two sharing with a mother of sixty five and her two sons of forty two and forty seven. The accommodation measured 6 by 2.5 by 2 metres and had originally been shared by the mother and her husband and the two sons (giving 3.75m^2 per person). When the husband died, the ODPR moved in an elderly gentleman who was a stranger to the family, because on their records there was a spare place for him. An examination of the container would have shown that where a family may have shared such a unit, it was not suitable for more than one family to share.

The only time families will not have to share 'oversized' accommodation is when members of families are ill or disabled. Only then will the family receive more private space.

Such a ruling leads to many families simulating illness in order to receive more space:

> "The biggest problem is lack of space. Many families here are asking for more space. They say that members of their family are sick and it is really important for us as management to realise who is really sick and who is not, because everyone is trying to get these papers and a room to themselves." (Refugee representative on the management committee for Kutina, January 1995)

Such behaviour links to activities outlined in the literature where refugees are designated as liars and cheats because they exaggerate their conditions in order to receive more from the aid agencies (Harrell-Bond *et al.*, 1992). However, such behaviour should be viewed in the context of the refugees' situation. They have been forced into a way of life where they are denied access to many resources and retain little control over their own lives. Their actions and exaggerations are merely a coping mechanism used to try and make their situation as acceptable as possible. It is almost inevitable that if agencies and governments treat refugees and displaced persons as groups that have to be provided for and cannot provide for themselves, then those refugees and displaced persons will utilise that attitude to their best advantage.

Such behaviour is a way of ensuring access to resources that they are otherwise denied. During conversation with a couple living in Blace camp in Rokovci, it was evident that they were very concerned that the author was there to assess the amount of space that they had, as they utilised every opportunity to emphasise their requirement for the space. They were the sole occupants of accommodation that was designed to take four persons, and throughout the conversation unsolicited references were constantly made by the husband to his state of health:

> " I left Vukovar first because I am an invalid. For twenty five years now I have had some mental problems. ...It would be very difficult for us to accept someone else to live with us because I am a hard medical case. Actually it is very, very difficult for anybody to live with me because when I am angry then I am really tough you know? I am normal now because I am taking medication, but it would be really difficult for me even to live with my son, for instance. When we were on the coast a social worker promised that we would live alone here." (Displaced man in Blace camp, January 1995)

Then again some twenty minutes later, the husband interrupts the conversation to show a certificate:

> "...this is from the psychiatric hospital in Zagreb — when I left the hospital I got such a certificate to show that I had received medication" (Displaced man from Blace camp, January 1995)

This desire to retain privacy as the most basic level of control over life is easily understood. Communal living is not a feature of life in Croatia. Even within extended families, the sons and daughters would inevitably construct a home within the plot of the parents, rather than sharing the house itself.

The second criteria that governs the allocation of space in accommodation is the actual long term condition of the perceived temporary status. The Croatian Government is not prepared to acknowledge the long term nature of the refugees and displaced persons and thus conditions of emergency are maintained. However, the author suggests that such a policy is not beneficial to the Government. In the long term, although refugees may ultimately return home, the Government will have to provide the social welfare that displaced persons will require as a result of living in inappropriate emergency shelter. While people can live in overcrowded or inappropriate accommodation for short periods of time, to maintain the situation beyond a month or two has depredatory effects on the residents. To live in emergency shelter for four years, as some of the residents of collective centres have done, has very serious debilitating effects. There is a human hierarchy of needs which defines that although refugees and displaced persons will be grateful at first to find themselves alive and warm and dry, they will soon start to desire to be in accommodation that fulfils more of their needs. Satisfaction with emergency shelter does not last long:

> " It is difficult to think about our problems now, because at first all of us were happy. We found accommodation here and we were alive. But now, we are thinking about the future, now it is something else." (Refugee in Kutina camp, January 1995)

The lack of control over personal space is obviously alien and unacceptable to the refugees and displaced persons and yet, agencies, donors and the ODPR, persist in locating them in such accommodation. The stated legitimacy of such an approach is lack of funds. It is obviously far less costly to accommodate many families or individuals together in one building than to construct or locate separate buildings

for each. It would also seem that money invested in partitioning existing buildings is thought to be a luxury rather than a necessity by those who administer the budgets for accommodation. Such concepts are the result of structures of accountability that focus more on cost/benefit calculations than humanitarian or moral concern. It is not 'humane' to house people in such conditions for extensive periods. As an emergency, short term solution it may be necessary, but the findings of this study show that when such a solution is permitted to extend into long term and permanent accommodation the innate capacities of those thus housed are undermined. Would such accommodation exist if agencies and donors were more accountable to the target population?

6.2.2 **Personal Performance of Familiar Tasks**

The findings indicate that the loss of control over personal space is compounded by the loss of intangibles such as the familiar routines and social patterns that previously shaped existence. The loss of recognised daily activities and routines that were linked with the built environment of home is endemic in accommodation that operates under centralised provision. In such accommodation, control over familiar day-to-day activities such as food preparation and bathing is retained by the management. The following list of rules and conditions can be seen in the corridors of one of the collective centres in Varaždin, Prihvatni 2, and illustrates perfectly the lack of autonomy preserved by the residents:

> "The first time [any of the following] rules are broken, residents will receive a warning, the second time they will be evicted from the centre. It is strictly forbidden to be in the corridor after 8pm or to disturb the inhabitants of the centre in any other way. It is strictly forbidden to take humanitarian aid or any form of clothing or footwear out of the centre. It is strictly forbidden to sell any kind of goods on the local market. It is forbidden to leave the centre after 10pm.
> Waking up is at 7am, personal hygiene until 8am. Lights are switched off and residents should be asleep by 10pm. This is with the exception of those persons over 18 who can watch the television programme *Image upon Image* (daily political broadcast). The regular time for taking showers is between 10am and 1pm on weekdays, 10am until 4pm on Saturdays. Smoking in either rooms or corridors is strictly forbidden. Daily rest is from 2pm until 5pm (no loud music should be played). Visits are allowed from civilians until 8pm, they may not stay overnight. Croatian Army soldiers may stay for up to four days with written permission." (Rules displayed in Varaždin 2, quoted in a bulletin posted by Za Mir Transnational Network, Zagreb, on the *Forced-Migration* electronic network, 3 April 1995)

Such rules treat refugees and displaced persons more like prisoners than individuals who have been forced to leave their homes for reasons beyond their control. Although this level of centralised decision making over day to day activities is an extreme example, it is representative of the pervasive attitude that refugees and displaced persons are a burdensome group that need to be provided for rather than a group capable of controlling their own lives if given adequate support.

Forced migration results in the loss of that which is familiar to an individual or community. The findings show that this dissociation, is exemplified partly by the loss of familiar patterns and routines and partly by separation from physical possessions such as the home. Refugees and displaced persons are constantly reminded of the magnitude of these losses by day to day residence within a camp, collective centre or private accommodation. The testimonies of the refugees and displaced persons all illustrated the intensity of feeling felt by the loss of the physical manifestation of 'home'. This sense of loss does not diminish with time but is nurtured and fed by the experience of living in a temporary shelter — a constant visual reminder of the change of circumstances.

6.2.2.1 Food Preparation

Out of the thirty one camps and collective centres visited [2] only four; the Naselje Prijatelstva in Čepin, Blace at Rokovci, Gaza at Karlovac and the DRC camp at Kutina, operate policies which enable residents to chose and prepare their own food and meals, thus retaining some link with their familiar pre-war routine. The inhabitants of these camps recognise the importance of retaining control over such an activity as food preparation:

> "...here we have a lot of freedom. We live together. We are cooking. It is very important to cook alone, what we want to eat today we can prepare for ourselves..." (Displaced family in Gaza camp, January 1995)

All the other camps and collectives visited provided pre-prepared meals from a central location. Such meals are either prepared on the premises by staff in one central kitchen or delivered ready cooked from another location and distributed within a canteen. In some centres, for instance the Građevinski Školski Centar in Osijek and Prihvatni 1 in Varaždin, residents are not even allowed to take these

[2] See appendices for a full list of sites visited

pre-prepared meals back to their rooms, but must eat in a centralised restaurant at a specified time. This ruling is only waived for those who are very sick and unable to walk to the central canteen.

In Gašinci, food is prepared in a central kitchen by the army and residents are called to collect it three times a day over the Tannoy system that covers the camp. The elderly will send younger members to collect the food as it involves a walk across the camp as well as queuing for long periods of time. With 3,100 people to be fed, the management calls them in three batches according to the sectors of the camp in which they live. The food is served in great warehouses and can either be taken back to the refugees' houses or consumed on the premises at the great wooden tables. Refugees must show their authorisation card in order to receive their meals. The entire process is both degrading and dehumanising and is unfortunately common throughout those camps that provide centrally prepared food. It seems however, that Gašinci is the only one that controls every movement of the refugees through a speaker system. Refugees are informed when to collect their post (again in batches), when to collect their food and when to visit the management office or the UNHCR building.

The removal of such a familiar process as food preparation, preserves and perpetuates the lack of control first felt by migrants during flight from the home. The rationale given by controlling organisations for centralised production and distribution of food and meals inevitably focuses on efficiency of organisation and reduction of expenditure. Indeed, the costs of providing adequate power and facilities are high, especially so in those buildings that have been converted from their pre-war use to provide accommodation. Old schools, army barracks or workers holiday hostels are not equipped infrastructurally to provide enough electricity to supply a cooker in every room. The camp at Gašinci, which holds 3,100 people has a continuous problem with the electricity supply. Practically every household has acquired at least one single plate hob which they use for boiling coffee and re-heating the food they are given in the central kitchen. The resulting demand on the electricity supply frequently damages the power supply, which costs money to repair. The management has conducted raids throughout the camp and tried to confiscate the hobs with little success, the process merely serves to further alienate the refugees (personal communication, UNHCR field office for Gašinci camp, January 1995) A less demeaning approach would have been to have prevented the intensity of the point load on the infrastructure in the first place.

Locating so many refugees together in one camp was inevitably going to place a strain on the existing resources. Had refugees been spread more evenly through the region instead of being kept in one large camp, the demands on infrastructure would have been dissipated across the supply and thus less disruptive. It would also have been possible to avoid the negative segregational aspects of camp life.

6.2.2.2 Accountability

Whilst acknowledging the difficulties of finding finance to upgrade facilities such as collective centres, the severe negative consequences of removing basic, recognised routines from the daily life of refugees and displaced persons, need to be understood. Such policies which impose vulnerability and create long term dependency should be avoided at all costs. The centralised process of giving pre-prepared food at pre-ordained times, daily reinforces the subordinate status of refugees and displaced persons as beneficiaries or charity cases. It does not encourage the belief that they are competent, productive members of society capable of performing basic tasks. Once again it appears that a lack of accountability on behalf of agencies to the refugees and displaced persons and an obsession with cost/benefit analysis perpetuates poor accommodation methods.

6.2.2.3 Cultural Applicability

Such a lack of accountability is compounded by the absence of monitoring and evaluation procedures of those centres, camps and private accommodations already in use. A *prima facie* example of disregarding the lessons that can be learnt from existing accommodations is that of the jointly implemented Croatian and Swedish Red Cross camps of Šašna Greda and Pisarovina, constructed in 1995. Despite the clearly visible difficulties that had arisen over four years in accommodation that removed control from refugees and displaced persons, here once again, centrally located, shared cooking and bathing facilities were provided. Although in these two camps the inhabitants are allowed to cook for themselves, there is still only one central kitchen which all will use. The rationale behind the provision of centralised kitchen facilities given by the Red Cross was that it would get individuals out of their houses to meet and interact while cooking in the kitchen (Mossberg *et al.*, 1994). The reasoning is without foundation in the Croatian tradition, as there is no indication that the residents of the units, all displaced persons, would ever have engaged in such activity before the war: their homes and villages were not constructed around central kitchens where everyone met to cook. The Croatian staffed Croatian Red Cross knew that such processes

would be completely alien to the inhabitant's pre-war lifestyle and yet permitted the camp to be built in such a manner.

The action of the Croatian Red Cross office negates the concept outlined in the literature that working with a local counterpart is one way to ensure the cultural applicability of relief projects. The case illustrates that while the local counterpart may well be aware of those interventions which are culturally applicable and those which are not, unless the counterpart is accountable to the recipient group rather than the projector implementor and trained to understand the negative consequences of removing control from refugees and displaced persons, then projects are just as likely to be misdirected. In view of the long term status of emergency periods in intra-state war, it is essential that relief provision is culturally sensitive. The camps outlined above are clearly not culturally appropriate and thus fail to meet real needs of the inhabitants. If acting through a local counterpart is still no insurance that projects are culturally sensitive, then alternatives need to be sought.

The actions of the Red Cross could be explained in one of two ways: either a lack of accountability to the target group or a lack of monitoring and evaluation of existing accommodation types. Unfortunately, examination of the accommodation in Croatia and the testimonies of refugees and displaced persons indicate that the omission of both practices is endemic in the field of shelter. The basis for the absence of monitoring of shelter programmes could be a lack of understanding of the extreme psycho-social effects that poor accommodation can have on inhabitants.

6.2.2.4 Psycho-social Effects of Shelter

There are many projects being undertaken by humanitarian organisations throughout Croatia that call themselves 'psycho-social'. Their emphasis is on assisting the refugees and displaced persons to recover from the continuing trauma induced by flight and exacerbated by the conditions of exile. Such projects focus on programmes of group activities such as handicraft groups for women or open sessions for individuals to share commonly held experiences. All such specified programmes are monitored, to record standards and effectiveness, by the ODPR or the Croatian Ministry of Health under Article 7 of the Croatian Law on Humanitarian Organisations and Humanitarian Aid (ODPR, 1995). However, programmes that provide accommodation come under no such monitoring

arrangement, as they are not deemed to have psycho-social effects. There is no provision to monitor the negative psycho-social consequences of types of accommodation on the population resident within them. For projects that provide physical items such as housing or food or hygienic items, the only legislation that exists as regards monitoring is that they be inspected under the following conditions:

1. The keeping of records on the humanitarian aid collected and distributed
2. The distribution of the collected aid in compliance with the way and criteria defined by internal by-laws of a humanitarian organisation
3. Specified-purpose of the humanitarian aid (Yaansah, 1995)

In other words, a housing project would be monitored by ensuring that it had recorded the numbers of units provided and the numbers of families assisted; that the units had been given to those registered for assistance with the government and that the initially stated aim of the project complied with legislation governing the objectives of humanitarian aid. Thus, the efficiency and effectiveness of the project would be monitored but not the social, psychological and economic effects that it was having on the resident community. Accommodation programmes that have negative psycho-social effects on the resident population therefore go unchallenged, and indeed, are repeated by other agencies in their projects. As evidenced by the Red Cross camps of Šašna Greda and Pisarovina.

There is also no monitoring procedure to cover the psycho-social condition of those living in private accommodation. For, as they only receive material aid of food and hygienic parcels, cash grants and seeds, the only government controlled monitoring procedure that the provision will be subjected to is that of counting the numbers of items supplied and the numbers of families assisted. No organisation monitors the ways in which those who are privately accommodated are coping with the stresses and difficulties imposed by the accommodation type. The only way of measuring satisfaction at present seems to be that the ODPR keeps track of the numbers of requests from those in private accommodation to move into collective accommodation.

The findings suggest then, that the humanitarian community needs to constantly reminded of the significance of shelter types and methods. A home is more than

four walls and a roof, it is a place of refuge and the centre of domestic life. It marks the existence of 'family' and as such has strong emotional ties. It is a visible statement of social position and condition. The psychological and social importance of 'house' and 'home' need to be recognised. **Accommodation that maintains a state of permanent emergency and thus denies residents the maintenance of daily routines; denies their privacy and personal control; segregates them from the wider society both physically and socially; labels them "different" and removes their dignity and value as social beings is accommodation that imposes severe psycho-social stress upon the inhabitants**. Such stress is debilitating in the short term and, when imposed over long periods, induces a long term reliance on external assistance. Refugees and displaced persons accommodated in such a way are less capable of returning to their homes and rebuilding when peace is declared.

Accommodation that does not provide for activities such as meal preparation to be carried out on an individual level strips away identity and traditionally understood roles. This argument for control over basic processes extends further to other areas of human interaction with immediate space and the built environment.

6.3 ORGANISATIONAL CAPACITY

The camp at Kutina run by the DRC is one of the few that has a policy of actively promoting inhabitant's control and involvement in every day activities and endeavours to implement it. The initial mandate claims:

> " ...inhabitant participation in decision making was a basic philosophy. The idea was to work with not for the inhabitants" (Kristensen, *et al.*, 1994)

Although overall control is maintained by the Danish Red Cross (DRC) management, there is a settlement council made up from the ten constituent areas of the camp which comments on and is involved in all decisions made within the camp. The DRC also employs some of the camp residents to work with the management, thus providing employment opportunities as well as projecting a familiar interface for those residents who come to discuss their problems and concerns with the management.

It is interesting to note that the management admits that it has been harder than it anticipated to give "autonomy" to the residents (Manager of Kutina camp,

personal communication, January 1995). The Manager based this comment upon an incident that occurred shortly before the second field visit to the settlement in late January 1995. The residents' committee had been given the task of distributing a consignment of children's shoes which had been received from Italy. In the intervening period between consultation with the management and the actual distribution taking place, the committee altered the agreed allocation method with the result that the distribution became more of a scramble. As a result, many families got no shoes at all, whereas some others managed to obtain several pairs, a situation which caused much ill-feeling between the residents and led to accusations of stealing. The management then had to advise on the ways in which the problem could be rectified and calm many angry families.

Incidents such as this have led the DRC management to believe that the residents of Kutina camp are finding it difficult to regain control over their lives. However, the author believes it is contestable that this behaviour illustrates an ineptitude for personal control rather than an inability to manage a diverse group of individuals. Responsibility for, and control over one's own life and family is a very different condition to being responsible for an entire settlement. In a pre-war situation all people, with the possible exception of children, the elderly and disabled, would have had control over their own lives and that of their families, but the number who held positions of management or governance would have been few. It would be unfair therefore, to assume that a lack of management capability can be directly compared to a lack of ability to control family life.

However, this is not to condemn the idea of a residents' committee but to suggest that its value lies not in its ability or inability to manage the entire settlement, but in the fact that it allows the refugees and displaced persons to represent their views to the management. Such a committee gives them legitimacy and empowers them to effect control over their own living conditions. In this way, they can advise and comment upon the decisions made regarding all facets of camp life and put forward their own needs and requirements to be enacted by a management team. Such a committee serves an invaluable function of providing a forum for real needs to be proposed and understood and for the maintenance of the refugees' and displaced persons' status as productive social beings. Such forums also exist in other camps and collectives, the Hotel International, Zagreb and Čepin being two further examples.

Those in private accommodation are in an inferior position in terms of representation of their needs to those in authority. There is no representative on a committee to whom they can turn and express their difficulties, they have only themselves. For many, this represents a severe problem, as individuals possess little legitimacy to effect change alone. Successive attempts to raise issues and difficulties that result in failure cause apathy and a lack of desire to try further. One couple and their three children, one of whom has severe learning difficulties, are living in Osijek in accommodation that measures 3 by 7 metres and contains only a minute cooking area and bedroom/living room. They have successively failed to receive new accommodation through ODPR and were thus driven to try other means:

> "We went to see one person who said he could get us accommodation in a vacant Serbian flat that he knew of. If we paid him a certain sum of money he would guarantee that we could have it. We paid him the money and arrived on the doorstep of the new flat only to find that another family were already there. He won't give our money back to us, so now we are stuck here." (Privately accommodated family in Osijek, January 1995)

When asked why they did not seek assistance to help regain their money, the couple replied that they had been advised to tell the mayor or someone "... but why should we call him, just so that he can come to this house and take pictures and laugh at us?". Such a perceived lack of legitimacy and power of representation makes the privately accommodated very vulnerable to abuse and easy targets for deception and fraud.

6.4 ACCESS TO RESOURCES

At a higher level than privacy, representation and control over day-to-day routine activities, is control over the surrounding physical environment. Such control would include access to land for cultivation and, ultimately, the ability to adapt and extend the unit of accommodation. This level of access is a prime enabling intervention for refugees and displaced persons as it supports their innate coping mechanisms in the face of inadequate aid and denial of formal economic opportunities.

6.4.1 **Allocation of Cultivable Land**

The camp at Kutina demonstrates how the layout and planning of the camp can affect access to land for cultivation. The layout of the camp is such that each house is located on a large plot of land (Fig 6.4.).



Kutina camp, Kutina, Northern border of UNPA North
Accommodates: 307 Displaced persons
873 Refugees
Managed by the Danish Red Cross, built by the Danish Red Cross
Camp

Fig 6.4. The housing layout showing the large plots allocated to each house (source: the author)

The amount of land gives the opportunity for the residents to plant gardens and vegetable plots, which means that they can improve the range of their diet as well as having some activity to occupy the time. The importance of the ability to improve the diet can be seen when it is understood that the food basket given to each family contains only dried and tinned meat, fish and vegetables in addition to oil, bread and powdered milk. Without the access to cultivable land, refugees and displaced persons are reliant on nutritional relief that does not fulfil needs. They

are caught in a institutionalised system which denies them access to the resources they need to fill their own needs at the same time as not providing them itself.

In camps that follow this policy of giving land to the residents, the testimonies of refugees and displaced persons indicate the importance to them of such provision:

> "I had a room in a hotel - but a hotel is nothing more than four walls and a roof, I wanted this land and this view of the trees" (Displaced Man from Vukovar, living in Mićevac Camp, January 1995)

> "We are satisfied with this camp because we are a family that wants to work and we want a piece of land. This piece of land means everything to us" (Refugee family living in Mićevac Camp, January 1995)

> "It is very good that we have a backyard here; that we can raise fresh vegetables at the very least. It's good because we can't stand eating from the tins and cans all the time, and we can't buy fruit and vegetables from the market without money." (Displaced couple living in Blace camp at Rokovci, January 1995)

To allow even greater access to land, the management of the DRC has signed leaseholds with the farmers who own the land adjoining the settlement in Kutina, so that residents can extend their productive land with an allotment. Tools for managing the land were provided by the DRC, as were the initial requirements for seeds. The camps of Rokovci and Čepin also adopt such an approach with houses located on large plots to give land for cultivation (Fig 6.5).

UNHCR runs an annual project through which they distribute seeds to refugees and displaced persons:

> "After we had distributed the seeds in Spring, it was very, very nice to see this land last Summer. When we came in the late afternoon or the early morning we could see half of the inhabitants on the field, digging. There was a nice channel they had dug for the water and they were taking this water and watering their vegetables...it was good to see it." UNHCR field officer Osijek office speaking of Blace camp in Rokovci, January 1995)

Several of the houses in Blace camp were displaying signs announcing to passers-by the excess produce that they had for sale, one was also offering eggs from their chickens. In addition to supplementing the diet through cultivation, therefore, access to land can also provide income generating opportunities through the sale

of surplus produce. In this way refugees and displaced persons are afforded yet more control over their lives through the purchasing power of an income.

Naselje Prijatelstva, Čepin, Eastern Slavonia
Accommodates: 2590 Displaced persons
0 Refugees

Managed by the ODPR, built by GTZ

Camp

Fig 6.5. Housing layout showing the allocation of cultivable plots (source: the author)

Those in private accommodation also receive seeds either through the CRC or Caritas (Catholic church aid organisation). Approximately 50 per cent of those in private accommodation have access to land that is either donated by the community (18 per cent) or the property of the landlord (53 per cent) or that of the church or friends or relatives (29 per cent) (UNHCR, 1994). CRC donates seeds to groups and Caritas supplies them at less than market price or for payment in kind with part of the produce. In some cases, the Građevinski Školski Centar for instance, Caritas also makes land available to individuals in collective centres, in

return for a share of the harvest: this food is then incorporated in the centrally supplied, pre-prepared meals that are sent to camps and collectives. The remainder of the harvest is retained by the cultivator of the land.

The testimony of one displaced woman in the Građevinski Školski Centar, showed that she found the access to the land invaluable:

> " I am eighty years old but I still wake at four every morning and go to work on this land. I have to work because I know that when I go back to my home I will have nothing, so I work to grow vegetables and sell them for money." (Displaced woman in Građevinski Školski Centar, February 1995)

This provision of materials and resources is important in maintaining the autonomy of the refugees and displaced persons who reside in the camps, settlements and private accommodations. To avoid reliance on external aid, the affected community needs not only the ability and will to keep control over their own lives, but also the access to the resources necessary to maintain that control. By providing the land for the refugees and displaced persons to cultivate, aid agencies are facilitating the communities' abilities to meet their own needs and enabling individuals to retain their autonomy and motivational characteristics that will facilitate the eventual return to, and reconstruction of, the home.

In many of the settlements and camps where refugees do not have the land to cultivate, camps which inevitably are those which also have a policy of centralised food provision, the residents are seen by outsiders to be lazy and indifferent. However, the will or ability to do something on its own, will achieve little unless it is combined with the physical resources necessary to perform the task. Refugees and displaced persons need access to cultivable land as well as the desire to cultivate the land; one without the other will not succeed.

The land needs to be practically accessible to the family as well. One group spoken with in Velika Gorica had been offered land by a friend and also had managed to bring their tractor with them when they fled, so in theory, they should have been able to cultivate the land and grow vegetables for sale or private consumption.

However, the family had problems with getting to the plot:

> "We used to have a large agricultural household. In one year we would produce about ten tons of corn and we also kept pigs, chickens and bees. For us it would be very good to have access to a parcel [plot of land], but it needs to be near to this house. Someone offered us a parcel for cultivation but it was ten miles away and not accessible by bus, so we would have had to drive, which needs petrol, which costs money, which we do not have. So we had to turn it down." (Displaced family living in ex-construction barracks in Velika Gorica, January 1995)

The atmosphere in the camps of Kutina, Rokovci and Čepin, where the residents have access to land and seeds and tools for cultivation, is very different to that which prevails in places such as Gašinci or the hotels or the army barracks. The construction of Gašinci has actually removed an opportunity to give control to the residents. When the units were constructed across the upper part of the site they were erected on a vast concrete platform which was poured to keep the levels of mud down in the Winter and to provide a base for the huts. However, the concrete means that there is no available land for these residents to cultivate vegetables that could supplement their diet. Additionally the units have been placed very close together, one metre apart, back-to-back with a path of three metres running along each row (Fig 6.6). This makes it impossible for residents to even locate pots for vegetables around the unit. Around the units in the lower part of the camp among the pine trees, the residents have more space and no concrete decking to contend with. Although little grows underneath the pine trees, the residents have established small vegetable patches where they can spend time and energy cultivating their flowers and vegetables. This is a clear indication that despite the fact that they receive no tools and no seeds through aid agencies there is still a desire to retain a little autonomy and act for themselves.

6.4.2 **Control over the Built Environment**

If camps and settlements are to be constructed by aid agencies then they need to be planned to allow for future growth. The extra land will not only provide space for cultivation as mentioned above, but will also provide room for the houses to be extended by the residents if they wish to. Such a possibility is not only important for the refugees and displaced persons themselves, as will be discussed later, but it would also comply with the agencies notions of efficiency. It is unlikely that any agency will ever be persuaded to provide more than the minimum space standards

for housing that they see to be temporary. However, if such houses can be located in larger plots, then they can be extended and adapted incrementally by the resident families to fit their own space and usage needs. In this way, the accommodation would meet agency requirements for maximum numbers helped for the lowest cost and would also fulfil the needs of the occupying family.



Izbjeglice Centar Gašinci, Đakovačka Satnica, Eastern Slavonia
Accommodates 0 Displaced persons
3100 Refugees
Managed by the ODPR, originally JNA barracks with additions built by many agencies
Camp

Fig 6.6. The tight housing layout showing the access path (source: the author)

This process of incremental adaptation gives the residents one of the highest levels of control over their lives. They can shape their built environment to their own requirements and needs. It could be argued that such an ability to adapt the built environment is a luxury that millions of people across the world, refugees or not, do not possess, so why is it important to allow refugees and displaced persons to control and adapt their surroundings?

In general terms, as was seen in Chapter Two, activity and participation as soon after experiencing trauma as possible, help in the psychological healing process. Such activities as food preparation and cultivation of land and adaptation of the immediate environment all help towards recovery from trauma. Levels of stress are far greater when it is perceived that control and choice are lacking (Rapoport, 1969). Therefore, giving refugees and displaced persons the chance to adapt their built environments is the ultimate healing process and the highest method by which to regain some of the control that was lost as soon as they fled their home.

For refugees and displaced persons, the ability to adapt the built environment is especially important for, while they can bring their culture, traditions and language with them from their homes, physical possessions are harder to bring and most often left behind. Of these, the most important is the home. The loss of home which is the scene for domestic life with all its emotional associations, is keenly felt and the hardest to bear when subsequently located in an environment **which was not selected but imposed, does not fulfil needs and is not possible to change or personalise:**

> "I'm not thinking about my home. I have to think in this way or else I will go crazy. Some people here are always talking about their life before, about what they had, what they have lost. I always want to say to them " OK, it was nice, we all had something nice, but now it is gone, now it's time to think about something else" I don't know if it is the right way to think — but it is what I must do to stop myself going crazy" (Refugee from Sarajevo speaking in Kutina Camp, January 1995)

Control is perceived to be lacking more by those living in camps and collectives than those in private accommodation, for the simple reason that those in private accommodation **organised it for themselves** and did not find it imposed upon them. Therefore, for those in the camps and collectives it is important that they be provided with the opportunities to adapt their immediate built environment. The camps of Čepin, Rokovci, and Kutina where such adaptations are encouraged, show the benefits of allowing such control over the environment:

> "We said, do whatever you want to the houses so that you have the space that you need and so that it would be more pleasurable for you to live there. Now every house looks different, and personally I think it looks better like that. For instance, this one has made a long porch for which they supplied the wood and we got them some panels for the roof from Sweden." (Manager, Čepin settlement, August 1994)

The commensal arrangement described above, where materials are provided by the management when individuals make their own personal investment to obtain materials, both encourages the adaptation process and overcomes potential concerns with security of tenure. In the literature covering the incremental adaptation of squatter settlements by owners, it is documented that residents are more likely to invest their own money and time in their property if they know that they will not be evicted from the plot (Abrams, 1964; Turner, 1976; Zetter & Baker, 1995). Therefore, in squatter settlements where it is wished to encourage the improvement of houses through self-help activities, tenure is assigned to the resident. The squatters' situation bears some similarities to that of refugees and displaced persons, as they are both endeavouring to make their homes in areas where both the community and the local municipality are unlikely to welcome them. In war, it is doubtful that local municipalities will assign tenure to incoming displaced persons or, even more improbably, to refugees. In a situation where all are competing for scarce resources and the host community has also been affected by war, any allocation of rights or resources to refugees and displaced persons that the hosts perceive to be theirs, will cause conflicts between the incomers and hosts. In Croatia, it would also be difficult to assign tenure of land to incoming residents as, in many cases, the ownership of such land is still disputed as a result of the change from the socialist regime that was in place prior to the war. Thus, by allocating materials for extension to the house on a *quid pro quo* basis, the residents of camps and settlements are encouraged to make their own investment in materials and thus extend and improve their housing units without the necessity of allocating tenure. Thus, the residents of Čepin are in possession of **perceived tenure** as personal investment is legitimised by the management's comparable investment.

The literature indicated that host governments would be wary of allowing the consolidation of shelter, as it implies that refugees and displaced persons are then permanent rather than temporary. However, there is no indication among the

testimonies of the refugees and displaced persons that the act of adapting or extending the housing unit curtails their desire to return home:

> "We are laughing at you for asking us such a naive question, of course we still wish to return home. The return to our home in Plitvice is all we are talking about here all the time. We have been in Karlovac for three years and yet in just a few minutes we would be packed and ready to go back to our home." (Displaced family in Gaza camp, Karlovac, January 1995)

Naselje Prijatelstva, Čepin, Eastern Slavonia
Accommodates: 2590 Displaced persons
0 Refugees

Managed by the ODPR, built by GTZ

Camp

Fig 6.7. One of the houses in Summer 1994 (source: the author)

The changes to individual houses in the camp of Čepin were very noticeable. In the five months between the author's two visits to the site, the houses had been extended further and the additions improved upon (Fig 6.7 and 6.8).



Naselje Prijatelstva, Čepin, Eastern Slavonia
Accommodates: 2590 Displaced persons
0 Refugees

Managed by the ODPR, built by GTZ

Camp

Fig 6.8. The same house in January 1995 (source: the author)

The same process but to an even greater degree can be seen in Blace camp at Rokovci, where extensions that were once wood and boarding have been incrementally improved with bricks and blocks and render. Fences have been constructed around the units, garages built, paths laid and vegetables patches and flower borders established [3] (Fig 6.9). Residents have invested their time and their

[3] The visible level of investment in the Rokovci camp may be a reflection of the origin of the residents, all of whom are displaced persons rather than refugees and of whom the vast majority come from rich towns located within the pre-war Vukovar county in Eastern Slavonia. This area comprised a thin strip of land following the Danube river and was an important commercial, industrial and transport centre. Residents within this area were seen to be wealthy prior to the war beginning, wealth which they have, to a comparable degree, retained. Thus many of the houses in Blace can be seen with garages and satellite dishes attached.

money in adapting the houses and in trying to retain a degree of normality within the new environment.

Blace camp, Rokovci, Eastern Slavonia
Accommodates: 2120 Displaced persons
0 Refugees

Managed by the ODPR, built by GTZ

Camp

Fig 6.9. The improvements to the camp showing the paths, fences and profusion of television aerials (source: the author)

Looking again at the upper level of the camp at Gašinci, it can be seen how the layout prevents the extension, adaptation or personalisation of the housing units. With such a tight layout there is virtually no opportunity to change the houses. Despite the lack of opportunity, residents have endeavoured to extend their units the only possible way and have covered over the gap between two houses to make extra storage space (Fig 6.10). However, as fast as they constructed such covered areas, the camp management pulled the structures down as they constituted a fire hazard. Thus, the refugees are denied all opportunity to adapt their units and yet,

with up to eight individuals living in a space of 18m² (2.25m² per person), there is clearly a great need to extend the space. Once again, the relief aid that had been provided is inadequate and yet refugees are prevented from improving the situation through their own efforts.

Izbjeglice Centar Gašinci, Đakovačka Satnica, Eastern Slavonia
Accommodates 0 Displaced persons
3100 Refugees
Managed by the ODPR, originally JNA barracks with additions built by many agencies
Camp

Fig 6.10. The makeshift extensions built between the units (source: the author)

Those refugees who live in the housing units on the lower level of the camp do have the opportunity to extend the houses as they are more spread out due to the steeply sloping nature of the site and the absence of concrete decking. Consequently, many of these units have extensions, built on out of materials that they have managed to collect incrementally from the camp and its environs (Fig 6.11). They are, of necessity, small extensions because the residents of Gašinci are not provided with materials and so they must rely on those that they can find.

However, the profusion of extensions on the southern side shows the level of their desire to adapt the space. With densities as high as they are within the houses (4.2m² per person), this wish to extend the space is understandable.

Izbjeglice Centar Gašinci, Đakovačka Satnica, Eastern Slavonia
Accommodates 0 Displaced persons
3100 Refugees
Managed by the ODPR, originally JNA barracks with additions built by many agencies
Camp

Fig 6.11. Incremental extension of the housing units on the southern side of the camp (source: the author)

For those in collective centres and private accommodation there is no opportunity to extend or adapt the house and rarely any land which is available to cultivate:

> "...we have heard about other places where there are flats with their own bathrooms and separate bedrooms and living rooms and a garden in the front, and we are dreaming about such a solution (Croatian Refugee speaking in Zaprude Barracks, January 1995)

In those buildings that have been converted from their pre-war use, there is no opportunity for the residents to adapt the accommodation. So families remain occupying the one room that they have been allocated, sharing central facilities with the other residents.

The psychological benefits of residents being able to adapt their houses should be recognised and provided for, however, this is not to suggest that every single refugee or displaced person will want to extend their property or plant gardens. The groups of refugees and displaced persons are not homogenous communities of like-minded individuals all wishing to build houses and plant potatoes. There will be those who do not wish to undertake such activities because they lack the ability or the knowledge or the motivation to do so. A recent UNHCR survey conducted among privately accommodated refugees and displaced persons in Slavonia, showed that only one family out of one hundred interviewed "...did not feel like working so never used the seeds" (UNHCR, 1994) which had been donated by the CRC.

Residents may not wish to invest time and energy in the property as a result of the lack of choice in the original location. If they have no vested interest in staying in the location, there will be little motivation to invest time and money in improving it:

> "It is strange, when I first arrived I wanted to change the house to how I wanted it. But now, I realise that I cannot, because this place is not for me. I have no feeling for this place. I will go somewhere else and start again, but not here..." (Refugee from Sarajevo speaking in Kutina camp, January 1995)

Others feel strongly that they do not wish to adapt the house because it signifies their acceptance of the condition of exile and suggests that they have abandoned their hopes of returning home:

> " No, we feel very strongly that we will not work on this house here. We will not do anything because our hope to go home is very big. It is our normal house or nothing." (Displaced family in Gaza camp, Karlovac, January 1995)

The choice to extend the unit or not remains with the resident. The essential concept is not that the refugees or displaced persons **do** extend and adapt their

units, but that they have the **choice** to do so if they wish. The accommodation provided should make allowance for residents to extend their houses or have land to cultivate if they wish to. The psycho-social benefits of refugees and displaced persons retaining control over their lives from the very basic level of day-to-day activities, such as food preparation, to the highest level of control over the built environment, need to be promoted. The importance of the type and method of accommodation in retention of coping mechanisms and recovery from trauma need to be acknowledged to be of primary importance.

6.5 REFLECTIONS ON PROVISION

Recent comments received on a paper prepared by the author and Sultan Barakat, which made proposals to give refugees and displaced persons in Croatia more control and autonomy stated:

> "During the most intense influxes of refugees and displaced persons...there was no time to plan, discuss or construct adequate shelter facilities. Most of these buildings were not suited for accommodation of any duration ... they were certainly not designed to facilitate individual family cooking or gardening activities. **Centralised accommodation was inevitable and indeed essential.**" (Murray, (ex-director of Scottish European Aid, now a consultant working in Mostar and Tuzla) communication by fax to the author, January 1996, emphasis added)

The stated "inevitability" of centralised provision needs to be questioned. As the initial discourse in this chapter has shown, the first rush of refugees and displaced persons combined with either non-existent organisational structures or existent structures which lack experience of refugee movements, does create chaos. In such situations it is inevitable that refugees and displaced persons will be sheltered wherever there is a space. However, that refugees and displaced persons then remain in such emergency accommodation for years at a time, should be neither "inevitable" nor "essential". Murray goes on to outline how in Bosnia the donors used the unstable military and political situation as a reason not to invest in the upgrading of accommodation centres or the relocation of the minority of refugees and displaced sheltered in this way. Thus such 'emergency' accommodation remained and the residents were kept in a situation of **permanent emergency** for periods of up to four years. The same reason for retaining refugees and displaced persons in inadequate shelter is almost constantly audible within Croatia. Agencies

and donors insist that camps and collective centres and organised centralised provision are inevitable because there are no alternative economical solutions.

The author contests these statements. Is it really inevitable that refugees and displaced persons must be sheltered in inadequate accommodation or only inevitable because it is imposed by an international community that knows nothing other than centralised provision of accommodation? In Croatia, 79 per cent of refugees and displaced persons have found accommodation with host families, not necessarily relatives or pre-war friends, would it not have been possible to offer financial incentives to other families to come forward as hosts to accommodate the remaining 21 per cent? Comparatively, it would have been much cheaper for agencies to fund cash grants for host families to accommodate refugees and displaced persons than building and renovating the collective centres and camps (Section 5.3). Such accommodation would also have provided shelter that was more culturally appropriate and socially supportive than any form of organised accommodation could ever be. However, such financial support is an invisible contribution and cannot be used to visibly promote the 'good works' of the humanitarian community. Media coverage and visibility are important to aid agencies and donors, as illustrated in Chapter Two (Section 2.3.7). Verification of the importance of visibility and press coverage comes from the Italian Government which recently refused to invest in the renovation of an existing hotel to accommodate elderly displaced persons until they were assured that there would be media coverage of the opening of the centre and articles and books published about the process (personal communication, Čizmek, 1995).

The agendas of agencies and donors that motivate them to promote the construction of visible centres and camps and encourage centralised aid provision, need to be reconfigured to provide more appropriate aid. The severe and long lasting consequences of removing personal control from refugees and displaced persons have to be understood. Such consequences actually mean that such shelter solutions cost more money in the long term. At present, donors in Croatia are funding a myriad of psycho-social programmes that focus on group activities and discussions. **Such programmes are only necessary to undo the damage that has been caused by the institutionalised way in which refugees and displaced persons are accommodated.** It has become apparent that the shelter provided has served to increase the levels of stress and trauma experienced through war and flight.

It makes no sense to spend money on curing a condition that was perpetuated by trying to minimise outlay in the first instance. Alternatively, it is sensible to provide the accommodation in a way that enables refugees and displaced persons to regain control over their lives and supports, rather than supplants, their innate coping mechanisms. Thus, shelter will not increase the levels of stress and trauma already experienced.

Centralised provision facilitates the act of humanitarian relief for the aid agency and donor instead of supporting the needs of the refugees and displaced community — **it is a solution for the benefactor not the beneficiary.** Such policies illustrate agencies' accountability to the donors rather than the recipients of aid. It is also evident that there is no effective needs assessment prior to programme implementation, or monitoring and evaluation after projects have been completed. The comments of refugees and displaced persons have been adduced to show clearly the importance to them of maintaining control, of having privacy and of being able to access resources.

Testimonies of the refugees and displaced persons show, although it is not defined in such terms by them, that when they compare their accommodation to that of others, they always wish for accommodation that gives them more control over their lives:

> "The rooms in the hotel were better than here, but here we have a lot of freedom. We live together. We are cooking. It is very important to cook alone, what we want to eat today we can prepare..." (Displaced family in Gaza camp, Karlovac, January 1995)
>
> Every house has a kitchen and we are all doing our own cooking and it's OK and we all have our own toilets, everybody. It's much better... I heard about some Swedish settlement that they built near Sisak. And they built one place for cooking and one place for the bathroom which everyone is supposed to share. I don't know how many houses they have but I think it is much better here" (Refugee from Sarajevo speaking in Kutina Camp, January 1995)
>
> "My sister who is living on the coast in Orebić has her own privacy, her own bathroom, even a piece of corridor. That's good but this is bad." (Refugee speaking in Depađansa Vojarna, Gašinci Annex, February 1995)

> "We recognise that this is a better solution than Špansko, because we have our own bathroom, own toilet, our own space. We would prefer a house with a garden but this place is better than others" (Displaced person in Hotel International, January 1995)
>
> "It would be nice to have a garden, then I could spend time working there rather than sitting in the room all the time" Đacki Dom Građiteljskih Struka, Zagreb, January 1995)
>
> "We have heard about other places where there are flats with their own bathrooms and separate bedrooms and living rooms and a garden and we are dreaming about such a solution" (Croatian Refugee living in Zapruđe ex-construction barracks, January 1995)

Maintaining refugees and displaced persons in conditions where they lack control and choice, ensures a high degree of imposed vulnerability. This imposed vulnerability creates groups with slower recovery rates, as the community's ability to function autonomously is restrained and dependency on external assistance is enforced. Alternatively, programmes that support the capacities and abilities of the refugees and displaced persons move beyond aid to empowerment and thus promote longer term solutions.

Once labelled as refugees or displaced persons, the treatment of such groups by the wider society makes their livelihoods vulnerable to destruction. This imposed vulnerability in Croatia is linked to numerous factors and is not an absolute concept. As has been shown, it varies depending on whether the migrant is in organised or private accommodation; the levels of control maintained and the access to physical resources such as land and building materials that is facilitated.

6.6 CONCLUSION

This chapter highlights a number of issues that need to be addressed if the humanitarian community is to improve its allocation of emergency shelter solutions in developed, war-torn nations such as Croatia. Recommendations that address the following issues will be listed in the final chapter of this thesis:

Can refugees and displaced persons be provided with shelter that allows the maintenance of dignity and privacy, when aid agencies and host governments endeavour to obtain maximum densities in accommodation?

Long term accommodation in emergency shelter has depredatory effects on refugees and displaced persons. How is it possible to negate such effects?

Personal control over familiar routine tasks can assist in the psychological recovery of refugees and displaced persons and facilitate the maintenance of their productive capacity. How can such control be encouraged?

Locating refugees and displaced persons in vast, designated camps and settlements places uneven strain on existing resources and serves to label and segregate the inhabitants. How can the practice of encampment favoured by aid agencies and donors be curtailed?

How can the implementing agencies be made accountable to refugees and displaced persons as well as donors?

How can the cultural applicability of shelter and consequently its greater supporting role, be ensured?

What are the positive psycho-social effects of shelter types and how can they be encouraged to the exclusion of negative effects?

What mechanisms need to be put in place to ensure that lessons are learnt from past shelter programmes?

How can the humanitarian community ensure that its shelter programmes accurately fill the needs of refugees and displaced persons?

How can access to enabling mechanisms be ensured?

How can host governments be made to see refugees as a resource and not as a burden?

This discussion of imposed vulnerability and repression of coping mechanisms is complemented by the exploration of the issue of integration. The physical and social integration of refugees and displaced persons into the host community have strong positive and negative effects on the maintenance of livelihoods while in exile. These issues will form the basis of the following chapter.

CHAPTER SEVEN: PHYSICAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN PRACTICE

7.1 INTRODUCTION

The literature reviewed in Chapters Two and Three indicated that it is the sum of refugees' physical and non-physical capacities that enables them to survive and cope (Anderson & Woodrow, 1989; Anderson, 1993). This implies that refugees require an organised access to social, economic and physical resources. Yet, as Wilson (1992) states, in many cases refugees' coping strategies are affected by rules and regulations that deny their interaction with hosts.

It is the social, economic and physical integration of incomers with hosts that this chapter will address. Findings from the study in Croatia will be adduced to show how policies that deny the interaction of incomers with hosts negatively affect refugees, displaced persons and hosts.

The findings will show that the **physical** integration of camps, collective centres and private accommodations facilitates the **social and economic** integration of refugees, displaced persons and hosts. This suggests therefore, that the location and planning of camps and settlements particularly, must be carefully considered by implementing agencies.

Harrell-Bond's (1986) definition of integration speaks of the co-existence of refugees and hosts. The study of Croatia shows that the prevalence of internal displacement in addition to migration across borders, means that integration must now embody refugees, hosts **and** internally displaced persons. The three factions possess widely differing degrees of legitimacy and yet must be provided for without perceived discrimination or partiality. All three groups have been affected by war, and so aid provision could utilise their shared suffering to bring them together, and yet it will be shown that programmes and projects fail time and again to address these commonalities of experience. The lack of integration of refugees, displaced persons and hosts combined with discriminatory aid policies increases the levels of tension and conflict between groups.

The findings also illustrate the importance of a country like Croatia, which is at war and yet retains peaceful areas which can shelter forced migrants, avoiding the spread of conflict throughout areas of peace. Thus, it will be shown that policies must aim to reduce ethnic rifts between refugees, displaced and hosts and endeavour to rebuild trust and co-operation at the micro-level. The study shows it is important therefore, that where hosts are expected to share existing scarce resources with incomers, there is a reciprocal arrangement whereby the provision for the incomers made by the humanitarian community also benefits the host. Integration must be a two way process in order to build a platform of mutual understanding at the micro-level that will aid post-war reconstruction.

These are the issues that will be discussed within the findings presented in this chapter. To facilitate the presentation of the findings, the following discourse will be divided into the two main categories addressed in the literature (Wilson, 1992; Harrell-Bond, 1990; Anderson & Woodrow, 1989; Anderson, 1993) :

- Physical integration
- Social and economic integration

7.2 PHYSICAL INTEGRATION

Physical integration can be defined as the extent to which the physical structure and infrastructure comprising the accommodation for refugees and displaced persons merges into the population centres of the hosts; the degree to which it is interwoven into the existing fabric of towns, cities, villages and hamlets; the extent to which it is dependent upon and contributes to existing communities. Examples from the study will be adduced to show that shelter projects located within, or on the periphery of, existing settlements, where the physical interaction and interplay of vehicular and pedestrian roots is high, promote greater social integration between incomers and hosts. The movement of traffic and pedestrians through and around camps, collective centres and private accommodations creates opportunities for mutually beneficial social and economic activity.

7.2.1 **Private Accommodation**

In this regard, therefore, those who are located in private accommodation benefit most from their place of shelter. This accommodation by default is located within existing urban structures. The refugees and displaced persons housed in this way

are diffused within the community rather than located in one specified area which would strain the local resources and infrastructure. Their social integration is facilitated as they are not 'obvious' to the host community; they are not in a labelled, designated and defined environment. As they are perceptually less intrusive on the host's environment, they cause less tension within the community. Privately accommodated refugees and displaced persons are not seen to receive specialised attention, nor they are visibly treated in any way better than the host community, this perceived 'equality' facilitates the acceptance of incomers within the host community. The findings show that only where there is visual and perceptible imbalance in receipt of goods and aid between incomers and hosts, or where incomers are defined as 'different' by their accommodation, will the relationship between incomers and hosts become strained.

7.2.2 **Collective Centres**

Applying the same concept to those in collective centres, it can be seen how they too benefit from being located within existing settlements. One of the main advantages of physical integration is that it facilitates access to education, health and employment opportunities for refugees and displaced persons:

> "The benefit of this accommodation is the location, in Zagreb, it is technically within the town. Because of that it is easy to get to the school, to the institution where we go for medical treatment and so on..." (Croatian refugee family in Zapruđe barracks, January 1995)

At the same time however, refugees and displaced persons in collective centres lack the invisibility of those in private accommodation. As collectives are converted public buildings, the host community is made very much aware of the presence of refugees and displaced persons through the loss of the building's primary function to the community. This acts to increase the tension between the incomers and the hosts, as not only are the hosts to share the few resources that they still retain with the incomers, but they also completely lose some of the resources that they possessed pre-war. This may not be a problem when the building provided workers' accommodation or housed the army, but where the collective centre is located in an old school or hotel then the loss is felt more. Such an attitude is particularly prevalent in areas of the Adriatic coast where tourism was the primary pre-war source of income for the population. Despite the present lack of tourists in Croatia, hotel owners are constantly pushing to have the

refugees and displaced persons moved on from their hotels so that they can resume trade (ODPR, 1995).

The data shows that there is a concern within the host community that providing physically integrated accommodation will ensure that some of the displaced persons and refugees will not want to return to their homes when they are able:

> "Dubrovnik is a special situation compared to the rest of Croatia, because here it is possible to go back home. But, the government must do something to push them back home, because they have been here for three years and it is easy for them here. For the young ones from villages they are now living in the town, it is easy to get to school, there are places to go in the evening, there is no long journey to get back home. They like it here and do not want to go back to their life in the villages." (Manager of the Bellevue Hotel, Dubrovnik, September 1994)

However, the fears of the hosts seem to be ill founded due to the difference between 'not wanting to return' and 'being allowed to stay'. The displaced may be able to remain while the ODPR is paying for their accommodation, food, heating, healthcare and education, however it is highly unlikely that they will be able to afford to stay once the government stops this funding. Even if they could afford it, current policy is that as the ODPR is reconstructing the villages and houses in the Dubrovnik hinterland, the occupiers are being 'encouraged' to return with the offer of financial and material benefits as well as penalties for non-compliance (Handabaka, 1995). With the government in such a position of strength, it is unlikely that displaced persons and refugees will be allowed to remain in organised accommodation once their return or repatriation is possible, thus concerns about the permanence of incomers in the host community appear unfounded.

7.2.3 **Camps and Settlements**

It is primarily the purpose built camps and settlements that are less likely to be physically integrated into existing built environments. The literature indicates that in general, land made available by a host government for the location and construction of camps and settlements is marginal land of little development value. It is therefore unlikely that camps will be found in the heart of existing settlements, where land has a high value. The location of camps in Croatia complies to this hypothesis, as they are all either peripheral to existing settlements or totally segregated from them. However, the camp of Čepin, shows that even those located

on the periphery of a town can be designed to physically interact with the town and thus promote the social integration of the incoming and the host communities.

The three GTZ camps of Čepin, Rokovci and Karlovac are all located on the periphery of existing towns on arterial roads (Fig 7.1).



Fig 7.1. Plans of the three GTZ camps showing the locations on arterial roads (source: Kreutner, 1993)

Thus all three camps are passed by a large volume of traffic each day. This in itself provides economic and social opportunities for integration with the host community. For example, in Rokovci, one family has extended their house, which is located on the main road, to provide a bar — the *Biffe Prognanik* (Displaced Persons' Bar). It attracts custom from the residents within the camp and passing trade from those driving by and so provides a place for social interaction between hosts and incomers (Fig 7.2).



Blace camp, Rokovci, Eastern Slavonia
Accommodates: 2120 Displaced persons
0 Refugees

Managed by the ODPR, built by GTZ

Camp

Fig 7.2. The Biffe Prognanik, the Displaced Persons' Bar (source: the author)

While it is possible to gain a degree of interaction just from the passing traffic, the degree of integration achieved when traffic is passing through the camp rather than merely passing by the camp is far higher. Čepin is the only one of the three camps which benefits from some through-traffic. The roads that pass through it, link areas of the existing town and thus provide a short cut for the host community to get

from one location to another. This physical planning, which appears to be more by accident than design as it has only occurred in one of the three camps, has resulted in the settlement becoming an integral part of the town. The host community through-traffic has encouraged both social and economic integration, in that the displaced can sell the produce from their own gardens by the roadside and attract customers from the host and the displaced community. A look at the other two camps of Rokovci and Karlovac shows that although they too are located on main arterial roads, there is no reason for the traffic to divert off these roads and through the camps unless they have specific business in the camps. Thus, the opportunities for physical mixing of hosts and incomers and resultant social integration are negated.

The physical interaction and integration of Čepin camp is supported by other activities. The displaced children attend the existing local school rather than a specific school constructed solely for them in the camp. This helps with the integration of the displaced and the host community, as the children from the camp play with their friends in the town and those from the town come to the camp. The integration with hosts is also facilitated by the composition of the camp residents who are almost entirely displaced persons (the ratio of displaced to refugees is 115:1) who used to live, at most, a matter of twenty kilometres away from where they are now living:

> "We are from Tenja, we can see our old house from the roof of one building in Osijek, it was like a suburb of the city, it is quite hard for us to be so close..." (Displaced family in Čepin, August 1994)

The residents, therefore, knew the area of Čepin well in pre-war times and many of them still retain the same jobs that they had in Čepin, or the central town of Osijek, prior to the war. There is a familiarity which fosters feelings of security and safety:

> "This place is closer to my home, that is why I came here. Osijek was the centre for everyone who used to live in Eastern Croatia before the war. People from a circle around of about thirty five kilometres all came here to do their shopping and so on. So I feel that this place is nearly home " (Displaced woman speaking in Čepin camp, January 1995)

The degree of familiarity aids in the process of integration, as there is no massive alteration in the environment or the traditions and culture of the region. For

refugees, the change in surroundings is always more severe and consequently harder to come to terms with. Locating settlements for refugees and displaced persons close to their place of origin is a positive benefit for integration of the incomers as it provides a culture and landscape with which they are familiar. However, it does also provide a cause for concern in terms of security, as for the displaced persons, their place of origin is located in occupied territory and although UNPROFOR is supposed to retain the peace in these areas, there have been instances where shells have been fired into the free territory of Croatia. The town of Karlovac where Gaza camp is located, has been particularly targeted by enemy fire throughout the period of UNPROFOR residence, and the camp has been hit during these shelling periods. While the host population is also in danger during these attacks, it does seem that the displaced persons are more vulnerable in their cellar-less, prefabricated timber houses. The security of settlements is an issue that the displaced persons and refugees see to be of importance:

> "It is good that we are near to our original home, because the area is familiar, but then there is still shooting all around here, we can hear it at night. Županja is under constant fire and it is only 15kms from here. When they shoot at it, this place shakes. This place would be a lot better if they built a shelter" (Displaced man in Blace camp, Rokovci, February 1995)

The benefits of locating displaced persons and refugees in familiar surroundings where possible, suggest that it is a policy that should be encouraged, in combination with supply of the appropriate safety considerations such as air raid shelters. Refugees and displaced persons have lost many of their physical possessions, the belongings that they can retain and bring with them into exile are their culture, traditions and abilities. Items that are familiar to them and cannot be taken away with ease. Moving into an environment which is sensitive to such cultures and traditions facilitates the recovery process from the trauma of war and flight. Such patterns and traditions are also reflected within the built environment, by locating new camps and settlements close to the place of origin of refugees or displaced persons, such familiar environments can be emulated. For foreign aid agencies, who do not know the areas in which they are working, this process is greatly assisted by working with those who understand and are familiar with the local environments and traditions.

For instance, the jurisdiction for planning laws in Croatia rests with the provinces, thus the plans that the GTZ had drawn up for the camps at Čepin, Rokovci and

Karlovac in Zagreb had to be redesigned with the municipal planning authorities in each town. In their report, the GTZ regret that they were "...only able to bring limited influence to bear on the development plans" (Kreutner, 1993). They label the plans developed for Rokovci and Čepin "monotonous", and state that the planning consortium could not be "persuaded" to give up their unimaginative design. The author suggests that it is a benefit to the occupants of Čepin and Rokovci that the GTZ did not manage to change the designs of the municipal planners, for the resulting "monotonous" plans are highly reflective of the traditional settlements in the area of Eastern Slavonia. A drive around the surrounding countryside would have shown the GTZ that many of the villages are planned on a linear, 'corridor' basis to simply follow the line of the road. Thus the patterns of the plans of Čepin and Rokovci are intimately familiar to the displaced persons resident there and offer the security of a known structure. This physical integration thus increases the social interaction between incomers and hosts and also facilitates the continuance of understood cultures and familiar traditions that provide security.

In a marked contrast to Čepin, the camp of Gašinci, located within Croatian Army territory is almost completely segregated from the host community. The camp is within an old army barracks that has been extended to accommodate 3,100 Bosnian Muslim refugees. It is a designated transit camp for those going on to third countries, but in reality those who are older, or less well educated, or physically or mentally disabled cannot get residency in a third country and remain in Gašinci for many months or years. Even for those who do eventually get residency in a third country, the wait can be over a year. As the camp is located within army territory it is, by its very nature, located away from surrounding towns and villages. Because of its army links, the camp is surrounded by high fences and barbed wire and the entrance is marked by a manned checkpoint. Between the camp and the nearest town of Đakovačka Satnica, some fifteen minutes bus ride away, there are no other settlements, villages or farms. Indeed, the only visible structures are watchtowers containing armed guards. Thus the residents of Gašinci are physically totally segregated from the host community. Their entrance and egress from the camp is controlled by the fact that they require written permissions from the management to leave the camp, and then they can only do so on the organised bus which leaves once daily for Đakovo or on the Red Cross transportation if they are going to hospital in Osijek:

> "...Of course it is better for us to live in some other place rather than Gašinci because Gašinci is some kind of camp, because it is surrounded with wire and we don't feel free. We have to ask for exit cards to get out, we have to wait in line for everything and that is why it is better to live elsewhere."
>
> "...I would like to have the freedom to walk where I want, to go by bus where I want..."
>
> "I lived in Tuzla for a while. And it was better there, because I could walk freely even with the grenades and fire and here, I cannot move..."
>
> (Comments from refugees living in Gašinci Refugee Camp, in Eastern Slavonia, February 1995)

Compared with Čepin settlement, where "People are free to come and go....We like to call this settlement a village because we haven't got any fences around and the people like to stay here..." (Manager of Čepin camp, August 1994), the camp of Gašinci displays a very different policy. The segregation labels the residents of Gašinci 'refugees' and therefore 'different' and promotes the sectarian way in which they are viewed by the wider community. As they are entirely Bosnian Muslim refugees the segregation and labelling enforces underlying ethnic rifts that result from the war between Croatia and Bosnia. The conflict and tensions are therefore perpetuated and dispersed from the heart of the war in Bosnia into areas of relative peace. The segregation and consequential way in which these refugees are labelled by the hosts, further affects their access to existing resources within the host community. The refugees are then caught in a self-perpetuating downward spiral where segregation breeds suspicion and resentment which further increases their segregation from the hosts. Such segregation denies refugees access to the enabling mechanisms that would promote the maintenance of autonomy.

7.2.4 **Discrimination and Bias**

The visible difference between the integration of Čepin camp that holds 2,590 displaced persons and no refugees and the segregation of Gašinci which holds 3,100 Bosnian Muslim refugees and no displaced persons speaks vociferously of the attitude of the Croatian authorities towards those of Croatian nationality and those of Bosnian nationality. An attitude exemplified by a member of UNHCR during an interview with a displaced family:

> "They have been offered the chance to move into Gašinci, which is better than here as they do not have to pay for anything and they get their food. However, they have a pride of which I approve — **they are Croats, they have the right to live in Osijek. It would be, let's say, impolite, to put them into Gašinci"** (Croatian UNHCR field officer, Osijek, January 1995, emphasis added)

The Croatian Government policy for provision of aid to refugees and displaced persons, as outlined in Chapter Five, would suggest that refugees and displaced persons receive exactly equal treatment (with the exception of long term healthcare). However, although the **categories** of aid given to both groups are the same, education, housing, etc.. The unwritten **levels of assistance** within those categories show distinct hierarchy to firstly displaced Croatians, secondly Croatian refugees and finally Bosnian refugees. The data will show that such policies of bias and segregation, while understandable though not condoneable, serve only to widen existing ethnic rifts and do nothing to promote an atmosphere of peace for post-war rehabilitation and reconstruction.

While it is easy to see the benefits of an integrative approach, the findings in Croatia show how hard it is to actually achieve. Harrell-Bond's definition of integration indicates that groups of Bosnian Croatian, Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Serb refugees need to co-exist and share scarce resources with displaced Croatians and Croatian nationals. For Bosnian Muslims, the problems began to arise with the start of hostilities between Croatia and Bosnia in April 1993. As outlined in Chapter Five, following a winter of tension these two forces began to fight each other. Muslim refugees who had fled to Croatia following the onslaught of the Serb forces in 1992, now found themselves taking refuge in a country with whom they were technically at war. Such a situation makes integrative policies hard to implement by even the most determined aid agency. The experience of the DRC in trying to allow Bosnian Muslims into their settlement illustrates the point precisely. Their camp in Kutina opened in February 1993, right at the time when relations between Muslims and Croatians were deteriorating. The camp was to take the most needy cases from the refugees and displaced persons already resident in the town of Kutina regardless of ethnicity. However, **all** those within the town were feeling the effects of the war, the strain placed upon existing scarce resources by the influx of refugees and displaced persons had affected the hosts just as much as the incoming refugees and displaced persons. Everyone, therefore wanted to benefit from the potential improvement in their situation that the DRC camp could

bring. This competition made the allocation of places in Kutina very sensitive, as both the displaced persons and the town residents objected to the Muslim refugees benefiting over Croatian nationals. It was they who put great pressure on the Kutina municipality and the DRC delegation to deny Muslims access to the camp.

It is hard for agencies operating within the ethno-nationalistic environment of Croatia resulting from the war, to implement projects and programmes that are impartial and unbiased. The DRC report on Kutina states:

> "...if DRC had not been responsible for the management...the settlement would no doubt have become purely Croatian. Many inhabitants of especially Muslim origin have expressed to DRC that our presence was of decisive importance to the security of their everyday life in the settlement. "You are our guarantee", they said.
> ...[That] some people within the ODPR might have preferred a different ethnic makeup ...became clear in July 1993, when the ODPR without previous notice appointed three managers for the three DRC refugee settlements. For the settlement of Kutina, the appointment fell to one of the inhabitants who had quite clearly expressed that there ought not to be any Muslim refugees in the settlement" (Kristensen, *et al.*, 1994)

Ultimately, the ethnic makeup of the settlement was as follows :

Ethnicity	Number
Croatian Displaced Persons	343
Bosnian Croat Refugees	761
Bosnian Muslim Refugees	314
Bosnian Serb Refugees	10

Fig 7.3. Ethnic make-up of Kutina Camp (source: the author)

A balance which still favoured those with Croatian citizenship, but did at least accommodate a percentage of Bosnian Muslim and Serb refugees. With the authorities within the Kutina area under such great pressure from the local inhabitants and the displaced community within Kutina to provide only places for Croatians; it was a struggle for the DRC to make as many places as they did for those of other than Croatian Nationality.

Such attitudes of segregation are a contributory factor to imposed vulnerability. The physical integration as displayed by Čepin camp offers opportunities for

income generation, healthcare and education and while it will never be a perfect match for all that the inhabitants have left behind, it does provide a degree of support through the return to understood ritual and routine. For those in Gašinci, the segregation is not only a constant reminder of their new status of refugee but also denies their opportunities for self-sufficiency and increased control.

Many reports of increased tensions throughout the centres and private accommodations of Croatia, as a result of the Muslim-Croat conflict show the difficulties that both Muslim and Croat refugees suddenly began to encounter as the conflict led to fights and attacks within settlements. As one refugee reported:

> "We were living in Savudrija, but there were mostly Muslims there and we are Croatian so when the conflicts between Muslims and Croats began, we had to leave and come here." (Croatian Refugee in Ivankovo Wagon Camp, January 1995)

Such conflicts have led to the segregation of refugees from displaced persons, rather than attempts to maintain integrated patterns as in the DRC camps. A look at the figures for some of the biggest camps and collectives within Croatia, shows that camps are wholly dedicated to either refugees or displaced persons or they have distinct majorities of one or the other (Fig 7.4).

Camps such as those of the GTZ support policies of segregation and discrimination by complying with governmental insistence that displaced persons be given priority when the allocation of accommodation takes place. The table shows how the GTZ camps comply to the patterns of segregation of refugees from displaced persons and of discriminatory projects against refugees. The GTZ report states that the project was initiated to provide accommodation for "...approx. 20,000 displaced persons **and** refugees in Croatia" (Kreutner, 1993, emphasis added). The camps were located in areas which were already overflowing with refugees and displaced persons and were intended to alleviate some of the overcrowding. In this light, the allocation of accommodation mainly to displaced persons in the Gaza camp of Karlovac can be understood, as there were 15,045 displaced persons to only 1,040 refugees, although the ratio of refugees to displaced in the camp is less than that within the potentially recipient community. However, the two camps built in the Osijek and Vinkovci regions were located in areas where there were far more

balanced numbers of refugees and displaced persons[1] and yet the displaced community still received priority. Instead of endeavouring to stop such discrimination, the GTZ have endorsed the policy through their tacit acceptance. Through their actions, the GTZ have helped increase the ethnic rifts between refugees and displaced persons and promoted conflict rather than utilising their programmes to build peace on the micro-level.

Centre	Refugees	Displaced Persons
Gašinci	3100	0
Savudrija	1750	0
Obonjan	400	0
Stobrec	448	0
Kamenjak	693	26
Puntizela	313	9
Rokovci*	0	2120
Čepin*	0	2590
Karlovac*	33	1870
Varaždin 1	724	63
Varaždin 2	673	40
Kutina **	873	307
Lipovljani**	478	576

Fig 7.4. Balance of residents in some of the camps and collective centres (source: data from ODPR, 1995)

* Camps implemented by the GTZ

** Camps implemented by the DRC

It is important to integrate the refugees and displaced persons with each other, to guard against perceived bias and consequent widening of ethnic rifts. The two camps in Špansko, a suburb within Zagreb, show the way in which refugees and displaced persons can construct notions of bias. Both centres were barracks lived in pre-war by construction workers during the fabrication of Špansko suburb, both consist of sub-divided wooden sheds with central washing facilities (Fig 7.5 and 7.6). Špansko 1, that used to belong to the company *Industogradnje*, houses displaced persons, Špansko 2, that was owned by *Tempo*, houses refugees. The two camps are separated by a distance of approximately one kilometre and have no

[1] 28,335 displaced persons to 12,203 refugees in Osijek region and 14,863 displaced persons to 19,031 refugees in the Vinkovci region, ODPR figures for August 1995.

contact with each other. It is the lack of integration between the two camps that encourages the perceptions of bias by the refugees, for there is no verbal contact or sharing of information that would enable each group to know exactly what the other receives. There is a difference in what each group receives, for refugees in organised accommodation do not receive a cash grant whereas displaced persons do [2].

Industogradnje, Španska 1, Špansko, Zagreb

Accommodates: 652 Displaced persons
0 Refugees
Managed by ODPR, previously construction workers' barracks
Collective Centre

Fig 7.5. The camps for displaced persons in Špansko suburb (source: the author)

However, the lack of contact between the two groups exaggerates the differences. Without interaction, the only evidence of the amount of aid and assistance each group receives is the visible state of the two camps, and that of the displaced

[2] Inequalities in provision will be discussed later in this section.

persons is visibly better. There are many cars and a tractor or two, net curtains at the windows, vegetable patches established and tools for cultivation.



Tempo, Španska 2, Španska, Zagreb
Accommodates: 0 Displaced persons
approx. 360 Refugees
Managed by ODPR, previously construction workers' barracks

Collective Centre

Fig 7.6. Camp for refugees in the Španska suburb (source: the author)

The reality however, is that the visible wealth of the displaced persons' camp is higher largely because they were able to bring so much more with them when they fled, and not because of cash grants that they have received since being in the centre. Examination shows that the cars have Vukovar licence plates, and thus were available to be loaded up with personal possessions when the owners fled. The more complex nature of flight through occupied territory that refugees took, meant that they could not carry anything with them and could not come out in their own cars. Such visible wealth and lack of information, enforced by segregation results in exaggerated perceptions of bias:

> "They [the displaced persons] have much nicer accommodation. They have better food and they get more money every month, someone cares about their heating. In this camp we are helpless, no one cares about us, because now we are from a different country and no on wants to know about us." (Refugee in Tempo barracks, Zagreb, February 1995)

Enforced feelings of discrimination only serve to widen ethnic rifts and do not facilitate the reunification of a country following such a war. There are conflicts between refugees and displaced persons when they are located together in the same centre. A vitriolic argument that broke out during a visit to the collective centre Hotel Posejdon on the island of Korčula, was ample testimony to the tensions that result from accommodating both groups together. Although it is difficult to put the two together, it would be more beneficial to work at solving the differences of living together than to separate the two in an attempt to prevent the problem. Separation does not solve the problem, as has been shown, separation only serves to increase the feelings of discrimination. Locating the opposing factions in the same accommodation, however, enables reconciliation of the differences and promotes the building of an ultimate peace at the grass roots level. Through establishing communication at the micro-level agencies can aim their shelter projects at the root causes of the conflict. By addressing the ethnic rifts that exist, and accommodating refugees and displaced persons together, agencies promote the maintenance of post-war peace when it comes. El Bushra's "process of conflict" diagram illustrated in Chapter Three shows how war will start again if the causes are not addressed during the period of 'fragile peace'. In the Croatian context, it is possible to address the causes of the conflict between the Croatian and Bosnian Muslim sides while the refugees and displaced persons are both accommodated in Croatia. If such underlying tensions are not addressed, but actually increased during exile, then the fragile peace that currently exists between the Croatian and Bosnian forces is unlikely to survive once attempts to re-build Bosnia as a multi-ethnic state begin (Fig 7.7).

It is interesting to note that over the past two years many projects have appeared in Croatia which pass under the title of 'conflict resolution'. These heavy, top-down projects are instigated by, and receive funding from, the international community and are aimed at bringing opposing groups together. One such project aimed to bring together members of the group of displaced persons with members of the

group of refugees living in the free territory of Croatia with members of the group living in Knin controlled UNPA North and South.



Fig 7.7. El Bushra's process of conflict model, adapted to show the current Croatian situation (source: the author)

Not only does the project re-enforce divisions by specifying the characteristics of the groups that will be included — refugee, displaced and citizens of occupied zones. It is also an artificial union to remedy a situation which was **initially** created by the unthinking application of humanitarian aid policies. Had groups of refugee and displaced persons not been segregated into separate locations from the beginning of the influx into Croatia - there would be little need to later enforce artificial unification projects.

It has to be understood, that policies of integration would be facilitated were there not such discrimination between the assistance given to refugees and displaced

persons. The entire aid system discriminates one from the other, as the individuals are labelled either refugee or displaced as soon as they register; refugees receive blue cards and displaced persons, yellow. The distinctions are then reinforced, not only by the Croatian government but also by many members of the international community that tie the aid that they give to certain groups. Whilst such policies of discrimination by the Croatian government can be understood, though not condoned, it is hard to see what benefit NGOs gain from discriminatory behaviour.

The practice of earmarking aid seems to be endemic in many agencies. UNHCR, as the name suggests, deals primarily with refugees, not internally displaced people, Marhamet (a Muslim organisation) will predominantly help Muslims, Caritas (a Catholic organisation) focuses on Croatians. The resultant inequalities of such a system only serve to increase tensions.

7.3 SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION

When it is well managed, integration into existing social systems such as employment, healthcare, education not only serves to unite incomers and hosts, but also reduces the imposed vulnerability of groups. When refugees and displaced persons can support themselves through income generating activities in the same way as they did pre-war, then they are less dependent on outside assistance and retain a higher level of control over their own lives.

7.3.1 **Employment**

In Croatia, access to income generating opportunities is a problematic issue for both refugees and displaced persons, although existing legislation makes it more difficult for refugees. There is nothing in Croatian law that forbids members of either of these groups to be employed within Croatia, however, there is legislation that states that jobs can only be taken by a non-Croatian citizen if there is no Croatian already resident in the vicinity that can do that job instead. With unemployment currently standing at 16 per cent within Croatia, it is unlikely that there will be no Croatian citizen available for any job opportunity. It is therefore highly improbable that a Bosnian Muslim would ever be able to be appointed for a job over a Croatian Citizen. This lack of access to employment opportunities, combined with policies that restrict refugees' coping strategies, as described in the previous chapter, generate high levels of imposed vulnerability on refugees.

Many displaced persons are still on the books of the factories and organisations for whom they worked pre-war. These employers are theoretically supposed to pay the staff a retainer even though it is no longer possible for the employee to work. However, the reality is that the retainer is seldom received, as the firms are in financial difficulties due to decreased production and demand, and yet the displaced are categorised as employed and cannot therefore be legally employed elsewhere.

> "I am still in work, even though the company doesn't exist in Zagreb, I still formally belong to it so from time to time we are receiving a few hundred Kuna [£1 is approximately 8.5 Kuna]. For instance this last year I received two hundred Kuna [£25.00]" (Displaced person in the Hotel International, Zagreb, January 1995)

Additionally, those registered as employed do not get the cash grant from the ODPR regardless of the regularity of the payment from the firm. Legal access of these groups to employment is then restricted, which encourages displaced persons to either seek and acquire seasonal or part time work that is cash-in-hand; sell personal possessions and belongings or to depend on assistance that is provided by relatives overseas or the government and aid agencies.

Employment statistics for both groups, collected in a UNHCR survey of privately accommodated refugees and displaced persons in Slavonia, show that 72 per cent of the population have some form of income other than the cash grant. Almost half of these families have at least one member of the family working, although the frequency of employment is three times higher for displaced persons than refugees. The remainder receive their alternative income from relatives overseas or relatives working elsewhere in Croatia or a pension from the government (this latter payment only goes to displaced persons).

One of the largest financial burdens falls to those in private accommodation, for while those in the camps and collectives receive their accommodation, heat, water and power without charge, those in private accommodation have to meet these costs themselves. These costs, combined with the minimal access to employment opportunities, are the primary reason for the privately accommodated to move into collective accommodation and camps. While few have to pay rent *per se*, many have to contribute to or pay entirely for services such as electricity which would

cost an average of 86DM (£58.25) per month. The cash grant received is only 122DM (£82.63) per month for a family of four:

> "...We have known the man we live with for some years so we don't have to pay rent, but we do have to pay a share of the bills. It is a fairly typical situation, and even though the costs are shared it is still difficult." (Displaced family living in Osijek, January 1995)

There are aspects of legislation in place that seek to curtail some of the secondary coping mechanisms of refugees and displaced persons, for instance that of the selling of personal possessions. Refugees and displaced persons can be often seen in the markets throughout Croatia endeavouring to sell the tinned and dried food that they receive through humanitarian aid parcels. In most cases, this is done not so much to raise an income but to enable the refugees and displaced persons to then purchase the fresh fruit and vegetables which they do not otherwise receive. Such a practice not only serves to improve the diet of the refugees and displaced persons, but also promotes social interaction between incomers and hosts in the market place. The management of Varaždin 1 found this practice so alarming that they included in their prodigious list of rules — "It is strictly forbidden to take any kind of humanitarian aid out of the centre. It is strictly forbidden to sell any kind of goods on the local market". The second sentence was added to the list after the management discovered that when the inhabitants were forbidden to take aid items out, they gave them to members of the host community to take out and sell for them. A practice that shows a high degree of social interaction with the surrounding community, and yet was curtailed for no obvious or understandable reason.

It would seem to be more logical to question why the inhabitants felt it necessary to sell their aid and then address the problem, rather than just banning them from selling their possessions. If rations are sold because they are perceived to be inappropriate by the recipients and do not fill their own understanding of their needs, then agencies need to do something to make food provision appropriate. This could be done either by changing the content of the food basket, although as the need is for fresh fruit and vegetables this would not be appropriate, or by filling the need for fresh food in another way. Alternatives would be to give them access to land, tools and seeds or to allow them to sell the dried goods as they are doing. This second way benefits the host community as well as it gives them access to tinned products that they cannot obtain elsewhere.

Testimonies of refugees and displaced persons show that another coping mechanism utilised to overcome restricted access to legal employment is seasonal cash-in-hand work as agricultural labour:

> "In Spring, the Croats start to come to the camp and ask people to help them with their land, and then again in Summer, people work for Croats digging potatoes and picking corn ..." (Refugee family in Gašinci camp, February 1995)

Those in collective centres and camps on the Adriatic coast can still manage to obtain seasonal work in the hotels during the Summer. However, the opportunities are much less than existed before the war, due not only to the war keeping the tourists away, but also to the accommodation of refugees and displaced persons in the hotels.

The desire to work and earn money on any basis, bears testimony to the ability of refugees and displaced persons to fulfil their own needs if they are given access to enabling interventions. It negates the concept that refugees are incapable beings solely reliant on external assistance in order to survive. Where they are permitted to meet their own needs they will.

7.3.2 **Education**

As regards access to education, most refugee and displaced children receive their education in existing schools within Croatia. In many locations, this use of existing resources assists the host community as well as promoting the integration of incomers and hosts. In Kutina for example, instead of investing in a separate school built in the camp just for the children of the settlement, the DRC invested in increasing the resources of the existing school in Kutina. In this way, the school receives the resources and assistance it needs to support the increased numbers of students, and also receives investment that benefits the host community both currently and in the future when the refugees and displaced persons return home.

> "Instead of establishing a school for the children in the DRC settlements, an agreement was made very early in the project phase with the school authorities about integrating the children into Kutina's schools and classes....It was the idea to extend the contact network across ethnic and social boundaries,...but the school administration lacked resources for the implementation of the co-operation. Like in all other sectors in Croatia the economy was under heavy strain. It was

> financially possible to cover the extra costs which is why DRC supported the purchasing of teaching aids and furniture for the pupils." (Kristensen, *et al.*, 1994, p3)

In this way, tensions that may have arisen over the sharing of a limited resource are diffused at the same time as providing an opportunity for the incomers to interact with the hosts. As the DRC's document continues to report, friendships were established by the children across ethnic and social boundaries. Such symbiotic relations mean that there is integration between the hosts and incomers among the children, and as the incoming children are of Croatian and Bosnian nationality, the policy assists in a small way towards the healing of ethnic rifts.

However, not all refugee and displaced children are taught in existing schools. For some[3], education is provided in specifically constructed camp or settlement schools. Documentation from the ODPR, states that the instances where special schools are in operation are locations where:

> "...the number of refugee children [i]s so high that the small local schools d[o] not have the capacity to take them all (for example, in the Gašinci centre where there are 320 children of school age)" (ODPR, 1995, appendices)

Such a remark gives some indication of the effect on resources of constructing vast camps and settlements for refugees and displaced persons. Such huge influxes swamp local facilities, resources and markets, ensuring that even if there were jobs available or existing schools and health centres, there would never be enough to support so many individuals. Concentrating refugees and displaced persons all together in one camp or settlement creates pressure points on local services, rather than spreading the demand evenly throughout the community and thus dissipating the load on resources. In this regard, those refugees and displaced persons living in private accommodation who are dispersed throughout communities have the possibility of greater access to services and opportunities.

7.3.3 **Reciprocal Relations**

Access to existing social services is important for incoming communities, as it aids the process of integration and facilitates the maintenance of independence by the refugees and displaced persons. However, the potential for such integration to

[3] In 1994-95, 2,540 children out of 28,724 were taught in specifically constructed facilities.

cause conflict with the host community is great, especially within a war torn country where all are affected by the scarcity of resources and the trauma of war. Therefore, enabling access to services and opportunities needs to be facilitated in such a way that benefits the host population as well as the incoming population. Investment in improving and expanding the existing local facilities to accommodate refugees and displaced will also visibly benefit the host. Settlements such as Gaza in Karlovac, where health facilities specific to the camp were built instead of investing in the existing large hospital which had been badly shell damaged, only serve to create tension. In Mićevac, provision of services to those in the camp easily exceeds the facilities that exist in the surrounding villages:

> "We have got a shop, we have a post office, we have a community house with a service every Sunday — and that is the best thing because the other villages around this camp haven't got a church, or a post office, they have nothing. This camp is one of the best in Croatia" (Manager of Mićevac, August 1994)

Hosts are expected not only to share their own scarce resources but also to remain congenial when incomers receive preferential treatment. Feelings of good will and welcome seldom survive in an atmosphere of perceived prejudice. It would seem therefore that where the UNHCR has a policy of parity which ensures that refugees are maintained at the same standard as the host, that there should be a reciprocal policy, for both international and national aid agencies, where hosts are maintained at the same level as the incomers, or at least benefit from the assistance given to refugees and displaced persons.

In addition to providing settlements and camps that benefit the host community once constructed, the construction of new built settlements can also be used to feed the host's employment and economic situation. The three GTZ camps were built using local construction firms for the infrastructure and foundation work, which gave employment opportunities to local Croatian businesses and thus recycled some money back into the economy. However, when it came to the housing units themselves, the GTZ believed that "...the local market would not be able to supply them in the brief period available" (Kreutner, 1993, p2). They therefore tendered the fabrication of the panels for the housing units out in Germany and gave the contract to a German-Turkish consortium. As the GTZ report details "this project also provided employment for a large number of people in Turkey" (Kreutner, 1993). However, it would seem to be far more beneficial, if

the project had provided employment for large numbers of people in Croatia and circulated some money back into the hosts' economy. While Croatia may not have been able to supply the cement-bonded particle boards and lightweight steel frames that GTZ were planning to use, the construction industry could have supplied other materials, thus generating yet more employment opportunities.

The GTZ report cites the need for speed and the urgent need for the "emergency accommodation" as reasons why it was necessary to seek a source for prefabricated boards outside Croatia. Yet, the accommodation that they constructed is not "emergency", it is far longer term than emergency. Indeed, much of the validation for the project appears to have been post-rationalised once it was in place, rather than considered prior to implementation.

The entire project seems not to have been conceived to match the conditions on the ground in Croatia, but **pre**-conceived in Germany, before the situation in Croatia had even been assessed. Indeed, the report begins with the statement that :

> "In Summer of 1992 the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany decided to make 50 million DM available to the Federal Foreign Office within the context of humanitarian aid to provide accommodation for approximately 20,000 displaced persons and refugees in Croatia in buildings capable of withstanding the rigours of winter. It was envisaged that approx. 8,000 persons would be housed in 3 new settlements to be erected, and approx. 12,000 persons would be accommodated in buildings more or less destroyed by the war which were to be rehabilitated." (Kreutner, 1993, p2)

The GTZ were not even commissioned until after the decision had been made as to what to provide, no one had conducted a needs assessment in Croatia to establish real requirements or potentials. The necessity of building prefabricated camps of shelter was not derived from a knowledge of the requirements of the hosts or the refugees or the displaced persons. Had the GTZ been allowed to take the time to assess the requirements of the hosts and the incomers, to evaluate the alternative options to building camps and settlements and seen the potentials of the Croatian construction industry, then accommodation could have been provided that would benefit both incomers and hosts.

7.4 CONCLUSION

This chapter highlights the issues that the humanitarian community will need to address if its shelter provision is to facilitate the integration of refugees and displaced persons into the host community. The findings have shown that integrative policies are essential for refugees and displaced persons if they are to maintain their capacities to support themselves. By providing them with access to existing social and economic structures, the humanitarian community empowers the refugees and displaced persons. Such empowerment promotes longer term solutions and facilitates the return home and post-war reconstruction. The data has shown that in order to operate integrative policies, aid agencies must invest in the host population simultaneously with the refugee and displaced populations, only in this way can the apportionment of scarce resources be achieved without increasing levels of conflict between incomers and hosts.

The study of Croatia indicates that in a war situation, programmes that integrate, rather than segregate, refugees and displaced persons establish communications at the micro level, guard against perceived discrimination and reduce rather than increase existing ethnic rifts. Thus, despite the difficulties of implementing such policies in ethno-nationalistic environments, it seems that agencies should endeavour to pursue integrative policies, rather than supporting, by default, policies of discrimination.

Only through integration into existing socio-economic structures can refugees and displaced persons hope to maintain their innate coping mechanisms and abilities to meet their own needs. Imposed vulnerability is reduced within integrative projects, as more enabling mechanisms are available to the refugees and displaced persons and thus they have more ability to maintain their productive social status. Maintenance of this status is ultimately beneficial to the hosts as well as the incomers.

The final chapter of this thesis will review the central issues of vulnerability and capacity, and integration raised within this thesis and thus propose a series of recommendations for improving shelter provision in war.

CHAPTER EIGHT : CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

8.1 INTRODUCTION

At the beginning of this thesis it was stated that there were three primary reasons for conducting this study.

- Current praxis for organised shelter is both debilitating and detrimental to the long term recovery and development of the refugees and displaced persons it accommodates.

- Fifty years after World War Two, the humanitarian community is no longer solely operational in developing nations with tropical or semi-tropical climates, but has found itself acting once again in developed nations with cold climates.

- There is a paucity of research on shelter for refugees from, and persons displaced by war. The resulting lack of understanding of the extreme environment of war creates complexity for the humanitarian community acting within it.

The analysis of the literature and the findings from the study in Croatia indicated that if current shelter provision in developed nations in situations of war is to be improved, then there are two central areas that need to be addressed:

- Vulnerability and capacity
- Integration

The discourses presented within this thesis, have shown that repressive and authoritarian shelter policies undermine the innate capacities of refugees and displaced persons and enforce an imposed vulnerability which is detrimental in the short term and in the long term, adversely affects post-war reconstruction (Harrell-Bond, 1986; Kibreab, 1993; Black, 1994; Zetter, 1987, Ellis & Barakat, 1996, 1996a). The findings further illustrated that it is the sum of refugees' and displaced persons' physical and non-physical capacities that enables them to cope. This requires an organised interaction with existing social, economic and physical

resources. Thus, integrative policies are essential if refugees and displaced persons are to retain their status as productive social beings during the years in exile. The data also showed that in an environment where all have been affected by war, the apportionment of scarce resources to incomers and hosts must be handled sensitively to avoid increasing the levels of conflict that exist between refugees, displaced persons and hosts.

This final chapter will bring together all the crucial components of these discourses as presented in the preceding chapters. By extracting common threads from them and highlighting important issues, a set of working recommendations will be developed for use by implementing agencies when providing shelter to refugees and displaced persons in a developed nation torn apart by war. The recommendations will be presented as a checklist of questions that can be utilised by those working in the field to aid the improved provision of shelter.

8.1.1 **Structure of the Chapter**

The chapter is divided into seven sections. Following the introduction, the next three sections reiterate the essence of points from the two central discourses of the previous chapters and highlight general areas that need to be addressed in order to improve current praxis. The fifth section forms these points into a working set of recommendations. These recommendations are presented in the form of a checklist of questions for use by implementing agencies. In this way, it is hoped to facilitate the provision of shelter which supports the innate coping mechanisms of refugees and displaced persons and endeavours to integrate incoming and host populations.

The recommendations are not provided as definitive and absolute, but are offered as a starting point and an invitation to establish a functional, working structure which can be extended and improved as the current paucity of knowledge on this subject decreases. To complement this, section six of this chapter outlines further issues identified within the work conducted in this study and section seven makes proposals for future research that will build upon the findings of this thesis.

8.2 ESSENTIAL COMPONENTS OF THE VULNERABILITY AND CAPACITY DISCOURSE

8.2.1 **Decision Making**

Chapter Two reviewed Harrell-Bond's (1986) work which states that dependency is increased by relief regimes that usurp the decision making capacity of refugees.

In further exploring this concept, Chapter Six adduced findings from the field to illustrate the debilitating effects of shelter programmes that remove personal control from refugees and displaced persons. It was shown that programmes that do not support innate coping mechanisms of refugees and displaced persons have serious negative effects on longer term rehabilitation and reconstruction. This finding both reinforces the literature which argues that repressive and authoritarian relief policies undermine long term development (Anderson and Woodrow, 1989; Anderson, 1993; Cuny, 1983), and expands the discourse to include the negative effects that such policies have on post-war reconstruction (Ellis and Barakat, 1996a; 1996b).

Chapter Six showed the positive benefits of programmes that allow inhabitants to control their everyday lives through depicting the settlements of Čepin, Rokovci and Kutina. These projects have promoted the retention of control by the refugees and displaced persons through allowing them control of personal space and the performance of familiar tasks.

8.2.1.1 Personal Space

The detrimental effects of long term accommodation in camps and settlements that afford no privacy to the inhabitants were seen in Chapter Six through the description of conditions in the Građevinski Školski Centar, Prihvatni 1 and Gašinci. It was shown that accommodation that promotes the lack of control over personal space, is a constant reminder not only of how much the refugees and displaced persons have lost, but also how little they have left. Where it may be acceptable for families to share cramped accommodation for a month or so in the initial emergency phase, it is not acceptable to expect people to live without the dignity of privacy for years. Therefore:

> **Camps and settlements should be planned and constructed to give the maximum privacy and dignity possible to each resident family or individual.**

8.2.1.2 Personal Performance of Familiar Tasks

The detrimental effects of removing personal control over daily familiar routines and activities were shown in Chapter Six through discussion of actions such as the choice and preparation of food. The findings show that removal of control over the performance of familiar tasks by authoritarian relief regimes, undermines the capacities of refugees and displaced persons and daily reinforces their subordinate

status as beneficiaries and burdens. Accommodation that does not allow for the personal performance of familiar tasks strips away identities and traditionally understood roles. The managers and implementers of shelter projects should endeavour to avoid policies that remove personal control from residents. The centralised provision of services and facilities should be avoided wherever possible as it has severely debilitating effects on refugees and displaced persons. Therefore:

> **Agencies should avoid policies that, by advocating centralised management, remove control over familiar activities from individuals. Policies that promote autonomy and independence of the inhabitants should be encouraged.**

8.2.2 Organisational Capacity

Chapter Six also presented data which reinforced the need for refugees and displaced persons to retain organisational capacity (Harrell-Bond, 1986). The camp at Kutina was presented as an example of a shelter programme that promotes "...inhabitant participation in decision making" as a positive thing (Kristensen, 1994). The residents' committee was seen to be an invaluable forum for the representation of the real needs of the refugees and displaced persons. Its existence promoted the maintenance of the inhabitants' status as productive social beings. Such empowering or participatory projects, that utilise the existing human resources within the refugee and displaced persons population, are more sustainable in the long term and promote the retention of personal productive capacity for post-war reconstruction. Thus:

> **Agencies should implement projects that support the organisational capacity of refugees and displaced persons and allow for their participation in decision making, in order to maintain their status as productive social beings and thereby facilitate post-war rehabilitation and reconstruction**

8.2.3 Allocation of Cultivable Land

At a greater level than allocating control over personal space, performance of familiar tasks and organisational capacity, is giving refugees and displaced persons control over their physical environment. In Chapter Six the benefits of camps that give inhabitants access to cultivable land around the area of the shelter were discussed using the positive examples of the camps at Kutina and Rokovci and the negative example of Gašinci. The findings showed that allocation of cultivable land allows for inhabitants to provide for their own needs where the institutionalised

system fails to; provides opportunities for informal income generating activities and offers meaningful, productive activity that aids recovery from stress and trauma. The findings suggest that new camps and settlements should be planned to allow for refugees and displaced persons to engage in cultivation activities. Thus:

> **Camps and settlements should be laid out to accommodate the establishment of agricultural plots and gardens**

8.2.4 **Control over the Built Environment**

The process of incremental adaptation of the built environment allows residents in camps and settlements the highest level of control over their lives. Building on Rapoport's statement (1969) that perceived stress is greater when perceived control is lacking, Chapter Six proposed that giving refugees and displaced persons the chance to adapt their houses could be the ultimate healing process. The findings illustrated that the loss of the home was most keenly felt by those inhabitants of environments which were not selected but imposed, did not fulfil needs and were impossible to adapt or modify.

> **Camps and settlements should be planned to allow for the incremental growth and adaptation of the shelter units by the inhabitants**

8.2.5 **Tenure**

Chapter Six discussed the issue of tenure in relation to the development literature which states that the consolidation and extension of settlements and camps will not take place without the inhabitants possessing tenure of the land (Abrams, 1964; Turner, 1976; Zetter & Baker, 1995). The literature suggests that if there is no ownership of land, residents will not invest their own time and money in improving and extending the house. The findings of the study show that tenure is not a necessary requirement for consolidation to occur in the refugee camps and settlements of Croatia. The cases of the camps at Čepin, Rokovci, Kutina, and to a more limited extent, Gaza at Karlovac, were adduced to show that consolidation will take place if there is perceived tenure.

This was shown to be beneficial, for in war, it is unlikely that any host government could be persuaded to allocate tenure of land to incoming refugees — especially when the host country is ostensibly still at war with the country of origin of the refugees. However, if there is **perceived tenure**, through investment from the

management or agency or local government in the settlement or camp, then this will be sufficient to encourage investment from the residents. In Čepin, this took the form of commensal relations over supply of materials. Investment in materials by the management of the camps gave a feeling of security and created an atmosphere within which residents were prepared to invest their own time, labour and money in improving and extending the house. Thus:

> **Granting a perceived tenure through the visible investment of goods or labour is important in facilitating the residents' adaptation of housing**

8.2.6 Assessing Capacities and Vulnerabilities Before Acting

Following the discussion of the need for relief to support, and not supplant, the capacities of refugees and displaced persons, it would seem to be an obvious statement that relief should only be supplied to fulfil the real needs on the ground. Yet, as has been shown within the bulk of this thesis, aid seldom addresses real needs. All too often the aid that is received by the population in need is determined by the donor countries political objectives and agendas and the list of items they hold in-country of which they wish to dispose (Keen, 1994; Weiss & Minear, 1993; Walker, 1995). Political convenience and the availability of unwanted goods should not be the basis for aid provision.

In order for relief provision to be appropriate to requirements, there is a demand for systematic and structured capacities and vulnerabilities assessment, conducted within thorough understanding of the situation on the ground. Agencies need to familiarise themselves with what the refugees and displaced persons are capable of doing for themselves in the presence of enabling interventions (Kibreab, 1993).

Relief projects that are driven purely by donors' agendas and not based on the abilities of the potential recipients, are inappropriate. These projects will inevitably promote refugees and displaced persons as burdens to be cared for rather than capable beings, as such projects begin with the assumption that refugees and displaced persons only have vulnerabilities rather than capacities. The findings presented in Chapter Six show that projects that are designed without consideration of the capacities of the recipients, undermine those capacities and impose higher levels of vulnerability upon them.

This adversely affects their abilities to return home and reconstruct in the post-war period. Thus:

> **Projects should only be implemented following a thorough assessment of the capacities and capabilities of the refugees and displaced persons to provide for their own needs within a network of supporting and enabling interventions**

8.2.7 Accountability and Transparency

If projects are to be developed to support the assessed capacities of the refugees and displaced persons, then agencies need to become accountable to the recipients of aid as well as to the donors. Chapter Three discussed the issue of accountability and showed that, at present, agencies are primarily accountable to the donors rather than the recipients of aid. This attitude results in projects that are determined on a numbers-assisted-for-the-lowest-cost basis. The results of projects which are implemented to comply with an obsession with cost/benefit analysis were discussed in Chapter Six. It was shown that, the sole emphasis on cost/benefit ratios results in projects that have high densities, lack privacy, negate personal control and deny the maintenance of recognised and familiar activities by refugees and displaced persons. It was stated that, although the need for counting and costing is understood, it should not happen to the detriment of the humanitarian perspective. The giver should retain responsibility for the suitability of the gift for the recipient; if the gift of aid is inappropriate to the needs of the user then it should not be given. Implementing agencies need to constantly remind themselves that they are supplying **humanitarian** aid and thus must ensure that it does nothing to increase or prolong the suffering of those it assumes to assist (Anderson, 1993). Without such accountability to the recipients of aid, relief provision will remain inappropriate and detrimental to the long term recovery of refugees and displaced persons. Therefore:

> **Aid agencies must become accountable to the recipients of relief, as well as to the donors of funds in order to provide aid that is appropriate and supports the capacities of refugees and displaced persons**

8.2.8 Cultural Sensitivity

Where possible, agencies should tie into and support existing local organisations and agencies that are functional in the host country. Through working in partnership with such groups who are aware of the situation on the ground,

projects increase their replicability and are more likely to be culturally sensitive and supportive of innate capacities. The example of the CRC adduced in Chapter Six, shows that such partnerships must not be run on the basis of blind trust alone. The local organisation may not have the knowledge or experience that will ensure that the project will support recipients in a culturally sensitive manner. It was also stated that it should be borne in mind that national organisations are just as capable of opting for projects designed primarily to satisfy cost/benefit ratios rather than humanitarian concerns. Informed and cognisant partnerships between host country organisations and international organisations can however, result in projects that are more accurately targeted and culturally sensitive. Therefore:

> **International organisations and agencies should endeavour to partner and support existing national organisations to create projects that are culturally sensitive and support innate capacities**

8.2.9 **Host Government Strategies for Reconstruction and Development**

Implementing agencies must pay attention to the needs of the host government, as well as the refugees and displaced persons, if projects are to be accepted and sustained following the departure of the agency. There is a need therefore, for agencies to be aware of the relief policies of the host government where they exist. Projects that are designed by those who are unaware of the requirements of existing governmental policy on the provision of relief aid and assistance may antagonise the government and thus be unsustainable. A further possibility, as evidenced by the findings presented in Chapter Seven, is that existing governmental policy may be discriminatory or biased and will thus need to be addressed by the agency or donor. As has been illustrated by the Croatian example, compliance with such policies may serve to perpetuate the level of conflict and tension. Such was the experience of the GTZ, where their three camps have served to condone the governmental policy of segregation and discrimination against refugees. Thus:

> **Projects need to be designed in the full knowledge of the host government's policies on relief provision and should either support or address the parameters defined therein**

Chapter Three reviewed the literature which promotes the necessity of making relief projects developmental and therefore supportive of longer term requirements (Duffield, 1994a; Barakat, *et al.*, 1995; Barakat & Hoffman, 1995) To achieve

this, agencies should be aware of the host government's reconstruction and development policies and endeavour to build relief projects that support them.

> **For relief projects that positively affect reconstruction and development, agencies should be aware of existing governmental plans and endeavour to support them where feasible**

8.2.10 **Integrated Action**

The current climate of competition, as discussed in Chapter Three, leads to many agencies acting solely within their own field of concerns without acting in support of others working in the field. A higher level of co-ordination needs to be in place in order to improve current practice; implementing agencies need to operate within a structure of integrated action. When the programmes of the many agencies in the field are not integrated with each other, the chances of mistakes being duplicated and projects undermining each other increase. The formal and informal exchange of experiences that can take place under a policy of integrated action can prevent the proliferation of programmes that impose greater vulnerability on the recipients. For example, the CRC projects in Šašna Greda and Pisarovina, reviewed in Chapter Six, may have been improved if agencies in Croatia operated a policy whereby they shared the knowledge learnt from both their successes and failures. Thus:

> **Agencies acting in the field should endeavour to share and disseminate their experiences to other agencies in the field in order to improve the quality of provision**

Chapter Three outlined the way in which the high level of competition that exists within the NGO community results in agencies that are accountable primarily to donors rather than recipients. It was stated that such competition does not foster the co-ordination and mutual support that are essential if projects are to benefit the recipients rather than adversely effect them. The implication is that there needs to be some degree of regulation over the activities of agencies within the arena of action. Numbers of agencies allowed to act in a country should be controlled, and their actions form part of an integrated operation that is constantly monitored in order to provide aid that is truly aimed at being of benefit to the recipients rather than the agency or the donor. There is a need to establish a structured body that can govern and integrate the actions of the humanitarian community on a multi-agency level. This body would co-ordinate the activities of the humanitarian

community acting in every situation, establishing patterns of action prior to any agency initiating relief operations in the target country.

> **A central governing body should control the number of agencies permitted to act within a country; co-ordinate their actions to provide integrated, mutually supportive assistance and monitor performance to ensure that programmes and projects are accurately targeted and support innate capacities that exist in country**

Such a methodology of action also requires agencies to be flexible, not only to recognise when their services are of need and when they are not, but also act to fill gaps that exist in provision either in location or project terms. Agencies should endeavour to be mutually supportive rather than competing for funds and projects to the detriment of the recipients.

In a conflict situation it is also essential that agencies retain a high degree of vigilance and flexibility in order to respond to swiftly changing circumstances caused by altered allegiances, shifting battle lines and the passage of war. Thus:

> **Agencies acting in the field must retain a high degree of flexibility in order to fulfil the real needs of the refugees and displaced persons and address the context of war**

8.3 ESSENTIAL COMPONENTS OF THE INTEGRATION DISCOURSE

8.3.1 **Physical Integration**

Chapter Seven expanded the discourse on integration, initiated in Chapter Three, through the presentation of the findings of the study in Croatia. The results of the study showed that the physical integration of camps, collectives and private accommodations can facilitate the social and economic integration of incomers with hosts.

It was shown that private accommodation, in which incomers are not 'labelled' and isolated in a specifically designated, defined environment, but instead integrated with a high degree of 'invisibility' into existing settlements, facilitates the integration of incomers with hosts. Where incomers are physically segregated, as are the refugees in Gašinci, they are labelled by the wider community as 'different', which enforces existing underlying ethnic rifts. It was thus shown, that physical segregation encourages social segregation which denies refugees access to

enabling mechanisms that would facilitate the maintenance of their autonomy. It is recommended therefore, that:

> **Agencies should encourage the accommodation of refugees and displaced persons within the fabric of existing settlements wherever possible.**

Where shelter with hosts in existing settlements is not possible and the construction of new camps and settlements unavoidable, then agencies should ensure that they are constructed in an area where they can interact with the existing community. The example of Čepin camp, cited in Chapter Seven, shows that by laying out and planning camps and settlements in such a way as to encourage the passage of pedestrian and vehicular traffic from the host community, the physical interaction of hosts and incomers is facilitated. It was shown that such interaction opens opportunities for mutually beneficial economic and social activity. Thus:

> **Where the construction of settlements and camps is inevitable and unavoidable, they should be established within the boundaries of, or on the periphery of, existing towns, villages or communities. The physical interaction of routes for vehicular and pedestrian traffic should be encouraged.**

8.3.2 **Discrimination and Bias**

Agencies acting in war must endeavour to be impartial and non-partisan. It was shown in the development of the integration discourse in Chapter Three, that in a conflict situation, preferential treatment of one side over another will only serve to inflame the level of tension that exists between opposing factions (Adams & Bradbury, 1994; Barakat, *et al.*, 1994). In the Croatian example, where the war has became one of intense ethnic division, actions which are seen to favour one faction over another merely add to existing rifts and perpetuate conflict. As was stated in the review of the literature, an action that incites further violence and increases the level of the war can no longer be said to be humanitarian (Anderson, 1993).

Thus the agencies mentioned in Chapter Seven, (Marhamet and Caritas) who primarily target aid at either Muslim or Catholic groups, do nothing to address the root causes of the crisis and thus do not prevent the crisis from recurring. Thus:

Agencies must be non-partisan when providing relief in a war situation or else risk inflaming and spreading the level of conflict

The data shows that further tension can be created by agencies that provide only for the incomers to the exclusion of the hosts. The camp at Mićevac, described in Chapter Seven, was seen by the Manager to be the "best camp" in Croatia, precisely because it had so many amenities that the surrounding villages did not. Refugees and displaced persons should be given access to facilities and services, however, this should not be done to the exclusion of the hosts, for to do so alienates the hosts against the incomers and can lead to segregation and marginalisation. The example of Kutina camp was used to show that those camps which upgrade the existing host facilities to cater for the incomers, as well as providing an improved service for the hosts, facilitate the co-existence of the groups without creating further tension. In such cases, all benefit from the actions of the agency and the incomers are more likely to be welcomed into the community. Integration into existing social structures creates more opportunities for refugees and displaced persons to engage their own innate coping mechanisms and the level of vulnerability imposed upon them is reduced. Thus:

Agencies should ensure that their aid provision is of benefit to the host community as well as to the incoming refugees and displaced persons

If relief aid is to target the needs of the hosts as well as the incomers, implementing agencies must assess the capacities and vulnerabilities of the host community as well as the incoming community. Therefore:

Agencies must assess the capacities and vulnerabilities of the host community as well as those of the refugees and displaced persons prior to designing and implementing a project.

8.3.3 Advocacy to Host Government

Working with and empowering national and local groups, the host community and the refugees and the displaced persons themselves, implies that the humanitarian community should also work to support and strengthen the existing government, so that policies and provision can be supported at the highest level and therefore be more sustainable. In war however, such policies of supporting government may present problems as it could imply that agencies then support practices which they find morally wrong. The findings in Croatia show that there is little evidence that

the government requires operational support or empowerment from incoming aid agencies or donors. The uprooting of refugees from hotels in Istria through denial of basic services; the determination with which they are pulling and pushing displaced persons back home in the Dubrovnik hinterland and the discriminatory policies adopted for refugees, all suggest that this is a government that does not require any external support or nurturing.

In the case of Croatia, the strength and mind set of the government requires restraint not support: it requires advocacy on the advantages and disadvantages of policies and practice. However, advocacy in a war environment can be a fatal operation for aid agencies, as unfavourable criticism may result in the expulsion of the agency from the country and then potential to provide further humanitarian assistance is lost (Weiss & Minear, 1993). Yet agencies which do not attempt to change discriminatory or debilitating government policies, are effectively condoning behaviour that will adversely affect the recipient group. Agencies which decide not to challenge what they see to be detrimental or debilitating policies, then have to address whether or not they are still fulfilling their primary humanitarian function (Anderson, 1993). Chapter Seven outlined the differing attitudes of the DRC and the GTZ when their projects were implemented — the DRC fought against the government's wishes to allocate places only to displaced persons and the GTZ chose to leave the allocation of places to the Croatian government, thus effectively condoning policies of discrimination. Ultimately, it is projects such as the DRC's that may contribute to building peace and healing ethnic rifts at the micro level; those of the GTZ merely serve to enforce the divisions that the war initiated. It would seem therefore that, difficult though it may be :

Agencies should endeavour to advocate change of discriminatory or biased governmental policies

8.3.4 **Social and Economic Integration**

Chapter Seven highlighted the way in which the units for the GTZ camps were manufactured in Turkey and thus provided employment and economic opportunities for Turkish nationals. It was stated that the use of a Croatian manufacturer would have been beneficial to the Croatian employment profile. It was seen that utilising the human resource base in country is particularly beneficial in war time as, firstly, it provides a visible benefit to the host community thus

reducing potential conflict between incomers and hosts and secondly, it invests money back into a war damaged economy, thus helping to revitalise and support it.

In war, where there is a depleted population due to service in the army, migration, injury or fatalities, it may not always be possible to invest in, utilise or employ members of the host community. However where possible, agencies should endeavour to do so. Thus:

> **Agencies should utilise the human skills and resources available locally and in-country when implementing projects in order to invest in the war damaged economy and reduce potential conflict between hosts and incomers**

Seeking to purchase materials in-country or locally also aids the process of investment in the host country and assists in supporting the economy. Once again , in war, it will not always be easy to attain materials due to war damage of factories or plants. However, agencies should investigate the possibilities for in country supply during needs assessment. Thus:

> **Agencies should utilise locally available materials and products where possible and identify potential suppliers and sources as part of the initial capacity and needs survey**

8.4 COMPONENTS OF RELEVANCE TO THE OVERALL IMPROVEMENT OF PERFORMANCE

8.4.1 **Monitoring Projects as they Develop**

Chapter Six cited the testimonies of refugees and displaced persons that showed the lack of monitoring and evaluation activities in Croatia. Yet, the condition of permanent emergency that endures in war should require not only that projects are evaluated at their completion, but also that continual monitoring takes place during their implementation. Monitoring should be conducted to establish the impact, relevance and sustainability, as well as efficiency and effectiveness of any project. In this way debilitating or detrimental projects can be identified and adjusted before long term damage is caused.

The lessons of both monitoring and evaluation should be publicised and disseminated to all those who are providing shelter in the field, for only in this way will the detrimental effects of certain shelter policies be understood and recognised. Such an activity would support the policy of integrated action

proposed under section 8.2.10. Had monitoring policies been in operation in Croatia, they may have prevented the construction of the CRC camps at Šašna Greda and Pisarovina, which have merely duplicated elements of bad practice from existing settlements. Therefore:

> **Projects should be monitored in terms of impact, relevance, sustainability and efficiency and effectiveness throughout their implementation. The lessons from such monitoring processes should be disseminated to other agencies conducting shelter projects in the field**

8.4.2 Evaluation of Projects on Completion

In order to improve emergency provision so that it addresses the longer term reconstruction and development needs of refugees and host communities, it is necessary to **evaluate** past and current projects using appropriate criteria. This was discussed in the methodology section in Chapter Four.

It is unfortunate that most agencies undertaking evaluation projects on behalf of donors, consider only the outcomes, or the finished product. This leads to projects being evaluated purely in terms of their **efficiency** and **effectiveness**.

If relief projects are to address long term reconstruction and development issues, then they need to be evaluated in terms of more than just efficiency and effectiveness. Thus:

> **Projects should be evaluated in terms of their impact on the target group, their relevance to the target group and their ultimate sustainability by the target group as well as their efficiency and effectiveness**

If the impact of shelter projects in Croatia had been examined, as it has been in this thesis, the positive and negative effects of the projects would have been visible. The negative economic, political, social and cultural effects of the projects both on the refugees and displaced persons and on the hosts at the local, regional and national levels could have been understood.

If the relevance of the projects had been investigated, as it has been in this thesis, it would have been possible to determine whether or not the projects were in line with the real needs of the refugees, displaced persons and the hosts. Refugees and

displaced persons are well placed to provide information as to the success or failure of a project to support their capacities and meet their real needs. Their opinion should be solicited as a matter of course. Thus:

> **Projects should be evaluated and monitored from the perspective of the users as well as the providers of aid**

An evaluation of the impact and relevance of shelter projects would have highlighted those that were not supporting the capacities of the refugees and displaced persons and those that were imposing greater vulnerabilities on the inhabitant communities. These issues could then have been addressed and the position rectified.

An evaluation of the sustainability of projects is the highest test of whether or not projects are successful, for if the target group lack the means or motivation to maintain the project after the implementing agency pulls out, then the project has ultimately failed. For instance, a look at the camp of Gašinci, which is segregated from the host society; almost completely denies activities such as cultivation or the adaptation of housing through its layout and restricts the personal performance of familiar tasks through a centralised control system; shows a camp that would not be sustainable by the inhabitants should any one aspect of current support be withdrawn.

For example, should the expenditure available for food be curtailed tomorrow due to reduced levels of funding from international donors, it would be impossible for the majority of the residents of Gašinci to make up the shortfall for themselves. There are no other enabling mechanisms that would make it possible for them to survive without help from another source. Therefore, the provision made for refugees at Gašinci is not sustainable in the long term, it endures solely through the external support and funding of the government and agencies, not through the efforts and abilities of the inhabitants.

8.4.3 **Funding**

To implement projects that are supportive of the existing capacities of refugees and displaced persons, implementing agencies need to be funded in a flexible manner and not be limited by pre-conceived assumptions of needs. This implies the need for platform funding, a system of funding that realises the mistake of intervening in a relief situation with predetermined objectives. Funds can be more

appropriately spent if implementing agencies go into the field with a broad aim, that can then be broken down into smaller, more accurately targeted tasks in line with the support that is truly required by the recipients. Thus, donors would have to come to terms with the idea of funding relief strategies with broad aims rather than narrow and specific ones, which can then be broken down into a series of smaller projects on site commensurate with real established needs.

To take the example, cited in Chapter Seven, of the German government who gave GTZ the pre-conceived aim of building three new camps to house 8,000 refugees and displaced persons, thus totally confining the potential projects to the construction of three camps. The money could have been more effectively spent on projects that truly supported the capacities of refugees and displaced persons had the government specified the aim, broadly, as the relief of suffering of communities. GTZ would then have been in a position where they could move into Croatia and establish real needs over time. Specific, accurately targeted objectives could then have been set within the overall aim in the field. For example, objectives to financially support host families or assist in the repair of houses, would have been more supportive of the existing, innate capacities of the refugees, displaced persons and the hosts. Thus:

> **Donors should adopt methods of funding relief activities that are more responsive to the situation on the ground and allow for projects to be accurately targeted by those familiar with the real needs of the recipients**

8.4.4 Education and Training

Dissemination of information and lessons learnt is important not only for those implementing the projects and policies, but also to the wider world. Primarily, lessons learnt from the implementation of projects; examples of good and bad practice and the debilitating effects of bad practice must be fed back into the donor community, as well as disseminated amongst international and local staff of implementing agencies. The essential importance of projects that are targeted to support the capacities of the recipients must be shown to those who are promoting the funding of inappropriate programmes and to those who implement them on the ground.

The author is well aware that philanthropic motives are at the bottom of the list of reasons for donors to give aid, however, through continuous demonstration of the

severe negative effects of inappropriate aid it may be possible to improve current praxis.

> **Dissemination of the results of independent monitoring and evaluation of projects and policies, back into the humanitarian community is essential to improve policy and praxis.**

8.4.5 **Media**

Chapter Two discussed the power of the international media to inform policy and practice of relief aid through the release of information to the public. In the light of this ability, there is also a case for attempting to utilise the press in an informed and valuable way to improve praxis. The way in which reports are given about the suffering and requirements of the survivors of war and crisis are crucial in the determination of public response and pressure on governments to act. Thus:

> **The media should be encouraged and educated about the benefits of depicting refugees and displaced persons as survivors and capable beings rather than helpless victims unable to perform even the most basic of tasks.**

In war, the manner in which the press reports crises can not only determine what help is given, how much and when, but can also determine who receives aid and who does not. Unbalanced reporting causes bias and prejudice and can result in the uneven distribution of aid and consequent extension of conflict and crisis. Agencies need to utilise the press to improve the aid that is given, thus:

> **Agencies should encourage the equitable reporting of crises where possible through giving the media accurate information of real needs and difficulties**

It would also seem possible that if donors act and provide aid that is highly visible, as they wish for an advert to show that they are in fact fulfilling their obligation to assist, then the opposite should also apply, and the adverse publicity of media reports that show the detrimental effects of the aid that has been supplied may also encourage donors to improve their provision.

> **Agencies should endeavour to utilise the media to improve current praxis**

8.5 WORKING RECOMMENDATIONS

From the above conclusions of the research conducted in the Republic of Croatia, it is possible to derive a set of working recommendations that can be used to direct the provision of improved shelter in war situations in developed nations by the humanitarian community. The following recommendations are presented as a working set of issues and questions to be used by implementing agencies in the field to set up improved shelter programmes and measure their performance. It is not offered as a final definitive document, but as a 'stepping stone' in the move towards improved shelter provision for refugees and displaced persons in war-torn developed nations.

Some of the following recommendations may seem naïve in the current international political climate, however, they have been written in the full knowledge that the provision of relief in war is a highly political issue. It is political not only from the point of view of those operating in-country who have to deal with the political machinations of the warring factions, but also in terms of what donors are prepared to give and offer to the country at war. The restrictions that international political concerns put upon the amount and type of aid that is given are understood. However, the author believes that it is not enough to merely accept that such pressures exist and not endeavour to change them. Pressure to change current policies through understanding of the adverse effects of inappropriate provision is essential. This would suggest that not only should lessons learnt from past provision be fed back into agencies and NGOs, but also that there is a requirement for dissemination of information among the donors. The belief that this will change politically and economically based policy decisions may seem to be jejune, but in the light of the long term damage that misdirected and inappropriate projects can do to a population already devastated by war, it is essential that pressure is applied to change current motivations for donating aid.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING THE SHELTER PROVISION FOR REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS IN WAR TORN DEVELOPED NATIONS:

a working checklist for implementing agencies

1.0 VULNERABILITY AND CAPACITY

1A. Personal Space

Camps and settlements should be planned and constructed to give the maximum privacy and dignity possible to each resident family or individual

i. As the best option, is it possible to provide individual / family unit shelter?

ii. If this is not possible, can accommodation be provided that gives combined family shelter?

iii. For those in combined family shelter, what provision can be made for securing privacy through partitioning, screening, etc.?

1B. Personal Performance of Familiar Tasks

Agencies should avoid policies that, by advocating centralised management, remove control over familiar activities from individuals. Policies that promote autonomy and independence of the inhabitants should be encouraged.

i. What are the potentials for providing individual families with personal cooking and washing facilities?

ii. Have policies and programmes been established to respond to the established capacities of the target group?

1C. Organisational Capacity

Agencies should implement projects that promote the organisational capacity of refugees and displaced persons and allow for their participation in decision making, to maintain their status as productive social beings and thereby facilitate post-war rehabilitation and reconstruction

i. Have the recipients been consulted about the planning and implementation of the project?

ii. Are there structures in place that facilitate the involvement of the recipients in the decision making processes and establish them as competent and capable beings?
iii. Do the recipients have adequate representation and legitimacy within the project?

1D. Allocation of Cultivable Land

Camps and settlements should be laid out to accommodate the establishment of agricultural plots and gardens

i. Is there potential to allocate each family a plot of cultivable land immediately surrounding the housing unit?
ii. Is there potential to allocate allotments within easy access of the camp / settlement?
iii. What are the possibilities for renting and leasing land from local landholders for use by incoming groups?
iv. Can reciprocal arrangements be made between incomers and landholders, for example, to lease land in exchange for a portion of the crop?

1E. Control over the Built Environment

Camps and settlements should be planned to allow for the incremental growth and adaptation of the shelter units by the inhabitants

i. How can the design and construction of the core unit facilitate its extension and adaptation by the inhabitants?
ii. Is it possible to provide inhabitants with some materials to assist in the extension process?

1F. Tenure

Granting a perceived tenure through the visible investment of goods or labour is important in facilitating the resident's adaptation of housing

i. Can materials provision be undertaken on a reciprocal basis, i.e., the roofing materials are supplied by management on completion of walls by the inhabitants?

1G. Assessing Capacities and Vulnerabilities Before Acting

Projects should only be implemented following a thorough assessment of the capacities and capabilities of the refugees and displaced persons to provide for their own needs within a network of supporting and enabling interventions

i. What is the root cause of the crisis?
ii. What is the extent of the requirement for humanitarian action?
iii. What do the affected communities identify as their primary requirements?
iv. Who are the major players in the field? How many warring factions are there and will they facilitate or obstruct external assistance?
v. What skills and resources do individuals, families, communities possess that can be utilised in the projects?
vi. How are the recipients organised - are there existing social structures that can be utilised and supported?
vii. What are the best techniques for eliciting information? How can the community participate in the information gathering process?

1H. Accountability and Transparency

Aid agencies must become accountable to the recipients of relief as well as to the donors of funds in order to provide aid that is appropriate and supports the capacities of refugees and displaced persons

i. Are the agendas and motives for action of the implementing agency in the field completely transparent to the recipients and the host government?
ii. Will the plans and policies of the implementing agency be made available for scrutiny by the hosts and recipients?
iii. Will the comments of the recipients and hosts be taken into account and acted upon by the implementing agency?
iv. Is there potential to install an independent monitor to ensure that all agencies acting in the field are endeavouring to address the needs of the recipients rather than overwhelm them?

1I. Cultural Sensitivity

International organisations and agencies should endeavour to partner and support existing national organisations to create projects that are culturally sensitive and support innate capacities

i. Which indigenous national agencies are acting in the field?

ii. What are their agendas and motivations for action?
iii. How experienced are they in the type of provision provided, is there potential to learn from their experience and operational expertise?
iv. What is the potential to upgrade and extend their experience?

1J. Host Government Strategies for Reconstruction and Development

Projects need to be designed in the full knowledge of the host government's policies on relief provision and should either support or address the parameters defined therein

i. Does the host government possess policies that govern relief provision?
ii. If so, what do they include?
iii. Does the proposed project comply with the basis of the policies?

For relief projects that positively affect reconstruction and development, agencies should be aware of existing governmental plans and endeavour to support them where feasible

i. Does the host government possess development / reconstruction strategies?
ii. Are the strategies up-to-date and viable?
iii. If so, does the proposed project support these strategies?
iv. If not, is it possible to advise on alternative more appropriate strategies?
v. Are the plans applicable in the proposed area of work or does the local municipality possess differing master plans?

1K. Integrated Action

Agencies acting in the field should endeavour to share and disseminate their experiences to other agencies in the field in order to improve the quality of provision

i. Are there structures in place that support the dissemination of experiences and findings amongst those working in the field?
ii. What are the formal and informal opportunities that could facilitate the transfer of experience amongst field operatives?

A central governing body should control the number of agencies permitted to act within a country; co-ordinate their actions to provide integrated, mutually supportive assistance and monitor performance to ensure that programmes and projects are accurately targeted and support innate capacities that exist in country

i. Is there a central co-ordinating body governing the provision of humanitarian assistance in the field?
ii. Has a programme of integrated action been established among agencies operational within the field?

Agencies acting in the field must retain a high degree of flexibility in order to fulfil the real needs of the refugees and displaced persons and address the context of war

i. Are the aims of the programmes broad enough to allow for projects to respond to the situation on the ground?
ii. Is there a structure in place to constantly monitor the changing conditions in the field?
iii. Does the budget allow for flexibility in the programme plan?
iv. Is there a contingency fund for adjusting the passage of the project to fit changing needs?

2.0 INTEGRATION

2A. Physical Integration

Agencies should encourage the accommodation of refugees and displaced persons within the fabric of existing settlements wherever possible.

i. What are the possibilities for accommodating individuals and families within host families?
ii. Are there any ways in which hosting of incoming families can be encouraged through financial or material incentives?
iii. Can support for those host families be provided on a long term basis?
iv. If there is no potential for accommodation with hosts, are there available public buildings that could be used to provide shelter without adversely affecting the host community?
v. Where shelter in public buildings will adversely affect the host community, are there measures that can be taken to recompense them, i.e., through investment in other facilities or services, or repair of war damages in the building proposed for use.
vi. Can the infrastructure of the proposed public building support the accommodation of incomers?
vii. Who owns the rights to the building?

Where the construction of settlements and camps is inevitable and unavoidable, they should be established within the boundaries of, or on the periphery of, existing towns, villages or communities. The physical interaction of routes for vehicular and pedestrian traffic should be encouraged.

i. How can the physical interaction of vehicular and pedestrian traffic be encouraged?
ii. What is the urban pattern of the existing settlement?
iii. How can the camp pattern be made to emulate and integrate with it?

2B. Discrimination and Bias

Agencies must endeavour to be non-partisan when providing relief in a war situation or else risk inflaming and spreading the level of conflict

i. Is it possible to provide assistance in the region at all or would any action merely sustain the conflict?
ii. Are there restrictions on movement that mean certain groups are not accessible?
iii. If so, is it possible to negotiate to access such groups?
iv. How many different warring factions are there operational within the area of action?
v. Is it possible to ascertain the military strategies of these factions and thus see possible connections with the provision of external assistance?
vi. Who will conduct negotiations with all parties to ensure the equitable distribution of assistance?

Agencies should ensure that their aid provision is of benefit to the host community as well as to the incoming refugees and displaced persons

i. What are the requirements of the host community?
ii. What is the extent of the damage to their social, economic, physical environment?
iii. How can the needs of the hosts and the incomers be provided for in a sustainable manner, so that the positive effects of the project build towards the hosts' post-war reconstruction and future development?

Agencies must assess the capacities and vulnerabilities of the host community as well as those of the refugees and displaced persons prior to designing and implementing a project.

i. What skills and resources do the hosts possess that can be utilised to assist the incomers to the benefit of the hosts?
ii. How can the hosts benefit from co-existence with the incomers?

2C. Advocacy to Host Government

Agencies should endeavour to advocate change of discriminatory or biased governmental policies

i. Is it realistic to attempt to change the discriminatory policies of host governments where they exist, or is it predictable that they will respond negatively?
ii. If it is possible, who will be responsible for negotiating with the government to change policies?
iii. Will such negotiations be conducted on behalf of all agencies or individually?

2D. Social and Economic Integration

Agencies should utilise the human skills and resources available locally and in-country when implementing projects in order to invest in the war damaged economy and reduce potential conflict between hosts and incomers

i. What skills are available in the host community?
ii. Is there likely to be difficulty paying such employees, i.e., is the local currency stable and are the banks operational?
iii. Is there legislation controlling the employment of incomers?

Agencies should utilise locally available materials and products where possible and identify potential suppliers and sources as part of the initial capacity and needs survey

i. Is there potential to obtain materials either locally, or in-country, either immediately of following investment in the productive capacity of the country?
ii. Have potential suppliers been identified both locally, in-country and in neighbouring countries?
iii. What arrangements need to be made to purchase such supplies in the absence of stable currency or financial institutions?

3.0 OVERALL PERFORMANCE

3A. Monitoring Projects as they Develop

Projects should be monitored in terms of impact, relevance, sustainability and efficiency and effectiveness throughout their implementation. The lessons from such monitoring processes should be disseminated to other agencies conducting shelter projects in the field

i. What are the potential indicators, both qualitative and quantitative, determined from the programme objectives, that could be used to monitor the project?
ii. What mechanisms exist to adjust the project in accordance with the findings of continued monitoring exercises?
iii. What structures are in place for the dissemination of the information learned to others in the field?

3B. Evaluation of Projects on Completion

Projects should be evaluated in terms of their impact on the target group, their relevance to the target group and their ultimate sustainability by the target group as well as their efficiency and effectiveness

i. What are the potential indicators that can be used to evaluate the project?
ii. Do the indicators account for the unexpected as well as the predicted outcomes?

Projects should be evaluated and monitored from the perspective of the users as well as the providers of aid

i. Are there members of the recipient community who can conduct monitoring and evaluation exercises?
ii. Are there organisational structures in place through which recipients can represent their views to management, local government and the implementing agency?
iii. Has information concerning the success or failure of the project been gathered from a wide range of sources and not just key informants?
iv. Has information been gathered using a wide range of techniques and methods?

3C. Funding

Donors should adopt methods of funding relief activities that are more responsive to the situation on the ground and allow for projects to be accurately targeted by those familiar with the real needs of the recipients

i. Has the donor funded a project with a broad aim that can be divided into working objectives on the ground to suit the conditions of need?
ii. Is there adequate funding to allow for the adjustment of projects to suit real needs?

3D. Education and Training

Dissemination of the results of independent monitoring and evaluation of projects and policies, back into the humanitarian community is essential to improve policy and praxis.

i. Has an independent evaluator been appointed to supervise the monitoring and evaluation of projects and organise the dissemination of results?
ii. Are there informal structures in place that enable agencies in the field to share experiences and lessons learnt?

3E. Media

The media should be encouraged and informed about the benefits of depicting refugees and displaced persons as survivors and capable beings rather than helpless victims unable to perform even the most basic of tasks.

i. What structures are in place to transfer accurate data about the real needs and capacities of refugees and displaced persons to the media?

Agencies should endeavour to utilise the media to improve current praxis

i. Is there provision made to disseminate the results from successful projects through the media?
ii. Is there provision for the negative effects of inappropriate and mistargeted programmes to be publicised?

8.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS

In addition to the above set of working recommendations, the author feels that this thesis has highlighted some more general considerations that need to be addressed by the international humanitarian community if the provision of aid in war-torn environments is to improve.

8.6.1 **Professionalism**

The aid business is one of the biggest markets in the world. Its expenditure runs to millions of dollars per annum and the decisions that it makes affect millions of lives all over the world. There are now over fifty million refugees and displaced persons throughout the world all of whom are affected in one way or another by relief agencies and humanitarian practitioners. In every new crises that occurs, aspects of relief provision are mismanaged and mishandled and yet, having made mistakes, those same relief agencies are free to move on to yet another crisis without any attempt being made to ensure that they have improved their practice or learnt from their mistakes. The mistakes that agencies make are costly, not only in financial terms, but more importantly, in human terms to those recipients who are adversely affected.

The burgeoning number of wars in the world and the proliferation of new aid agencies and NGOs that are springing up to deal with the casualties of these wars, mean that now more than ever before, there is a need to regulate the international humanitarian community. The author believes that this needs to be done in two ways.

8.6.1.1 Training

Firstly, humanitarian practitioners need to acquire new skills and training. For example, it is not enough that professional architects go to Croatia to design refugee shelter schemes. Unless those architects also have a knowledge of the potential negative and positive effects of that shelter on the recipient community, then the results can still be devastating to the recipients. Humanitarian practitioners need not only expertise in their chosen field, but also a professional, post-graduate, qualification in the field of relief and reconstruction. While organisations like ICRC and Oxfam do maintain a highly professional and experienced staff base, there are many thousands of NGOs and agencies that are unprofessional and unqualified to provide appropriate assistance. They need training in political and conflict analysis and negotiation skills; they require an understanding of the concepts of

vulnerability and the ways in which relief links to recovery and long term reconstruction and development; they need to be aware of their own needs for personal survival in an environment of war and understand the processes for working with international military forces; they need to understand the nature of conflict and the necessity of maintaining a non-partisan approach; they need to master analysis techniques and develop methodologies for monitoring and evaluation procedures and they need to develop specialist knowledge of the country within which they will work. All this is needed in addition to a basic understanding of social anthropology, economics, geography and history.

Within such a qualification, the practitioner should also spend a period of apprenticeship in the field with an experienced field worker. Only after this apprenticeship is completed and the qualification attained, should they be allowed to operate autonomously in the field. Such trained and qualified professional practitioners and agencies should then be registered and utilised in future emergencies.

8.6.1.2 Quality Control

This programme of training for the humanitarian practitioner needs to be conducted in addition to the establishment of regulatory mechanisms to control the quality of all those agencies operating in the field. Programmes and policies and operational strategies need to be monitored and evaluated by independent auditors, poor practice needs to identified and the implementor informed. A record of poor practice should result in the agency being struck from the register.

Such measures may seem extreme, but the author firmly believes that unless the humanitarian community is made a professional, accountable and responsible body, then inappropriate and debilitating relief provision will continue. Humanitarian aid has to become truly humanitarian and not remain a product of political convenience.

8.6.2 **Responsible Body**

The UNHCR has encountered serious difficulties and caused considerable damage in Croatia by operating strictly within its mandated policy of assisting only refugees. While their desire to not exceed their remit to help refugees can be understood, it does suggest that there is a requirement for a change in the structure of UN departments. There is a need for a department that can assist both refugees

and displaced persons without discrimination. Cuny (1993), suggested the establishment of a United Nations High Commissioner for War Victims which would assist those affected by conflict whether they be refugees or displaced persons or hosts. The author believes that such a department is now crucial, for not only could it contain personnel who are specifically trained to deal with the provision of relief in war, but it could also provide a wider degree of protection to all those affected by the path of war .

8.7 FUTURE RESEARCH POTENTIALS

The working set of recommendations and the suggestions listed above open up a number of lines of future research and activity that need to be pursued if current praxis is truly to change for the better and to continue to improve.

8.7.1 **Training and Professionalism**

Appropriate and current training of professionals in the field can only be provided if there is new and accurate data constantly available that defines good and bad practice. This requires a cycle of research studies looking at the effects of policies and programmes in action. Not only would such studies be required for each country within which the humanitarian community is operational, but also across a range of disciplines. This study of Croatia has been conducted from the point of view of an architect, and although it has been viewed within the contexts of socio-cultural, economic and political concerns, there is a need for researchers from other disciplines to study such problems.

Currently there is a prime need for research into operations in the Transcaucasus area, for this region is rapidly becoming the central arena for action. As well as Chechnya, the tensions between the myriad of ethnic groups in the densely populated area of the Fergana valley which lies between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan is very high, and the conflict that has existed in the region since 1993 could easily explode again to create thousands of refugees. Additionally, there remains a need for research into the shelter policies and provision made in the 'developing' nations, where environmental erosion and devastation even further reduce potential for the support of innate coping mechanisms.

8.7.2 **Cultural Concerns**

There is a prime need for research into the appropriateness of aid provision to Islamic refugees and displaced persons. Over 75 per cent of refugees and displaced

persons in the World are Islamic and yet 90 per cent of the humanitarian community originates in the West (Cuny, 1993). The resulting differences in culture and outlook between agencies and recipients, create difficulties in the implementation of relief assistance. Attempts to adapt Christian based relief principles to Islamic law have so far failed. Islamic traditions and cultures need to be understood if relief programmes are to provide appropriate assistance. For instance, the tradition of *purdah* has significant effects on the way relief shelters should be provided and yet it is seldom recognised or addressed. There is a need for an increased understanding of the failures of the system to meet Islamic needs if the system is to be improved.

8.7.3 **Testing the Recommendations**

Having established this working set of recommendations based on the findings of the research in Croatia, there is now a need to expand the area of applicability and further check the recommendations' veracity in other situations. Discussion of the basic concepts contained within the recommendations at the October 1995 workshop in Luton indicated that those working in the field felt that understanding of such issues was important to improve current praxis (see appendix D). There is a need to test the code more extensively in the field and adjust and improve upon it further.

APPENDIX A

APPENDIX A: SITES VISITED DURING THE DATA COLLECTION PHASES

A.1 DATA COLLECTION PHASE ONE — AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER 1994

Location	Name	Number Interviewed
Zagreb	Novo Čiče	3
	Southern Barracks	2
	Mićevac	2
Kutina	DRC	5
Karlovac	Gaza	2
Đakovačka Satnica	Gašinci	10
Čepin	Naselje Prijateljstva	3

Fig A.1. Camps visited

Location	Name	Number Interviewed
Zagreb	Dom Umrovljenička "Trnje"	3
	Hotel International	2
Osijek	Dom Žničara	3
	Građevinski Školski Centar	1
	Hvratski Radiša	4
	Trgovački Dom	2
Dubrovnik	Grand Hotel Park	4
	Hotel Bellevue	7
	Hotel Imperial	1
	Hotel Libertas	3
	Hotel Plakir	1
Orebić	Hotel Komodor	5
	Ventilator	4
Korčula	Bon Repos	2
	Hotel Posejdon	3

Fig A.2. Collective Centres Visited

Location	Number Interviewed
Zagreb	2
Osijek	2
Karlovac	2

Fig A.3. Private Accommodations Visited

Location	Name	Number Interviewed
Zagreb	UNHCR	1
	ODPR	4
	GTZ	1
	CRC	3
Kutina	DRC	1
Đakovačka Satnica	Suncokret	1
	ODPR	1
	UNHCR	1
Osijek	UNHCR	3
	ODPR	3
Dubrovnik	UNHCR	4
	ODPR	2
	IRC	1
	Deša	1
Orebić	Marie Stopes International	3
	Marhamet	1
Korčula	Marie Stopes International	2
	IFRC	1

Fig A.4. Aid Agencies Visited

A2. DATA COLLECTION PHASE TWO - JANUARY AND FEBRUARY 1995

Location	Name	Number Interviewed
Karlovac	Gaza	2
Mićevac	Mićevac	3
Kutina	DRC	4
Čepin	Naselje Prijatelstva	3
Rokovci	Blace	2
Ivankovo	Wagon village	6
Đakovačka Satnica	Gašinci	18

Fig. A.5. Camps Visited

Location	Name	Numbers Interviewed
Zagreb	Zapruđe	2
	Hotel International	7
	Građitelskih Struka	7
Velika Gorica	Barracks	4
	Shipping Containers	4
Osijek	Građevinski Školski Centar	20
	Đepadansa Vojarna	3
Varaždin	Prihvatni Centar 1	3
	Prihvatni Centar 2	4
Španško	Industogradnje	3
	Tempo	2

Fig A.6. Collective Centres Visited

Location	Name	Numbers Interviewed
Osijek	Kovačeć	2
	Andrić	2

Fig A.7. Private Accommodations Visited

Location	Name	Numbers Interviewed
Zagreb	CRC	2
	ODPR	4
Dubrovnik	ODPR	1
Osijek	UNHCR	3
Đakovačka Satnica	UNHCR	2
Kutina	DRC	2
Varaždin	ODPR	1
Ivankovo	ODPR	1
Karlovac	ODPR	1

Fig A.8. Aid Agencies Visited

APPENDIX B

APPENDIX B: PERMISSION LETTERS

B1. PERMISSION LETTERS FOR DATA COLLECTION PHASE ONE

Studijski centar za obnovu i razvoj d.o.o.
STUDY CENTRE FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT – DUBROVNIK, CROATIA

Dubrovnik, 26. srpnja 1994.

SVIMA NA KOJE SE OVO MOŽE ODNOSITI

Predmet: ISTRAŽIVAČKI PROJEKT: SMJEŠTAJ PROGNANIKA I IZBJEGLICA U HRVATSKOJ

Štovana gospodo,

Lijepo Vas molimo za pomoć gđici SUE ELLIS za vrijeme njezinoga studijskoga putovanja u Hrvatskoj od I. kolovoza do 20. rujna 1994.g.

Gđica SUE ELLIS angažirana je u ISTRAŽIVAČKOM CENTRU SVEUČILIŠTA U LUTONU i nalazi se na studijskomu putovanju u svrhu istraživačkog rada za pripremu svoje doktorske disertacije SMJEŠTAJ IZBJEGLICA I PROGNANIKA U HRVATSKOJ. Ovaj istraživački projekt realizira se posjetom izgjegličkim naseljima i drugim smještajnim objektima, te anketiranjem prognanika i izbjeglica, kao i posjetom humanitarnim organizacijama koje pomažu prognanike i izbjeglice u Hrvatskoj. Ovo istraživanje je zajednički projekt SVEUČILIŠTA U LUTONU i našega STUDIJSKOGA CENTRA ZA OBNOVU I RAZVOJ.

Gđica ELLIS ima britansku putovnicu i britanska je državljanka.

Vrlo smo Vam zahvalni na Vašoj pomoći gđici Ellis za vrijeme trajanja njezinoga studijskoga putovanja.

S osobitim štovanjem,

Marija Kojaković, direktor

Studijski centar za obnovu i razvoj
STUDY CENTRE FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT
DUBROVNIK
CROATIA

Fig B.1. Croatian version of permission letter for data collection phase one



Studijski centar za obnovu i razvoj d.o.o.

STUDY CENTRE FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT – DUBROVNIK, CROATIA

Dubrovnik, 26 July 1994

TO ALL WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

Re: RESEARCH PROJECT: SHELTER FOR DISPLACED PERSONS AND REFUGEES IN CROATIA

Gentlemen,

We kindly ask your help to Miss SUE ELLIS during her study trip in Croatia (August 1 - September 20).

Miss SUE ELLIS is engaged in THE RESEARCH CENTRE, UNIVERSITY OF LUTON and makes study trip on purpose for preparation of her doctoral research SHELTER FOR DISPLACED PERSONS AND REFUGEES IN CROATIA. This research project will be realised by visiting refugees' settlements and making interviews with displaced persons and refugees, as also by visiting of international humanitarian organisation engaged in helping displaced persons and refugees. This research is a joint research venture of UNIVERSITY OF LUTON and our STUDY CENTRE FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT.

Miss ELLIS has a British passport, British resident.

We are grateful to your assistance and help to Miss ELLIS during her study trip in Croatia.

With best wishes,

Yours sincerely

Studijski centar za obnovu i razvoj
STUDY CENTRE FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT
DUBROVNIK
CROATIA

Marija Kojaković, Director

Fig B.2. English translation of permission letter for data collection phase one

B2. PERMISSION LETTERS FROM DATA COLLECTION PHASE TWO

VLADA REPUBLIKE HRVATSKE
URED ZA PROGNANIKE I IZBJEGLICE
Ul. Republike Austrije 14, 41000 Zagreb, Hrvatska
Tel: 041-173 699 Fax: 041-171-234

Zagreb, 25. siječnja 1995.
Klasa: 019-01/93-01/605
Ur. broj: 50407-09-95-179

n/r Susan J. Ellis

Predmet: Dozvola ulaska u prognaničko/izbjegličke centre na području RU Zagreba, RU Osijek i RU Varaždin

Djelatnici Univerziteta iz Lutina (Engleska), Sue Ellis, odobrava se provedba studijskog rada pod nazivom "Studija smještajnih objekata za prognanike i izbjeglice u RH" u prognaničko/izbjegličkim centrima koji se nalaze na navedenim područjima .

Spomenuta djelatnica, obavit će posjete prema slijedećem rasporedu, a uz prethodnu najavu upraviteljima zbjegova:

RU ZAGREB	
Hotel "International", Miramarska 24	25. siječnja 1995.
Đački dom graditeljskih struka, Av. V. Holjevca 3	26. siječnja 1995.
Hotel "Bijela ruža", Velika Gorica	27. siječnja 1995.
"Hidroelektra"-Novo Čiče, "Mićevec"	28. siječnja 1995.
"Tempo" Jug 3, Špansko	30. siječnja 1995.
"Industrogradnja" Dolina bb, Špansko	30. siječnja 1995.
RU OSIJEK (Čepin, Gašinci, Rokovci, Trgovački dom, Hrvatski radiša, GŠC)	31. siječnja - 3. veljače 1995.
RU VARAŽDIN Prihvatni centar I i II	5. i 6. veljače 1995.

Republika Hrvatska 2 — VLADA REPUBLIKE HRVATSKE — URED ZA PROGNANIKE I IZBJEGLICE ZAGREB

dr. Tanja Vucelić
Načelnica Odjela za zdravstvenu zaštitu

Prof. dr. Adalbert Rebić
Predstojnik Ureda

RU Zagreb, RU Osijek i RU Varaždin
Upravitelji zbjegova

Fig B.3. Permission letter from ODPR for visits during data collection phase two

APPENDIX C

APPENDIX C: PHYSICAL OBSERVATIONS

C1. PHYSICAL OBSERVATIONS

- Size of accommodation
- Sizes of rooms and numbers of people in them/using them.
- Numbers of people sharing facilities - bathrooms, kitchens, toilets, laundry
- What activities are carried out in what spaces / How are the spaces used
- What happens throughout the day
- Overall size of building and number of people accommodated in it.
- State of repair of facilities
- Communal activities - schooling, healthcare, social services
- Defensible space - private, semi-private, semi-public, public
- Graffiti
- Ethnic segregation
- State of repair
- Personalisation of space
- Numbers of vehicles, white goods, etc..
- Differences in coping abilities between agrarian and urban communities / families
- Differences in housing and shelter provided between rural and urban areas

APPENDIX D

APPENDIX D: REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP: TOWARDS IMPROVED SHELTER AND ENVIRONMENT FOR REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS WITHIN THE POST-YUGOSLAV COUNTRIES

9-11th October 1995

D1. INTRODUCTION

The aim of this workshop, which was organised by Sue Ellis and Dr Sultan Barakat, was to bring together academics specialising in all aspects of shelter for refugees and displaced persons with practitioners working in the field and manufacturers of shelter systems to discuss current practice of shelter provision in the Post-Yugoslav countries and collectively make recommendations for improvement.

In advance of the workshop, twelve papers were prepared which outlined general experience and areas of achievement and difficulties. Themes from these papers, together with the results of doctorate research being undertaken by Sue Ellis, formed the basis of the discussion:

- Level of shelter provision in a developed, cold climate country
- Participation in the design, organisation and management of shelter
- Integration of refugees and displaced persons into the built and social environments
- Shelter provision that is sensitive to the requirements of age, gender and special needs
- Relief to development continuum
- Return and resettlement programmes

The forty participants came from nine different countries and spent two days in working groups which began by identifying a range of shelter approaches and the contexts which dictated them, the role of refugees and displaced persons in their implementation and their effects on the host community and then, in subsequent

working sessions, the participants identified opportunities and bottlenecks in making emergency shelter approaches more developmental.

D2. SHELTER APPROACHES

Physical approaches to shelter provision were identified from the papers and subsequent discussion in the working groups as being:

Primarily **private accommodation**, with the vast majority of refugees and displaced persons in post-Yugoslav countries accommodated in this manner, i.e., sharing houses with host families or renting rooms or flats. Secondly the **temporary use of existing buildings**, which ranges from the occupation of abandoned housing to the use of public buildings such as schools, hotels, workers barracks and army installations. Thirdly **temporary accommodation** such as camps of prefabricated buildings and tents etc.. Fourthly, **repair and reconstruction** of villages and houses.

During the working groups different support mechanisms for the physical shelter were also identified, such as :

- financial rather than physical support
- partnerships rather than humanitarian aid
- introduction of expertise and training to complement finance and housing units
- investment in and recovery of local industries
- autonomous rebuilding by the refugees and displaced persons themselves

D3. THE EFFECTS OF THE CONTEXT ON PROVISION

The working groups then discussed issues and contexts that would affect what shelter approach was utilised. It was observed that at the outset of the war in the post-Yugoslav countries, agencies and donors found shelter provision difficult as they possessed no institutional memory of acting in a developed, cold climate country. Standards for space requirements, level of sanitation, cooking requirements had to be established quickly. It was also noted that the pre-war situation of the post-Yugoslav countries had provided some unique opportunities for mass emergency shelter provision, such as utilising the hotels along the Adriatic coast.

It was also acknowledged that, as the vast majority of refugees and displaced had been accommodated through elasticity of resources, where camps and settlements had been built from prefabricated units, it was likely to have been directed by agencies and donors needs for projects of high visibility in order to raise further funds and maintain a high public profile.

D4. ROLE OF THE REFUGEES AND DISPLACED

A number of the participants agreed with sentiments that the refugees and displaced persons are a political tool and this has marked effects on the policies that govern aid and provision. It was mentioned that any shelter provided for refugees and displaced must have the appearance of being temporary as host populations and governments do not wish to encourage notions of permanency. It was also acknowledged that 'participatory' and incrementally upgraded programmes of shelter provision in this context are difficult to instigate as they can result in tension with the host community.

It was also proposed that it would be difficult to design, implement and manage a participatory programme due to the self-perceived transient nature of the refugees and displaced persons and the high levels of trauma experienced. However, it was also noted that one effective way of reducing the levels of psychological trauma is to encourage refugees and displaced to regain control over their lives and be autonomous and participate in the control of their environments.

D5. IMPACTS OF SHELTER PROVISION ON THE HOST COMMUNITY

It was asserted that shelter provision for refugees and displaced persons assists in the rebuilding of the local economy. In discussion, it was noted that in the post-Yugoslavian context, the continuance of war makes it currently very difficult to rebuild the economy through shelter provision, (it was shown that in Croatia, less than 10 per cent of the 70,000 prefabricated units were provided through local markets). However, several examples were presented of shelter provision that is attempting to revive and support local construction industries in several regions of Bosnia-Hercegovina.

The level of shelter provided for the refugee and displaced community compared to the conditions of the host community was also discussed. It was acknowledged that when refugees and displaced are receiving free accommodation as well as food, medicines and hygienic items in a country where all are competing for scarce

resources there is a consequently high level of tension between the host community and the incoming population.

D6. RELIEF TO DEVELOPMENT

In the second day of discussion the working groups identified problems with the short term, emergency approach of shelter. An unplanned, emergency response to shelter has prodigious depredatory effects on long term development. It can increase levels of dependency and psycho-social trauma among the refugee and displaced population. It was suggested that emergency assistance should focus on the saving of livelihoods as well as the saving of lives and that therefore, aid should be directed less towards the physical, technical aspects of shelter, and more towards the social, psychological, economic and cultural environments that combine to produce that shelter.

To promote relief that focuses on the saving of livelihoods as well as lives and to address the idea of a relief to development continuum, the working groups tackled ways in which the emergency shelter approaches they had identified could address development and thus promote long term independence and autonomy rather than producing marginalised and dependent communities.

The discussions in the working groups, and subsequent presentations led to the production of a potential basis for a 'code of conduct' for all those providing shelter in a war situation:

- The approach to shelter provision is more important than the physical object provided
- Use local labour, local material and human resources in all levels of provision
- Agencies and donors must work to empower the local authorities, local communities and the refugees and displaced persons
- There must be a restructuring of policy at all levels that facilitates collaboration between international and non-governmental organisations
- Aid agencies should be accountable to both donors and beneficiaries
- Legal issues of ownership, building regulations and planning legislation need to be addressed swiftly in the emergency period in order to facilitate longer term action

- There is a need for all actors to be acutely aware of the debilitating affects of psychological trauma on refugees and displaced persons and ensure that the 'relief' provided does nothing to increase the level of suffering
- Relief actions should build and provide a platform of capability from which development can proceed
- Pre-war development plans should be examined in order to decide the direction of relief and future development
- Actors in relief situations are primarily motivated by self-interest and their actions are determined by their past operations. Care must be taken therefore, to offer assistance appropriate to the identified need and not to a predetermined agenda
- Donors and agencies need to act within open agendas in order to be responsive to real and not perceived needs. They need to be flexible so that they can take the leads from the local population and not impose their own predetermined agendas, thus their actions will support not supplant local efforts
- There is a lack of commitment from the donors which can inhibit programmes that are developmental, for instance the short term nature of funding
- There needs to be increased co-ordination between the relief and development departments within aid agencies and donor governments
- It is easier to raise money for humanitarian aid projects that are comprehensively covered by the media, therefore there is a necessity to educate the media to promote images of refugees and displaced persons as capable survivors and resources not victims and burdens.
- It is hard to find funding for rehabilitation projects or longer term programmes, so relief projects should be designed to positively affect long term development
- Programmes need to be evaluated not purely in terms of efficiency and effectiveness but also in terms of impact, sustainability and relevance
- Enable refugees and displaced persons to utilise their enforced free time to accrue new skills and so maximise their future opportunities for long term solutions

D7. BIBLIOGRAPHY OF SUBMITTED PAPERS

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HANDABAKA, P., (1995) The Politics of, and Programme and Projects for, the Return Home and Reintegration Of Displaced Persons and Refugees

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ZETTER, R., (1995) From Relief to Reconstruction - The Development Continuum in Post Yugoslavia

D8. PARTICIPANTS

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